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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the gendered implications of science and technology in
the era of reforms. It argues that in this era, which began in 1978 and continues today,
science and technology are highly romanticized as nearly omnipotent. This results in its
being embedded not only into ordinary Chinese people’s lives, hoping to bring them
positive changes, but also into the Chinese government’s political practices, hoping to
achieve its political purposes through science and technology. It also points out that in the
era of reforms, Chinese women’s lived experiences are full of tensions, struggles, and
conflicts, as evidenced by the expectations for them to become virtuous wives, caring
mothers, and, at the same time, successful professionals. The veneration of science and
technology in Chinese culture and the Chinese government’s strict control over science
and technology further complicate Chinese women’s experiences.
To illustrate these points, I mainly use the analytical methods “articulation” and
“mapping” from cultural studies to explore the impacts of Chinese myth, Confucianism
and Daoism, Chinese language, Chinese political practices, and media and popular
discourses to explain the status of science and technology and the living situation of
Chinese women in the era of reforms. I analyze the cases of the development and use of
science and technology: to promote marriage and family, for population control and
family design, to promote the discourse of the super mother, and to help women gain
independence and fight against sexual violence. I focus on the gendered implications of
some specific scientific and technological artifacts, including dating websites, in vitro
fertilization (IVF), breast pumps, social media, and many others.
viii

This dissertation contributes to understanding Chinese women and science and
technology in contemporary China. It reveals that although Chinese women’s living
situations have improved significantly, many of them are still trapped and subordinated.
Science and technology, which are always articulated with other elements, especially the
Chinese government’s politics, the traditional patriarchal culture, and many Chinese
women’s demands for gender equality, aggravate many women’s suffering while also
offering some of them extra job opportunities and access to virtual spaces to engage in
social activism.
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Chapter One: Introduction
China is undergoing enormous changes in the twenty-first century. Its economic
performance is impressive: products made in China circulate around the world, and
China’s GDP per capita is skyrocketing. In 2017 China’s merchandise export reached
2,263,371 million USD and the GDP per capita reached 8,525 USD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, 2019). However, despite China’s remarkable
economic performance in recent years, the economic gap between the poor and the rich
has become increasingly pronounced as claimed by Benjamin, Brandt, Giles, and Wang
(2008). The Gini coefficient in China was 0.465 in 2016 (Statista, 2019). 1 In contrast, in
1990, the Gini coefficient was 0.357 and in 2005 it was 0.449 (Wu, 2010, p.93).
Moreover, because China’s economy has relied heavily on industrialization, its
environment is under threat. Roumasset, Burnett, and Wang (2008) write that “One-third
of China’s total land is prone to desertification, including 262 million hectares of pastoral
and oasis land in the Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Gansu, and Qinghai Province”(p.
251). The industrialization not only results in the desertification of land, but also heavy
environmental pollution in China. For example, Hu (2016) reports:
Discharge [into the Yangtze River] has been steadily increasing over the past
decade: already surpassing 30 billion tonnes in 2006 and growing to 33.9 billion
tonnes in 2014, according to the Yangtze River Water Resources Commission.

1The Gini income coefficient that is used to measure income distribution across a population can take any value
between 0-1.The closer the Gini coefficient is to 1, the more unequal a country is.
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Also worth noting is that in 2014, 80.8% of total waste water was discharged into
the mainstream of the Yangtze; the major tributaries; and the Tai, Poyang &
Dongting Lakes—all parts of the Yangtze River’s water system.
In order to deal with water pollution, the Chinese government has formulated a series of
regulatory policies. For instance, China’s revised Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Law has been in effect since January 1, 2018. This law imposes several strict
requirements, such as:
Those who build sewage outlets in protected drinking water source areas will face
a maximum fine of one million yuan. […] The law instructs government to build
sewage treatment and garbage disposal facilities in rural areas, and that standards
be set on fertilizer and pesticide use. (as cited in Meng, 2017)
Facing not only water pollution but also air pollution, which has led the capital city
Beijing to be known as a smog city, the Chinese government issued the Air Pollution
Prevention and Control Action Plan in September 2013. In this plan, which regulates
emissions including those produced by coal burning, industry production, and vehicle
exhaust, the Chinese government has made several promises such as:
By 2017, the urban concentration of PM10 must decrease by 10% compared with
2012, and as a result the annual number of days with fairly good air quality should
gradually increase. 2

2 “PM is particulate matter 10 micrometers or less in diameter, PM
10
2.5 is particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in
diameter. PM2.5 is generally described as fine particles. By way of comparison, a human hair is about 100 micrometers,
so roughly 40 fine particles could be placed on its width” (Australian Government Department of the Environment and
Energy, n.d.).
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Concentrations of PM2.5 in the heavily polluted Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze
River Delta, and Pearl River Delta regions must fall by around 25%, 20%, and
15%, respectively (as cited in Library of Congress, 2019).
On April 22, 2016, China signed the Paris Climate Agreement. In this way, the Chinese
government demonstrates to the world its determination to tackle environmental issues.
Socially, China’s literacy rate has improved. Due to China’s free nine-year
compulsory educational system spanning from primary school to middle school, which
has been implemented since 1986, an increasing number of Chinese people are literate.
Thus, in 1982, 65.505% of Chinese adults (a person aged 15 or above) were literate; in
contrast, in 2010, 95.124% of Chinese adults were literate (The World Bank, n.d.). While
it is positive that illiteracy, which had challenged the Chinese society for thousands of
years, is no longer an issue, new issues have emerged—for example, food safety. In
2008, the Chinese Milk Scandal broke out. It was revealed that several large and famous
Chinese milk companies (e.g. Sanlu/三鹿 and Yili/伊利) used the toxic chemical
melamine, which can crystallize easily and result in kidney stones, in their products
including powdered infant formula. In addition to the issue of food safety, an exploitative
sex industry flourishes in contemporary Chinese society. From the mid-1950s to the early
1980s, the sex industry almost vanished because of the Chinese government’s policy that
shut down brothels and nightclubs, taught sex workers other living skills, and retained
sex workers to work in other industries. While in China the sex industry currently is still
illegal on the surface, it has become an important industry, even one of the leading
industries in some Chinese cities such as Dong Guan (东莞), due in part to the local
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government’s corruption and individuals seizing opportunities to make profit. Osburg
(2016) points out that nowadays Chinese society “has been marked by the rise of
hierarchical, patron-client form of sexuality, especially among elite” (p. 108).
Politically, the Chinese government has an elevated status in the world. Until July
2018, more than 20 countries allowed Chinese citizens to enter without applying for
visas. In contrast, before 2010, there were fewer than 10 visa-free countries for Chinese
passport holders. Moreover, the Chinese government tries to connect with the rest of the
world through exerting its soft power and in the forms of investment, trade, and
exchange. 3 By December 2017, the Chinese government had set up 525 Confucius
institutes and 1,113 Confucius classrooms globally (Confucius Institute Headquarters,
n.d.). These Confucius institutes and classrooms are responsible for teaching foreigners
Chinese language and culture. Moreover, the Chinese government has carried out the Belt
and Road Initiative since 2015. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to build a unified
international market with China at the center. It includes several strategies such as
making investments and creating infrastructure in Asian, European, and African
countries. In general, the relations between China and other countries have been
improved, but regional conflicts remain an issue. For instance, due to the disagreements
concerning the South China Sea and Taiwan, military and political skirmishes persist
between China and some countries.

3 Soft Power: This term is contrary to hard power. Exercising hard power means a country uses its military power such
as gunfire to exert its influence over other countries. In contrast, exercising soft power means a country tries to
persuade other countries to respect it and follow its leadership without military coercion. Usually, a country works to
craft a positive image of itself internationally and propagandize the superiority of its culture.
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These economic, environmental, social, and political changes in China are largely
attributed to the Reform and Opening-Up Policy (Gai Ge Kai Fang Zheng Ce/改革开放
政策/ROUP), which was initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1978 to 1989. 4 Deng Xiaoping announced this
policy in the third plenum of the eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China held from the18th of December 1978 to the 22nd.
In general, ROUP aims to carry out reforms in China and to open China to the rest
of the world. ROUP replaces the Chinese Communist Party’s previous emphases on
egalitarianism and class struggle, instead encouraging competition and entrepreneurship.
Accordingly, money is supposed to be distributed based on the amount and quality of
work done, individuals can start their own business, and farmers can use their farmland to
meet their own needs. ROUP also requires the Chinese government to shift its focus from
class struggle to boosting the economy, developing science and technology, and
cooperating with other countries. China’s Communist Party summarizes the desired
effects of implementing ROUP as: liberate and develop productive forces, enhance
comprehensive national power, emancipate the mind and seek truth for facts, build a
socialist country with Chinese characteristics, and so forth (“Reform and Opening-Up,”
n.d.).
Since 1978, China has entered the era of reforms. From Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership through successive leaders Jiang Zeming, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, ROUP

4In

this dissertation, I use the abbreviation of “ROUP” to refer to China’s Reform and Opening-Up Policy.

5

has remained one of the constitutional policies. The Chinese government consistently
maintains that China’s project of reforming and opening-up is an ongoing one. For
example, on October 24, 2018, China’s current chairman Xi Jinping visited Shenzhen,
which was chosen by China’s central government as a pioneering economic zone in 1980.
After attending an exhibition that celebrated how Shenzhen changed from a fishing
village to an international city in the past decades, Xi (2018) said “China will never stop
the project of reforming and opening-up. This is the promise we make to the world” (para.
1). Thus, the era of reforms began in the year of 1978 and continues to this day. 5
The year 2018 marked the 40th anniversary of the implementation of ROUP. This
occasion offered a time to step back and to think about what had been going on so far.
This work of reflection was crucial because:
Understanding China’s reforms is important first and foremost for getting the
historical record right, and this record is still shifting despite the many volumes
that have already been developed to this topic. Understanding China’s past
reforms and, with them, the basis for China’s success is also important for
China’s future reforms; understanding the path travelled, the circumstances under
which historical decisions were made and what their effects were on the course of
China’s economy will inform decision makers on where to go next. Third,
reflections on China’s reforms are increasingly important for the rest of the world.

5Some

scholars (e.g. Minzner 2015) argue that China is in the post-reform era, a stance with which I do not agree. I
believe that although in recent years, China’s process of reform and opening-up has been slowed in some aspects (e.g.
politics and the opening of the domestic market to foreign investors) compared with the past decades, China still is on
track with making domestic changes and building connections with the rest of the world. Moreover, in China, the
predominant discourse that is both forwarded by the government and believed by most Chinese people is that China is
still in the era of reforms.
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Because of China’s economic success, more and more countries see China as an
example to emulate, a model of development that could help them move from
rags to riches within a generation. (Hofman, 2018, p. 53)
There are a number of options for researchers if they want to understand what has
been going on in the era of reforms. For instance, researchers can study the economic or
environmental situation in China. In fact, these two aspects are the two most researched
topics by scholars interested in the era of reforms (see the works of Chow 2004; Heston
& Sicular 2008; Pekins 2018; Roumasset et al., 2008; Pan 2018). However, this
dissertation aims to study the implications of science and technology in the era of
reforms. 6 In fact, in this period, the Chinese government has initiated a number of
scientific and technological projects and spent billions of dollars on developing science
and technology, which have significantly contributed to China’s impressive scientific and
technological achievements and the perceived high status of science and technology in
China in the era of reforms. For example, in March 1986, the Chinese government
announced the National High-Tech Research and Development (R&D) Program that is
also known as the 863 Program. This program aimed to support research projects in
various scientific and technological fields (e.g. biology, information and electronic
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Here, I want to clarify my uses of three terms “science,” “technology,” and “science and technology.” In the
Chinese language, the three corresponding terms are Kexue/科学 (science), Jishu /技术 (technology), and Keji/科技
(science and technology). Semantically, Kexue refers to knowledge that helps people to understand the
natural/material/physical world theoretically (for example, the fields of mathematics, physics, and chemistry are
regarded as fields of Kexue), Jishu refers to skills or expertise that can be applied to solve practical problems (for
example, the fields of engineering are regarded as fields of Jishu), and Keji refers to both theoretical knowledge and
practical skills. However, it is a common practice in China that people use the term of Keji even though they actually
merely refer to Kexue or Jishu. Accordingly, in this dissertation, I follow the Chinese tradition of using the term
“science and technology” to align with the existing scholarship in China even though in some situations using a single
term of “science” or “technology” would probably be more appropriate.
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engineering, and automation). From 1986 to 2005, the 863 Program cost the Chinese
government 33 billion Yuan (approximately 4.8 billion USD), and more than 150,000
million scientists and engineers participated in the 863 Program (“863 Program,” n.d.).
Accordingly, in the era of reforms, Chinese people have made some extraordinary
scientific and technological achievements. For instance, on August 16, 2016, China
launched Micius, which is the world's first quantum communication satellite. On July 29,
2017, China successfully produced gas from flammable ice for the first time. The
perceived high status of science and technology in contemporary China is indicated in the
popular saying, “A nation will prosper only when its science and technology thrive; a
country will be full of hope and have a promising future only when its science and
technology are advanced (Ke Ji Xing Ze Min Zu Xing, Ke Ji Qiang Ze Guo Jia Qiang/科
技兴则民族兴，科技强则国家强).”
The magnitude of the scientific and technological changes and their prestige in the
era of reforms imply an interesting area of inquiry. However, “the implications of science
and technology in the era of reforms” is still a broad research question. It is impossible
for me to address the entirety of science and technology in a dissertation. So, I add
another parameter to bring my topic into focus: to explore the implications of science and
technology for gender relations, in particular for Chinese women in the era of reforms. 7

7Here,

I want to clarify my use of the terms of “woman”/“women” and “female”/”females.” When I use the term
“woman” or “women,” I refer to the word of Funü(妇女) in Chinese language. In China, Funü refers to adult females.
Accordingly, in this dissertation, “woman”/ “women” refers to adult females, while “female”/”females” is used without
reference to age.
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This decision is made based on the following reasons. First, the population of
Chinese women is substantial. In 2017, there were 678,710,000 females (National Bureau
of Statistics of China, 2018). This number was greater than the total population of the
U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand combined. Thus, as a Chinese female
researcher, it is both my interest and my responsibility to know what this large population
of people are experiencing, to understand their happiness and sorrow, to share their
stories with both Chinese and non-Chinese audiences, and to figure out ways to improve
their living situations. Second, the discussion concerning Chinese women’s lived
experiences in the era of reforms is heated and includes many contradictory arguments.
Some people argue that Chinese women have satisfactory livelihoods in the era of
reforms. For example, on November 12, 2018, China’s Women’s News released an article
in which a set of statistics and diagrams was used to prove that Chinese women’s living
situations have been bettered. 8 This article pointed out that in 2017, 52.5% of Chinese
students who had received higher education were women; 48.6% of professionals in
China were women; and 91.7% of Chinese women had access to free pre-pregnancy
physical examinations (“Report of The Outcome,” 2018). However, some scholars argue
that Chinese women’s living situations are not satisfactory in the era of reforms. For
example, Lin (2001) writes:
Reforms are failing women (along with workers and farmers), as evidenced by
high unemployment, poor labour conditions, lack of protection for rural migrants,

Women’s News/中国妇女报, a newspaper sponsored by the All-China Women’s Federation, is the only
governmental national newspaper in China that focuses on Chinese women.
8China’s
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the commercialisation (and traditionalisation according to artificial ‘Oriental
taste’) of femininity, and ultimately the erasure of the problem of gender equality.
(p. 1284)
I want to engage in this discussion, to unpack contradictions, and to contribute my point
of view through focusing on the gendered influences of science and technology. In fact,
as I argue in Chapter Two, in the era of reforms, new practices of science and technology
have become indispensable in Chinese people’s lives. Thus, if we want to understand
Chinese women’s living situations in the era of reforms, we need to take the elements of
science and technology into consideration.
I want to make one further specification: in this dissertation I explore the
implications of science and technology for Chinese women as wives, mothers, and
professionals in the era of reforms. This research question is built based on my argument
in Chapter Three, in which I argue that in the era of reforms, being wives and mothers
remains crucial for Chinese women, meanwhile an increasing number of them are
encouraged to join the workplace. Further, Chapter Four points out that the literature that
maps the implications of science and technology for Chinese women’s marriages,
families, and careers in the era of reforms is scant and lacks complexity. Thus, my
dissertation addresses this gap in the research. To sum up, in this dissertation, I answer
the question of how science and technology influence Chinese women, especially their
marriages, families, and careers in the era of reforms.
In order to answer my research question, I draw from the field of cultural studies.
Cultural studies builds on and out of what is sometimes referred to as British cultural
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studies. In addition to the impact of Stuart Hall, the field of cultural studies has been
developed by scholars from various disciplines, such as Marxist scholars (e.g. Antonio
Gramsci), scholars in communication and media (e.g. Lawrence Grossberg), and scholars
in gender studies and critical race theory (e.g. Angela McRobbie). Due to these various
influences, cultural studies is “an interdisplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes
counter-disciplinary field” (Nelson &Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 4).
To risk the danger of over-simplification, the intellectual heritage of cultural
studies can be characterized as having the following four aspects. First, cultural studies
entails a particular view of what constitutes a culture and how to study it. Hoggart (1969)
defines culture as “the whole way of life of a society, its beliefs, attitudes and temper as
expressed in all kinds of structures, rituals and gestures, as well as in the traditionallydefined form of art” (p. 3). Williams (1958) points out that “culture is ordinary” (p. 91).
These statements make the abstract concept of “culture” accessible: culture is something
everyone lives. It is politics, rituals, religious faiths, ideologies, people’s routine
practices, affect, and so forth. Furthermore, because culture is ordinary, it can be
perceived not only from elite artifacts (e.g. literature and highbrow art) but also from
more “ordinary” artifacts (e.g. magazine articles and popular music). Thus, it is important
for researchers to pay attention to the everyday “ordinary” artifacts. Accordingly, in this
dissertation, concerning materials of analysis, I study different kinds of artifacts, which
include but are not limited to government documents, popular sayings, news reports,
folklore, magazine articles, TV series, songs, films, commercials, photos, paintings,
stamps, and anonymous posts in open-access internet forums and discussion boards.
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Second, cultural studies emphasizes the analysis of struggles of power for the
purpose of understanding how change happens. When Grossberg (2010) defines the
project of cultural studies, he writes:
Cultural studies is concerned with describing and intervening in the ways cultural
practices are produced within, inserted into, and operate in the everyday life of
human beings and social formations, so as to reproduce, struggle against, and
perhaps transform the existing structures of power. (p. 8)
In fact, one of the crucial purposes of conducting research in cultural studies is to
investigate how culture operates to disempower and empower people. Because cultural
studies is deeply concerned for marginalized and oppressed people, a primary task of
researchers in this field is to discuss how power shapes the current landscape of the
culture that privileges certain people, ideas, and practices at the expense of others. Then,
researchers are expected to figure out ways to intervene into relations of power to change
societies for better. In short, cultural studies is “politically driven, that is committed to
producing knowledge that help people understand that the world is changeable and that
offer some direction for how to change it” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 264).
Third, cultural studies is informed by a feminist orientation. For example, Angela
McRobbie expressed her strong dissatisfaction with the absence of gender in analysis in
early cultural studies. In 1980, she wrote “[in current works in cultural studies,] women
and the whole question of sexual division have been marginalized” (p. 111). In 1992,
Hall wrote that the feminist orientation is important for cultural studies and listed five
significant contributions it has made:
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First, the opening of the question of the personal as political, and its consequences
for changing the object of study in cultural studies, was completely revolutionary
in a theoretical and practical way. Second, the radical expansion of the notion of
power, which had hitherto been very much developed within the framework of the
notion of the public, the public domain, with the effect that we could not use the
term power-so key to the earlier problematic of hegemony-in the same way.
Third, the centrality of gender and sexuality to the understanding of power itself.
Fourth, the opening of many of the questions that we thought we had abolished
around the dangerous area of the subjectivity and the subject, which lodged those
questions at the centre of cultural studies as a theoretical practice. Fifth, ‘the reopening’ of the closed frontier between social theory and the theory of consciouspsychoanalysis. (p. 269)
Feminism profoundly informs my criticism. As a feminist researcher, I commit to making
Chinese women’s living situation visible, which I believe is an important first step to
fight against sexism. Moreover, I embrace and value my situatedness as a Chinese
woman. Haraway, a scholar in gender studies and cultural studies, puts forward the
concept of “situated knowledge,” which argues that although there are some “core”
qualities, objectivity is mediated and our situatedness matters for understanding the world.
By drawing from my situatedness, I not only resonate with many other Chinese women’s
experiences in the era of reforms but also engage in the work of self-reflection, which is
promoted by cultural studies. Additionally, in this dissertation, I carefully consider ways
to improve Chinese women’s living situations. As a field whose commitment is to
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achieve social justice, feminism is not about privileging women at the cost of oppressing
men; instead it is about changing our current societies into more fair and just places
where everyone is able to have more access to self-fulfillment. Thus, one of my
intentions in writing this dissertation is to reveal ways that Chinese women have
empowered themselves and think about their future directions.
Fourth, cultural studies provides researchers analytical methods to study a culture.
Cultural studies requires researchers to ask the question “What’s going on?” (Grossberg,
2010). Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, cultural studies promotes the method of
mapping. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explain mapping by contrasting it with the method
of tracing. They write:
What distinguished the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward
an experimentation in contact with the real. The map…fosters connection
between fields…The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn,
reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or
social formation …A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing,
which always comes back “to the same.” (p. 12)
Thus, in cultural studies, good researchers are good “mappers” who work hard to record
different elements, to figure out relations among elements, and to detect how relations are
changing. They draw the connections that constitute the map and do the work of
articulation.
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Articulation “is perhaps one of the most generative concepts in contemporary
cultural studies” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). Although the word “articulation” can refer to the
act of enunciation, in cultural studies, it is used to describe the process of linking
(articulating), delinking (disarticulating), and relinking (rearticulating) different elements.
The concept of “articulation” can be traced back to Stuart Hall’s use of Gramsci’s
work to resolve the confrontation between the culturalist paradigm and the structuralist
paradigm of cultural studies. At the risk of over-simplification, the culturalist paradigm
claims that culture is interwoven in all social practices such as common forms of human
activity, and there is a “harmonious and well-structured social totality in which
everything fits together” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 214). In contrast, the structuralist paradigm
argues that people are bearers of structures, and unity “is constructed through the
differences between, rather than the homology of, practices” (Hall, 1980, p. 68). Hall
(1983) draws from both paradigms and provides “Marxism without guarantees”—a
theory that argues ideological categories not only are generated based on “their own laws
of development” but also are “generated out of given materials” (p. 45). Due to this
relative openness, scholars should understand “‘determinacy’ in terms of setting of limits,
the establishment of parameters, the defining of the space of operations, the concrete
conditions of existence, [and] the ‘givenness’ of social practices” (Hall, 1983, p. 45).
I use the concept of “articulation” as an analytical method to explore “the process
by which otherwise unrelated phenomena—practices, beliefs, texts, social groups, etc.—
come to be linked together in a meaningful and seemingly natural way” (Rodman, 1996,
p.24). Thus, to understand an issue, I analyze its articulation in relation to a range of
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different elements. Rodman’s analysis of the posthumous “life” of Elvis Presley is a good
example of using “articulation” as an analytical method. In order to understand Elvis’s
posthumous ubiquity, Rodman discusses how race, sexuality, class, and the American
dream are articulated to constitute the power and significance of a posthumous Elvis.
Moreover, the concept of “articulation” claims that because connections are
contingent, “not only does the cause have effects, but the effects themselves affect the
cause, and both are themselves determined by a host of other relations” (Grossberg, 1992,
p. 56). This point is important in terms of resisting simple determinist thinking. Since
there is no determinant cause and effect, cultural theorists need to understand cultural
phenomena relationally and to notice the dynamics and struggles that are crucial in the
process of political and cultural changes.
The concept of “articulation” argues that connections are “not necessary,
determined, absolute and essential for all time,” but this doesn’t imply that there is no
“unity or stability” (Hall, 1986, p. 141). In fact, because “some connections are more
difficult to disarticulate/rearticulate than others,” articulations vary in their tenacity
(Slack, 1993, p. 27). The phrase “lines of tendential force” refers to articulations that are
more resistant to change. For example, many women are discriminated against in the
workplace. The connection between gender and the lack of trust for women’s credibility
is a line of tendential force. Although this connection is not necessary, it is a common
practice that women’s salary is less than men’s and it is harder for women to get
promoted even when the quality of their work is on par with men’s. This means that
gender-based discrimination in the workplace is relatively “stable.” However, despite its
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“stable” status at this point, articulation is an ongoing process of change without a
definite termination. This means maybe one day, women can be treated fairly given that
political systems, people’s minds, and sexist cultures are open to change.
Last but not the least, the concept of “articulation” provides a productive way for
researchers to conceptualize history. The concept implies that in order to understand the
present moment, we must understand its history. Because, as Williams (2011) puts it:
In the analysis of contemporary culture, the existing state of [the] selective
tradition is of vital importance, for it is often true that some changes in this
tradition—establishing new lines with the past, breaking or redrawing existing
lines—is a radical kind of contemporary change. (p. 74)
Thus, it is through history that we can better understand the present. It is through the
present that we can better predict the future trajectory of development. When we look at
history, we look for “what’s old;” when we look at the present, we look for “what’s new”
and for “what has been rearticulated;” and when we look for trajectories of change, we
consider the question of what can be disarticulated and what is possible to be articulated
and re-articulated.
My analytical materials include various cultural artifacts while the methods of
“mapping” and “articulation” are my two primary research methods, and feminism is my
critical perspective. Through focusing on the element “gender” and mapping what
Chinese women are experiencing in the era of reforms, I answer the question of “What’s
going on?” Through using the method of “articulation,” I look for “what’s old,” “what’s
new,” and “what’s rearticulated” in order to understand struggles of power that influence
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genders asymmetrically. Then I put forward ways of articulating, disarticulating, and
rearticulating these relationships for the purpose of contributing to the project of
“end[ing] sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” (hooks, 2015, p. xii).
This dissertation includes five chapters. Chapter One, “Introduction,” provides an
overview of what’s going on in the era of reforms. I argued that the changes in era of
reforms pose an interesting area to explore with regard to the gendered implications of
science and technology in contemporary China. To explore this area, I outlined a
theoretical orientation to cultural studies that guides me to choose analytical materials to
study a culture, that emphasizes a feminist perspective, and that provides the research
methods of “articulation” and “mapping.”
Chapter Two, “Science and Technology in the Era of Reforms” argues that in
order to understand science and technology in the era of reforms, we must consider the
articulation of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the intellectual heritage of the
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of
numeracy, the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the
country’s inadequate capacity for production with a particular focus on food supply, and
the policies of China’s Communist Party. This chapter concludes that in the era of
reforms, science and technology are romanticized as solutions to all social, economic,
and political problems, which results in many Chinese people’s fascinations with science
and technology, the inhumane costs of developing them, and their embeddedness into
Chinese political practices.
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Chapter Three, “Chinese Women in the Era of Reforms,” focuses on women’s
roles in contemporary China. It argues that in the era of reforms, Chinese women are still
expected to become wives and mothers. I explore the articulation of four lines of
tendential force: Chinese myth, Chinese language, Confucianism and Daoism, and the
Chinese government’s political practices, which significantly contribute to this
expectation. However, at the same time, due to the forces of the discourse of the New
Woman that promotes the image of an independent and knowledgeable woman and the
Chinese government’s political practices of encouraging and preparing women to join the
workplace that have begun to exert increasingly important impacts, many Chinese
women have become professionals. Tensions have formed between women’s traditional
roles as wives and mothers and their contemporary roles as professionals, resulting in
significant changes to their lived experiences. For example, women are expected to
become super mothers: confident and knowledgeable mothers who have highly
successful careers and at the same time can take good care of their children.
Chapter Four, “Put It All Together: The Impacts of Science and Technology for
Women’s Prescribed Roles the Era of Reforms” is developed based on my Chapter One,
Two, and Three. This chapter begins with my analysis that reveals the insufficiency of
literature that addresses the implications of science and technology for Chinese women.
Then, this chapter points out Chinese women’s lived experiences, which are already
characterized by tensions, are complicated by the perceived nearly omnipotent power of,
the prevalent applications of, and the embeddedness in the Chinese government’s
political practices of science and technology. I used four examples to demonstrate this
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claim: the development and use of science and technology to promote marriage and
family, the development and use of science and technology for population control and
family design, the development and use of science and technology to promote the
discourse of the super mother, and the development and use of science and technology
for women to gain independence and to resist sexist violence.
Chapter Five, “Conclusion,” summarizes the implications of science and
technology for Chinese women in the era of reforms. This chapter narrates cultural stories
of science and technology and Chinese women in the era of reforms. This chapter also
lays out the theoretical significances of this dissertation to the fields of cultural studies
and women’s studies, as well as its practical significances for understanding
contemporary China and fortifying the fight against sexism. At the end of this chapter, I
address the limitation of my dissertation and explain my future directions for expanding
this dissertation and developing other research projects.
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Chapter Two: Science and Technology in the Era of
Reforms

To understand the implications of science and technology for women, especially
their marriages and families in the era of reforms, this chapter lays the groundwork for
understanding the significance of science and technology in China. It considers the
articulation of the key elements of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of
numeracy, the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the
country’s inadequate capacity for production with a particular focus on food supply and
housing, and China’s Communist Party’s policies. Through discussing these mythical,
historical, philosophical, religious, cultural, humanitarian, and political forces, this
chapter reveals that in the era of reforms, many Chinese people believe that science and
technology are powerful, even nearly omnipotent, and can enable positive societal and
cultural changes. Thus, science and technology are highly valued and even venerated.
Due to the perceived high status of science and technology in the era of reforms, they are
developed even at the cost of sacrificing human interests and have become indispensable
to the Chinese government’s political practices.
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Myth
Myth has exerted profound impacts on Chinese culture. Thus, in order to
understand science and technology in the era of reforms, it is crucial to explore the role of
Chinese myth, which has a long tradition of valuing science and technology.
Most Chinese mythical figures have specialized scientific and technical skills. Nü
Wa (女娲), Fu Xi (伏羲), Shen Nong (神农), and Sui Ren Shi(燧人氏) are four figures
who are believed to have significantly contributed to Chinese civilization and people’s
lives with their skills. 9
The goddess Nü Wa, who has a female upper body and a snake tail, is respected
as the mother of human beings, as described in the story “Nü Wa Created Man.” After the
birth of the world, there were no humans. Nü Wa wanted life and beauty in the world, so
she made people from clay. Another story “Nü Wa Patched the Sky” describes how she
fixed a big hole in the sky that led to the death of people by extraterrestrial fire and
meteorites. She accomplished this by melting rocks of five colors into magma to patch
the hole, and by catching a giant tortoise and using its four legs as pillars to hold up the
sky. These two stories reflect the three most important technical skills Nü Wa has: to
produce human beings, to master the technology of melting, and to be a good architect. In
Chinese myth, Nü Wa is the most significant creator—and engineer— who used her
scientific and technical power to create, save, and help humans.

To know more about Chinese mythical stories, please consider reading these books: 1) Birrell, A.(1993). Chinese
Mythology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 2) Christie, A.(1968). Chinese Mythology. Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing. 3)
Werner, E.T.C. (1922). Myths and Legends of China. New York: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 4) Yang, L.; An, D.;
&Turner, J., A. (2005). Handbook of Chinese Mythology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
9
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The god Fu Xi is the forefather of Chinese civilization in Chinese myth due to his
several great achievements. Fu Xi invented bagua/八卦—an influential epistemology.
Below is a photo of a bagua:

Figure 2. 1Bagua In A Coin. This photo was taken by the author.
Bagua includes eight characters. The character “乾” refers to sky, “坤” refers to
ground, “巽” refers to wind, “震” refers to thunder, “坎” refers to water that cannot
be controlled such as floods and rainstorms, “离/離” refers to fire, “艮” refers to
mountain, and “兑” refers to the water that can be used and controlled by human
beings. Bagua includes two images. “- -” refers to yin/阴, which can be roughly
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understood as femininity and “一” refers to yang/阳, which can be understood as
masculinity. Fu Xi argued that these two images and six characters can be combined in
many ways and the combinations can represent and interpret everything in the world. Fu
Xi also invented the practices of hunting and fishing, thereby giving people more regular
access to protein. Moreover, he created the Cangjie system of writing Chinese characters,
thereby the culture shifted from primarily oral to written communication. In this way,
people could learn knowledge in a more systematic way and pass down information over
generations.
The god Shen Nong is the father of medicine and agriculture. The famous story
“Shen Nong threshes the hundred grasses” tells how he tasted hundreds of grasses in
order to explore their different characteristics, such as taste, toxicity, and medicinal
properties. He shared this knowledge and instructed people in the use of plant-based
medicine, thereby greatly extending the lives of Chinese people. Shen Nong’s knowledge
became the basis of Chinese medicine. He is also credited with the invention of
agricultural tools such as the plow and the hoe and with teaching the practice of
agriculture.
The god Sui Ren Shi is the father of fire. In Chinese myth, he was described as a
man who was different from his peers. While others were afraid of fire, he was willing to
be around it. He found out that fire brings warmth, which benefits wellbeing and can be
used to cook food, which makes food more digestible and delicious. Hence, he advocated
for using fire tactically. Sui Ren Shi also created the practice of sparking fire by friction,
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which he taught to other people. Because of Sui Ren Shi’s contribution, he is well
respected and his hometown is recognized as the birthplace of fire culture in China.
In Chinese myth, many goddesses and gods were originally ordinary people.
However, due to their scientific and technical contributions, they were deified, such as Da
Yu (大禹) who had the skills of hydraulic engineering, You Chao Shi (有巢氏) who
specialized at building houses, and Lu Ban (鲁班) who was elevated as the father of
carpenters in China. Chinese people built temples to memorialize and mythologize these
figures. This demonstrates ancient Chinese people’s veneration of science and technology
and their deep respect for scientists and engineers. Further, in Chinese myth, the
development of Chinese civilization is aligned with the development of science and
technology. For example, Fu Xi supports the system of Chinese written language, Shen
Nong promotes the development of Chinese medicine, and Sui Ren Shi elevates Chinese
people’s mastery and use of tools. Chinese myth reflects the close relation between the
development of civilization and the development of science and technology. As these
mythical stories reveal, in Chinese culture there is a deeply rooted belief that science and
technology can bring people power, benefits, conveniences, and happiness.

Confucianism and Daoism
Besides myth, to understand science and technology in Chinese culture, it is
necessary to consider the impacts of Confucianism and Daoism. These two important
Chinese ideological and religious forces have contributed to the high status of science
and technology in the era of reforms in significant ways.
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Confucianism emerged in the Warring States Period between the years of 475 and
221 BC. 10 11Confucius (551-479 BC) and his disciples were the forefathers of this school
of thought. Before the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), Confucianism as well as other
schools of thought, such as legalism and Mohism, thrived and developed because
different emperors had different preferences. For example, Qin Shi Huang (259 BC—
210BC), the first emperor of a unified China, prioritized legalism and applied it to govern
the country.
In the early Han Dynasty, because of the scholar Zhongshu Dong’s
recommendation, Emperor Wu of Han (156 BC-87 BC) rejected the other schools of
thought in favor of adopting Confucianism exclusively. This historical event is known as
“Ba Chu Bai Jia Du Zun Ru Shu/罢黜百家独尊儒术.” This policy enabled Emperor Wu
of Han to constrain people’s beliefs and maintain his governance. After Emperor Wu of
Han, this policy passed down from emperor to emperor. While a few emperors were not
of Han ethnicity (e.g. Genghis Khan) resulting in occasional challenges to the superior
status of Confucianism, for the most part, emperors regarded Confucianism as the
governing socio-cultural-political theory. In fact, Confucianism was regarded as the
epitome of the intelligence of Han ethnicity, which is the ethnicity that the majority of
10I want to clarify my use of the English term “Confucianism.” Some scholars (e.g. Chen 1999, and Fen & Chen 2015)
argue that Confucianism is or is becoming a religion. In fact, from ancient to modern times, Chinese people adhering to
Confucianism perform some ritual practices such as bowing in Confucius temples to pray for strong academic
performance. However, the Chinese government doesn’t include Confucianism when they work on the statistics on
religions in China. Thus, although Confucianism has a strong religious dimension, it is not officially recognized as a
religion in contemporary China. Accordingly, I view Confucianism as an intellectual and cultural tradition that was
developed by Confucius scholars such as Confucius, Mencius, and Zhu Xi.
11 To know more about Confucianism, please consider reading the following books: 1) Gardner, D. K. (2014).
Confucianism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. 2) Lee, M. (2017). Confucianism: Its
Roots and Global Significance. D. Jones (ed.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 3) Rainey, L., D. (2010).
Confucius & Confucianism: The Essential. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. 3)
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Chinese people identify with and that has been at the center of power in China throughout
most of history. In general, from the Emperor Wu of Han through the Qing Dynasty
(1644-1912), Confucianism was the dominant ideology in Chinese society.
From the late Qing Dynasty to the early 1980s, the influence of Confucianism
declined. In the early 1900s, Confucianism was seen “as the cause of all the failures of
society and government….Confucianism was to blame for almost everything” (Rainey,
2010, p. 179). During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Confucianism was viewed as
the “four olds” (old culture, old thinking, old habits, and old customs), which should be
destroyed. However, Confucianism was never completely obliterated, and since the late
1980s, it has experienced a resurgence in mainland China. Some scholars have advocated
for preserving and reviving Confucianism, because they believe that “only by returning to
a Confucian foundation can Chinese societies maintain a solid culture. ‘Confucian
values’ are basic to [the] culture, attitude, and behavior of these societies” (Rainey, 2010,
p.183).

12

Even the Chinese government advocates reviving Confucianism. Yeung and

Fung (2011) point out that the Chinese government’s intention to develop soft power is
profoundly shaped by Confucianism, which emphasizes the need for attracting people to
adopt beliefs that the government promotes and provides persuasive strategies for
fulfilling that need (pp. 109-134). Accordingly, since 2004, the Chinese government has
begun to set up Confucius Institutes and classrooms internationally for the purposes of
improving China’s global image and soliciting foreign followers for the CCP.

12Chinese societies not only refers here to the society in mainland China, but also to the societies in which Chinese
people constitute the majority group, such as the Singaporean society and the Hong Kong society.
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Confucianism emphasizes moral development, which primarily promotes the
ideas of being virtuous, and subordinating oneself to the ruling class, and obeying
authority. These two ideas can be detrimental to the development of science and
technology, since in essence they do not cultivate the spirit of being critical and
innovative. Confucianism also emphasizes education, arguing that “books offer the path
to be rich and to attract beautiful women/Shu Zhong Zi You Yan Ru Yu, Shu Zhong Zi
You Huang Jin Wu/书中自有颜如玉，书中自有黄金屋.” However, Confucianism
focuses on education in the humanities solely, which resulted in the paucity of STEM
education in ancient China.
First, Confucianism promotes cultivating morality and constructing moral systems
in society. Confucian scholars argue that a person should develop the five constant
virtues: ren /仁 (benevolence), yi/义 (righteousness), li/礼 (propriety), zhi /智 (wisdom),
and xin/信 (sincerity). Upon careful observation of these five characteristics, it is clear
that ren, yi, li, and xin are primarily ethical and moral characteristics, which are not
typically associated with innovation. Only zhi has connotations related to learning and
exploring science and technology as a way to cultivate one’s intellect. However,
originally, Confucius only emphasized three characteristics: ren, yi, and li. It was
Mencius who later added the characteristics of “zhi.” As Confucianism was developed
further, the five virtues were extended into fifteen: ren/仁 (benevolence), yi/义
(righteousness), li/礼 (propriety), zhi/智 (wisdom), xin/信 (sincerity), wen/温
(gentleness) , liang/良 (modesty), gong/恭 (courtesy), jian/俭(temperance), rang/让
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(complaisance), zhong/忠 (loyalty), xiao/孝 (filiality), lian/廉(self-discipline), chi/耻
(conscientiousness), and yong/勇 (bravery). Thus, according to Confucianism, people
with high moral standards are respected above those with high intelligence. Consequently,
a person’s primary task is to nourish his or her soul. In fact, for Mencius,“ human[s] who
are different from animals in a few [aspects]…The [biggest] difference between [a]
human and [an] animal is ‘four-mind of human nature’, that is, to sympathize, to feel
shame and abhor, out of modesty and courtesy, and to tell from right and wrong, with the
‘kindheartedness view’ as the core concept”(Wang, 2017). Based on Mencius’s
viewpoint, the way for people to become better is to cultivate virtues; and the more
virtuous people are in a society, the better society will be. This viewpoint, which
positions morality as the core distinction between humans and non-human animals,
differs significantly from a predominant Western viewpoint, which maintains that either
language or the ability to use tools marks the difference. This Western viewpoint
emphasizes the importance of scientific knowledge and technological skills
deemphasized by Confucianism. In fact as has been argued by Gale (2005),
Confucianism is principally a moral philosophy and places the moral life above
all other aspects of human activities. For Confucians the ultimate value of human
activities depends solely on their contribution or lack of a contribution to the good
moral life of humanity (ren). In other words, apart from its contribution to the
good moral life, an activity does not possess any value. This moral view has been
subjected to narrow interpretations and at times has devalued science and
technology. (section: Applications to Science, Technology, and Ethics )
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In this configuration of beliefs, there was no intrinsic motivation for people to become
scientists or engineers in ancient China, since a person’s virtuous reputation rather than
skills—including scientific and technical skills— enables the person to be accepted and
respected in the society. In fact, in ancient China, the social status of artisans was low,
only slightly above that of thieves and prostitutes.
Confucianism strongly supports the division of classes and highlights the idea of
people’s subordination to the ruling class and obedience to the authority. Confucianism
argues that a polite, ethical, and harmonious society is also a hierarchical one. It
acknowledges and promotes the hierarchical order of heaven (Tian/天), earth (Di/地),
emperor (Jun/君), parents (Qin/亲), and teachers (Shi/师). This means that a person
should show his or her ultimate respect first to heaven, second to the earth, third to the
emperor, fourth to parents, and fifth to teachers. Because of the abstractness of heaven
and earth, the practices of respecting the other three were applied most prevalently. For
example, in ancient China, a well-accepted practice was that if the emperor wanted a
person to die, the person should commit suicide, which is directly captured by the
Chinese phrase, “Jun Yao Chen Si, Chen Bu De Bu Si/君要臣死，臣不得不死.” In
general, it was a citizen’s responsibility to cater to his or her emperor, through abiding by
the emperor’s wishes. Besides being subservient to the emperor, Confucianism also
promotes the hierarchical relationship between children and parents, which I will explain
in detail in Chapter Three. Moreover, the emperor is more important than parents. Thus,
when a conflict arises between serving the emperor and taking care of parents, a virtuous
person should put the interests of the emperor first, as indicated by the sequence of the
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fifteen virtues in which loyalty precedes filiality. The relationship between students and
teachers was rigidly hierarchical such that it was intolerable if a student disrespected his
teachers in any way, for example, by questioning teachers, defying teachers’ instructions,
dressing inappropriately, and behaving poorly in front of teachers. Thereby, it was
unacceptable for students to question their teachers’ ideas and challenge their teachers’
authority since they were expected to accept their teachers’ instruction uncritically.
Consequently, in ancient China, since emperors emphasized cultivating their
citizens’ morality instead of developing science and technology, most ancient Chinese
people were educated to follow emperors’ instructions to work hard to satisfy emperors,
and they did not emphasize STEM learning or crafting scientific and technical skills.
Moreover, the relationship between students and teachers in ancient China deprived many
people of opportunities to develop the spirit of critical thinking, bold conjecture, and an
inclination to challenge existing theory, which are crucial for doing research in science
and technology.
Moreover, although Confucianism emphasizes education, it merely emphasizes
education in humanities. Confucianism argues that people should “pursue…high ideals
[such as human relations, and human nature] …[and] should not concern oneself with
mere tools—concrete, practical, technical problems, and knowledge” (Kim, 2010, p.
210) . In other words, compared with scientific and technological knowledge, people
should focus on scholarship in the humanities such as philosophy and literature.
In ancient China, education primarily was based on the nine Confucian books that
were known as four books and five classics: Great Learning (Da Xue/大学), Doctrine of
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The Mean (Zhong Yong/中庸), The Analects of Confucianism (Lun Yu/论语), Mencius
(Meng Zi/孟子), The Classic of Poetry (Shi Jing/诗经), The Book of Document (Shang
Shu/尚书), The Book of Rites (Li Ji/礼记), The Book of Changes (Yi Jing/易经), and The
Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu/春秋). Great Learning instructs people on how to
improve themselves ethically and thus make society a better place. It is regarded as a selfhelp book through which people learn why and how to become a person of high morals.
Doctrine of The Mean explains and promotes morality, arguing that it is the raw
substance of the Dao. The Analects of Confucianism records conversations between
Confucius and his students that best represent Confucius’s thoughts on humanities such
as social relations, while Mencius is a collection of anecdotes and conversations centered
on Mencius concerning moral philosophy. Classic of Poetry is a collection of 305 poems
that were composed between 11BC to 6 BC that offers insight into the birth and
development of literature in Chinese civilization. The Book of Document is a collection of
rhetorical prose. It includes many speeches made by major figures in the eras from Yu the
Great, to the Xia Dynasty, Shang Dynasty, and Zhou Dynasty. Book of Rites is a
collection of texts concerning the social forms, administration, ceremonies, rites,
etiquettes, and so forth. Due to the Confucian emphasis on Li, which can be understood
as good and polite rules of conduct, Book of Rite, whose Chinese name is Li Ji, is a very
important book. Book of Rites argues that we should believe in the absolute positive
power of “Li” for people and a society and to this end aims to promote a restoration of
traditional rites and practices that had been lost throughout history. Book of Changes, also
known as The I Ching, is a book of philosophy. This book introduces hexagram (gua),
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which can be understood as an essential unit of change. This book argues that through
studying the 64 different hexagrams, people can understand the process of change and
predict the future. The Spring and Autumn Annals is a book of history. It focuses on the
time period from the year from 722 to 481 BC and offers a chronicle of the State of Lu,
the state in which Confucius and most of his students were born. It records many events
that occurred in the State of Lu during each year such as marriages, deaths, and wars.
These nine books were the primary sources from which ancient Chinese people
obtained their knowledge. However, none of these nine books are particularly related to
science and technology. 13 Furthermore, exams in ancient China were composed primarily
based on the nine Confucian books. These exams typically included several types of
questions such as asking students to interpret sentences and paragraphs from the nine
books, to provide solutions for political problems using Confucian ideas, and to craft
arguments by quoting and paraphrasing sentences from the nine books. To pass exams
was significant for ancient Chinese students because it was only through passing exams
and becoming a Jun Ren that one would be respected, recognized as a scholar, and win
candidacy to work for the government. 14 Thus, for most students in ancient China,

13 Here I want to add a note of clarification. Although these nine books are not specialized books on science and
technology, some of these books do include minor insights regarding science and technology. For example, in Li Ji
“commentaries on the ‘Yueling’月令 ( Monthly Ordinances)…contained discussions of specialized knowledge in the
calendrical astronomy” (Kim, 2010, p.213). Moreover, in ancient China, there were other books that center on scientific
and technological knowledge such as Astronomical Compilations from the Six Classics and Essential Techniques for
Common People. However, these books were not as popular as the nine Confucian books and primarily served the
purposes of personal interest and recreation.
14Jun

Ren (举人): a rank achieved by people who successfully passed the triennial provincial exam in ancient China. It
was a rank higher than the rank of XiuCai (秀才) achieved by people who successfully passed the entry-level exam, but
lower than the rank of Jin Shi (进士) achieved by people who successfully passed the triennial court exam.
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studying science and technology was not necessary and would potentially distract them
from preparing for exams. Due to the predominance of the nine Confucian books as the
main source of knowledge and the exam system in ancient China, “the intellectual, and
social, status of the specialized scientific and technical knowledge [was subordinated]”
(Kim, 2010, p. 225).
Due to the embeddedness of Confucianism in Chinese culture in the past
thousands of years, some of its ideas still matter profoundly in contemporary China. Two
persistent ideas are people’s subordination and obedience to the government and to
authority, and the emphasis on education, which in the era of reforms are re-articulated
with other elements such as the Chinese government’s emphasis on science and
technology, resulting in the rapid scientific and technological development.
In line with Confucian traditions, in contemporary China, for many Chinese
people, the government is sacred. This high esteem for the government is reflected in the
ferocious competition in China’s national examination for admissions to civil service. For
example, the Guangdong Meteorological Service planned to recruit 1 employee; however,
4040 people applied for this job opening when registering for the national exam (National
Public Servant, 2018). Many Chinese people want to work for the government even
though they might get higher salaries if they work for industry, because it is believed that
working for the government means having “a golden bowl,” which means that the job can
offer a decent salary, but more importantly, social respect. Due to the high status of
government in Chinese culture, many Chinese people are inclined to follow the
government’s policies without question. For example, as mentioned in the Chapter One,
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in the era of reforms, when the government has focused on developing science and
technology, many Chinese people have devoted themselves to the fields of STEM.
Moreover, Chinese children are educated to respect authority from a young age. In
Chinese elementary schools, it is a common practice that a student should raise his or her
left hand to wait until called on and approved by his or her teachers to answer a question,
or even to go to the bathroom. If a student fails to conform to this practice, the student
will be criticized as being impolite and unruly, which are grounds for punishment, even
corporeal punishment. This education reinforces the Chinese people’s subordination to
their leaders and the government.
Moreover, education is still tremendously emphasized in contemporary China.
For example, even the New York Times Magazine reported on the famous Chinese high
school “Mao Tan Chang Zhong Xue/毛坦厂中学”, which was nicknamed as the biggest
test-prep factory in Asia (Larmer, 2014). This school recruits more than 20,000 students
annually and specializes at preparing students for the national college entrance
examination through training students to almost machine-like in their accuracy and
efficiency at answering exam questions. This school and other test-prep “factories” are
popular in China because college education matters tremendously in Chinese society.
This prioritization is evidenced by the fact that it is legitimate for parents to quit their
jobs to take care of their children who are preparing for the exam and to compel drivers
to stop honking on exam days to avoid distracting students from answering questions.
This strong emphasis on education resulted in the rapid development of humanities in
ancient China and of science and technology in contemporary China when the focus
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shifted from humanities education to STEM education, which I will explain in more
detail later in this chapter.
Besides Confucianism, Daoism, also known as Taoism, also significantly affects
the status of science and technology in the era of reforms. To better understand the
impacts of Daoism, I must first explain the distinction between Daoism as a school of
intellectual thought and as a religion. In fact, in Chinese, Daoism as a school of
intellectual thought is written as “道家,” and Daoism as a religion is written as “道教.”
However, the English conflation of these two phrases into the same word “Daoism” blurs
significant differences including perspectives on science and technology.
Similar to Confucianism, Daoism, which was forwarded and developed by several
thinkers such as Lao Tze and Chuang Tze, initially emerged as a school of intellectual
thought. As a school of intellectual thought, the essence of its ideas “can be summarized
into one phrase ‘returning to nature’” (Fung, 1922, p. 241). Daoism argues that people
should let things work out by themselves and in their own ways and, further, people
should concentrate on their essentially good nature, should be satisfied with the current
moment whether it is good or not, and should be able to find happiness through focusing
on inner peace in their hearts. Accordingly, Daoism contends that “knowledge is of no
use and can do only harm: ‘Our life is limited, but knowledge is not limited. With what is
limited to pursue what is not limited is a perilous thing’” (Fung, 1922, p. 243). Moreover,
Daoism as a school of thought views technology as a corrupting evil power that can lead
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to moral degradation, as indicated by the phrase “machine heart/ji Xin/机心.” 15Although
this phrase still exists in contemporary China, it is seldom used.
In contemporary China, Daoism is recognized predominantly as a religion rather
than a school of intellectual thought. According to the website of China’s National
Religious Affair Administration, the five most widely practiced religions in China are
Buddhism, Daoism, Islamism, Catholicism, and Protestantism (“National Religious”).
Daoism as a religion emerged in the Han Dynasty and was developed based on its origin
as a school of intellectual thought. For instance, the most preeminent God in the Daoist
religion is Tai Shang Lao Jun/太上老君, who is the mythified Lao Tze—the founder of
the Daoist school of intellectual thought. Tao Te Ching, which is one of the first and the

15This phrase comes from a story in Chuang Tze, which is one of the most important books in Daoism. The story is
about:

Zigong traveled south to Chu, and on his way back through Jin, as he passed along the south bank of the Han, he saw
an old man preparing his fields for planting. He had hollowed out an opening by which he entered the well and from
which he emerged, lugging a pitcher, which he carried out to water the fields. Grunting and puffing, he used up a great
deal of energy and produced very little result.
"There is a machine for this sort of thing," said Zigong. "In one day it can water a hundred fields, demanding very little
effort and producing excellent results. Wouldn't you like one?”
The gardener raised his head and looked at Zigong. "How does it work?"
"It's a contraption made by shaping a piece of wood. The back end is heavy and the front end light and it raises the
water as though it were pouring it out, so fast that it seems to boil right over! It's called a well sweep."
The gardener flushed with anger and then said with a laugh, "I've heard my teacher say, where there are machines, there
are bound to be machine worries; where there are machine worries, there are bound to be machine hearts. With a
machine heart in your breast, you've spoiled what was pure and simple; and without the pure and simple, the life of the
spirit knows no rest. Where the life of the spirit knows no rest, the Way will cease to buoy you up. It's not that I don't
know about your machine - I would be ashamed to use it!"
Tzu-kung blushed with chagrin, looked down, and made no reply.
(Zhangzi, 2013, pp.90-91)
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classic texts of Daoism as the school of intellectual thought, also became the classic book
of the Daoist religion.
However, there are some significant differences between Daoism as a school of
intellectual thought and as a religion. As I discussed previously, the Daoist school of
intellectual thought emphasizes returning to nature and not intervening with the natural
developments of things. However, Daoism as a religion focuses on pursuing and
practicing immortality. This shift of focus in part is caused by the foundation of
Confucianism as the only orthodox school of intellectual thought in ancient China. Thus,
Daoism, in order to co-exist with Confucianism and attract followers, had to evolve
continuously. Finding ways to avoid death and become immortal is a key focus of the
Daoist religion to serve an essential need of many people, that is to be immortal and
maintain their youth and health forever. In short, “[D]aoism as a philosophy teaches the
doctrine of following nature, while [D]aoism as a religion teaches the doctrine of working
against nature” (Fung, 1948, p. 3).
This focus of the Daoist religion leads to an emphasis on developing science and
technology. For example, the Daoist religion is famous for making alchemy, which
significantly contributed to the emergence of gunpowder, one of the four greatest
scientific and technological achievements in ancient China. Many Daoist priests who
devoted themselves to making pills to avoid death were famous doctors, such as Sun
Simiao/孙思邈 who is the respected as “the God of Doctors” in China. His book
Thousand Golden Prescriptions/Qian Jin Yao Fang/千金要方 , which records his ideas
on how to treat many diseases, is still used in contemporary China. Ma Danyang, another
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Daoist priest, is also recognized as an exceptional doctor because of his contribution to
the science of acupuncture and moxibustion.16 Moreover, the Daoist religion also
profoundly influenced astronomy in ancient China. Because the ultimate goal of
practicing Daoism is to become a god, many Daoist priests, such as He Hong in the Wei
Jin Southern and Northern Dynasties, studied astronomy in order to understand earth and
the galaxy. Fung (1948) points out that “the [D]aoist religion has the spirit of science,
which is the conquering of nature” (p.3).
Some scholars argue that Confucianism and Daoism had significantly hindered
the development of science and technology. For example, Gong (2012) claims that
Confucianism and Daoism together “have discouraged curiosity, commercialization and
technology. They helped to produce a scientific void in Chinese society that persisted for
millennia” (p. 411). However, this viewpoint overlooks some notable historical
developments. In fact, as I analyzed previously, Confucianism and Daoism, especially the
Daoist religion, contributed to some scientific and technological achievements in ancient
China. More importantly, some of their commitments, such as the importance of
receiving education and figuring out ways to be immortal, which are also active in
contemporary China, have strongly affected impacted the status of science and
technology in the era of reforms.

16Moxibustion is a traditional Chinese therapy, in which some herbs, the most typical one is dried mugwort, are burnt
so that their heat and smell can be applied to some specific points of the body. It is believed that moxibustion can
reduce pain and stimulate people’s immune systems.
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The Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement
The Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement were two
influential social, cultural, and political movements in modern China (1840-1949) that
aimed to promote science and technology, and have profoundly impacted the status of
science and technology in the era of reforms. The currents of the Westernization
Movement emerged in the 1840s. In 1842, the year in which the First Opium War ended
with China’s complete defeat, the book of Illustrated Annals of Oversea Countries/Hai
Guo Tu Zhi/ 海国图志 was published. This book was written by Wei Yuan (魏源), the
prefect of Gaoyou District, who participated in the First Opium War in the frontlines,
witnessing the power of Western technologies, especially weapons. He argued that
Chinese people must open their eyes to see what is happening in the world. Illustrated
Annals of Oversea Countries documents Western countries’ science and technology,
political systems, cultures, histories, religions, education, trades, geographies, and so
forth. In the preface, Wei Yuan writes that the purpose of the book is to help Chinese
people to learn from the West and puts forward the famous argument that Chinese people
should learn from foreign countries in order to fight against and surpass them (Shi Yi
Chang Ji Yi Zhi Yi/师夷长技以制夷).
Wei Yuan’s book enforced the growing argument that China must learn from the
West. Facing the situation that China was under pressure of further foreign aggression
and internal social turmoil, some high ranking officials of the Qing government
supported this argument and urged the government to accept Western ideas and practices,
especially those related to developing science and technology. Zeng Guofan, Zuo
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Zongtang, and Li Hongzhang launched the Westernization Movement (Yang Wu Yun
Dong/洋务运动), also known as the Self-Strengthen Movement, in 1861. The ultimate
purpose of the movement was to use Western scientific and technological knowledge to
maintain the rule of the Qing government. The slogan of this movement was “Chinese
learning should be followed as the essence; Western learning is for use” (Zhong Xue Wei
Ti, Xi Xue Wei Yong/中学为本西学为用). To face the danger of over-simplification,
this means that Confucianism should still remain the dominant ideology, but advanced
science and technology should be imported from the West to solve practical problems.
This was a process of dis-articulation and articulation: the emphasis on valuing
humanities exclusively was disarticulated from Confucianism while Western science and
technology were articulated with Confucianism. The Qin government and many Chinese
intellectuals believed that this new articulation could make the country prosperous.
In general, the Westernization Movement emphasized introducing and applying
science and technology from the West to industrialize China. In practice, the Qing
government focused on learning advanced scientific theories such as optics, bringing in
new technological devices such as guns, and promoting education in STEM. The Qing
government opened several big factories such the Tianjin Machine factory and Jiangnan
Arsenal. The Qing government also sent Chinese students to learn in the West, primarily
in the fields of STEM. On August 11, 1872, the first group of Chinese students to study
abroad left Shanghai for the U.S. From 1872 to 1875, the Qing government sent 120
Chinese students ranging in age from 10 to 16 to study in the U.S. Many of these students
who studied in elite U.S. universities such Harvard and Yale became prominent scientists
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and engineers upon their return to China. For example, the father of China’s railroad,
Zhan Tianyou, known in the West as Jeme Tien Yow, was among these students. The
Qing government also established schools specializing in STEM education. For instance,
for the purpose of building a strong and modern navy, the Qing government set up the
Foochow Shipbuilding College. McNeill, Li, and Wang (2010) explain the structure and
the curriculum of the Foochow Shipping College:
Foochow Shipbuilding College started with two departments, or divisions. The
first division, or Qian Xue Tang (literally “forward school”, 前学堂) trained
students in the design and manufacture of battleships, while the second division,
or Hou Xue Tang (literally “rear school”, 后学堂) trained students in navigation
and ship maintenance. This second division was developed essentially for the
training of naval officers.
Table 1. The course of the Qian Xue Tang
Foreign language

French (all the textbooks were in French),
English

Basic sciences

Arithmetic, trigonometry, analytic geometry,
calculus, physics and mechanics

Major courses

Engineering Cartography; the manufacture and
structure of steam engines; manufacturing of
ship hulls

(pp. 15. 635.8-15.635.9)
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As revealed by its curriculum, there was no other training in humanities besides the two
language courses that were designed to help students to better understand science and
technology for Western countries.
The Westernization Movement did not successfully prevent China from being
invaded and the Qing government from being overthrown. In 1895, the Qing navy was
defeated by the Japanese navy in the first Sino-Japanese War, which was viewed as a
failure of the Westernization Movement. In 1912, the Qing government was overthrown
and the Republic of China was founded. Despite its failure, the Westernization
Movement was the first movement in China that introduced a large volume of scientific
and technological knowledge from the West. Furthermore, I maintain, as an effect of the
Westernization Movement, the belief that science and technology are powerful and
capable of bringing positive changes, became widely acknowledged and influential in
Chinese culture.
This faith in science and technology continued to grow in the Republic of China
and contributed to the establishment of the New Culture Movement. On January 15,
1915, Chen Duxiu, one of the most influential scholars who received education in
Japan—a country that was further ahead in terms of Westernization— and who in 1917
became the dean of Peking University—the best Chinese university in the fields of
humanities, published “My Response to the Criticism” in the journal New Youth /Xin
Qing Nian/新青年. This journal focused on criticizing traditional Chinese culture,
especially Confucianism, and promoting Western ideas. Chen (1919) wrote:
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Westerners fight hard for Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. However, [their
efforts are worthwhile] because Mr. Democracy (De) and Mr. Science (Sai) saved
Westerners from the darkness. In fact, only Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science can
save Chinese politics, moral system, academics, and ideology from darkness and
evil.
Chen’s article was widely read and supported. “For Mr. Democracy/德先生 and Mr.
Science/赛先生” became the slogan of the New Culture Movement.
The New Culture Movement (Xin Wen Hua Yun Dong/新文化运动) began
around 1916, reached its height in 1919, and continued through the 1920s. This
movement was anti-imperialist, cultural, and political. On May 4, 1919, because of the
Republic of China’s government’s acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, college
students in Peking refused to attend schools and marched in the streets. 17 Accordingly,
the New Culture Movement is also known as the May Fourth Movement. In the
following days, students from the rest of the China as well as Chinese people in different
occupations and from different classes participated in the protest. For example, many
workers refused to go to factories and many businesspersons refused to run their
businesses.
In general, the New Culture Movement argued that China’s current backward
politics, culture, and social practices should be abolished. This movement advocated for
restoring China’s integrity, replacing the emphasis on learning Confucianism with

17 The Treaty of Versailles was the peace treaty which brought the World War Ito an end. During World War I, China
helped the U.K. to fight against the Germans. However, this treaty awarded China’s Shandong Province to Japan.
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learning Western science and technology, using vernacular Chinese (Bai Hua Wen/白话
文) to replace classical Chinese (Wen Yan Wen/文言文) in order to increase literacy, and
creating a democratic political system. Compared with the Westernization Movement,
which still viewed Chinese knowledge, such as Confucianism, as the essence of Chinese
culture and society, the New Culture Movement was determined to completely disarticulate Confucianism from Chinese culture and infuse China with Western science and
technology and its democratic political system.
As evidenced in the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement,
three ideas have become articulated to the status of science and technology in Chinese
culture. The first idea is that Western countries and Western cultures are more advanced
and civilized than their Chinese counterparts. This idea has resulted in the prevalence of
beliefs in Chinese society that only Western countries are able to master advanced
scientific knowledge and develop innovative technological artifacts for decades. The
second idea is that a key cause of China’s backwardness is the underdevelopment of
science and technology, which have the potential to bring positive social changes,
resulting in the veneration of science and technology in Chinese culture. The third idea
that has taken root is that the development of science and technology must first serve the
Chinese government’s political purposes, given the continuing articulation of
Confucianism in promoting the superior status of the government over the people, as
discussed previously. Recall, the driving force behind the Qing government’s support of
the Westernization Movement was to avoid being overthrown. Similarly, the Republic of
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China’s plans for developing science and technology were highly political. Kirby (1989)
writes:
Industrialization became a primary concern for the government of Chiang
Kaishek, which depended on the modern sector of the economy for much of its
income, and sought security through creation of a world-class armed force
supported by state-of-the-art metallurgical, chemical, and munitions industries.
(p. 25)
In this way, the emphasis of the government of Chiang Kaishek on metallurgical,
chemical, and munitions industries can be largely attributed to the government’s
insecurity after witnessing the Japanese government’s determination and ability to invade
China. Although both the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement
ended, their intellectual heritage, especially the value placed on developing science and
technology, persists in contemporary China.

The Chinese Cultural Tradition of Numeracy
Besides myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and the
New Culture Movement, the Chinese cultural tradition of numeracy also has significantly
contributed to the high status of science and technology in Chinese culture. Numbers are
important in Chinese culture. The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Arts/九章算术,
which was composed by several Chinese mathematicians from the 10th to 12th century,
is one of the most ancient but influential books in terms of studying numbers. This book,
which used to serve as a textbook both in China and in some other countries, is
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recognized as evidence of ancient Chinese people’s talent in quantitative studies.
Moreover, “the nine-nine song/九九乘法口诀表,” which is a song about multiplication,
has been passed down for almost two thousand years. Below is my translation of “the
nine-nine song” based on its Chinese text:


一一得一 (one times one gets one)



一二得二 (one times two gets two) 二二得四 (two times two gets four)



一三得三 (one times three gets three) 二三得六 (two times three gets six)

三三得九 (three times three gets nine)


一四得四 (one times four gets four) 二四得八 (two times four gets eight)
三四十二 (three times four gets twelve) 四四十六 (four times four gets
sixteen)



一五得五 (one times five gets five) 二五一十 (two times five gets ten)
三五十五 (three times five gets fifteen) 四五二十 (four times five gets
twenty)



五五二十五 (five times five gets twenty-five)

一六得六 (one times six gets six) 二六十二 (two times six gets twelve)
三六十八 (three times six gets eighteen) 四六二十四 (four times six gets
twenty-four) 五六三十 (five times six gets thirty)
六六三十六 (six times six gets thirty-six)
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一七得七 (one times seven gets seven)

二七十四 (two times seven gets

fourteen) 三七二十一 (three times seven gets twenty-one)
四七二十八 (four times seven gets twenty-eight)
五七三十五(five times seven gets thirty-five) 六七四十二 (six times seven
gets forty-two)
七七四十九 (seven times seven gets forty-nine)


一八得八 (one times eight gets eight) 二八十六 (two times eight gets
sixteen) 三八二十四 (three times eight gets twenty-four)
四八三十二 (four times eight gets thirty-two)

五八四十 (five times eight

gets forty)
六八四十八 (six times eight gets forty-eight)
七八五十六 (seven times eight gets fifty-six) 八八六十四 (eight times
eight gets sixty-four)


一九得九 (one times nine gets nine) 二九十八 (two times nine gets
eighteen) 三九二十七 (three times nine gets twenty-seven)
四九三十六 (four times nine get thirty-six) 五九四十五 (five times nine
gets forty-five) 六九五十四 (six times nine gets fifty-four)
(seven times nine gets sixty-three) 八九七十二 (eight times nine gets
seventy-two) 九九八十一 (nine times nine gets eighty-one)
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This song remains one of the most popular nursery rhymes in contemporary China.
Generations of Chinese children grow up listening to this song and many of them even
have memorized it before they enter elementary school. In this way, Chinese people have
begun to build a mathematical approach to understand numbers since they are young.
Building on this attachment, there is also a long tradition in China of interpreting
numbers from a cultural perspective. Since ancient China, Chinese people have assigned
special connotations to numbers. For example:
The number 0 refers to the beginning of all things. It is usually regarded as an auspicious
number because of its round shape. However, since some Chinese people believe that 0
can refer to nothing, its valence becomes negative when it is the final digit of a number
(for example 870 and 560). There are mixed and contradictory associations with the
number 1. It can refer to the winners of the first place in a competition; but at the same
time, it can refer to singlehood. The number 2 is usually regarded as a good number
because it refers to companionship. There is a Chinese proverb “good things come in
pairs/hao shi cheng shuang /好事成双.” For some Chinese people, the number 3, which
sounds like “sheng/life or to live,” is a good number. However, for some Chinese people
with a different dialect, this number sounds like “san/ separation,” which makes it an
inauspicious number. The number 4 is viewed as a bad number because it sounds like “si/
death.” The number 5 is associated with “not” or “lacking” because it sounds like “wu/
do not have.” The number 6 is an auspicious number because it sounds similar to
“liu/smooth/success,” and “lu/happiness, and prosperity.” There are mixed and
contradictory associations with the number 7. This number sounds like “qi/arise/rising
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up,” thus some people believe that it is a good one. However, because July is the ghost
month in the Chinese lunar calendar, some people think this number is inauspicious. 18
The number 8 is another auspicious number because it sounds like “fa/being rich and
prosperous.” Thus, it is the number that many Chinese businesspersons favor most. The
number 9 is often used in weddings because it sounds like “jiu/ lasting forever.”
Moreover, because in ancient China this number was also associated with the emperors, it
is also regarded as a royal number.
From ancient to contemporary China, Chinese people continue to have
preferences regarding some numbers. For example, almost all Chinese telecoms
companies and DMVs mark phone and car numbers that include several auspicious
numbers (such as 666888) as special ones and sell them for large sums of money.
Due to Chinese people’s fascination with numbers, it is a common practice that
people use numbers to represent and evaluate lived experiences. In 2015, there was a very
popular competition in China. The competition was about the numbers of coins people
could hold with their collarbones. Many Chinese people zealously participated: they put
coins on their collarbones, took selfies, uploaded the selfies to social media, and
competed with others concerning the number of coins. Below is a representative photo:

18In

Chinese culture, it is believed that during the ghost month, ghosts can leave hell and wander around on earth.

50

Figure 2. 2 A Collarbone Holds Coins. This photo was taken by the author.
Basically, people perceived having more coins as more valued and closer to the ideal.
This competition not only reflected Chinese people’s appreciation of a slender body but
also their obsession with quantifying and evaluating merely based on numbers. It was
astonishing that millions of Chinese people were willing to use numbers of coins to
represent their bodies, to believe that more coins better represent the “ideal body,” and to
reduce the worth of their bodies to this metric.
In almost every aspect of Chinese people’s lives, numbers are applied for the
purposes of representation and evaluation. For example, the Chinese government uses
GDP per capita to evaluate Chinese people’s quality of life; the Chinese government
believes that the higher the GDP per capita, the happier Chinese people are. In terms of
evaluating intellectual performance, Chinese people look at grades, the ranking of
universities, and the numbers of journal articles published. It is common that job
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openings in Chinese universities require their applicants to graduate from the top 250 or
300 universities based on QS World University Ranking system and to have published at
least 3 journal articles that, combined, must exceed certain impact factors. In fact, when
the 2018 Science and Engineering (S&E) Indicators announced that China had overtaken
the U.S. with the highest number of publications in S&E, many Chinese people became
extremely excited (National Science Foundation, 2018). Many media outlets
subsequently released news reports that celebrated Chinese people’s impressive
intellectual performance. For example, on February 3, 2018, Sina, which is one of the
most popular websites in China, published an article titled “The Rise of a Superpower:
The Number of Chinese Articles in Science and Engineering Surpasses the Number of
U.S. Articles in S&E and Ranks the Highest Worldwide.” Chinese people were proud of
the number of journal articles they published even though some Chinese people are clear
that many Chinese journal articles are of low quality and significance.
The popularity of a Chinese counselor Ayawawa also reflects many Chinese
people’s obsession with numbers and quantification. Ayawawa is famous for developing
a theory, which centers on two terms MV and PU, to help women attract partners. MV
stands for mating value and PU stands for paternity uncertainty. Ayawawa argues that an
attractive woman should have a high MV, which means that she should be beautiful and
young, and have a lower value of PU, which means that she should be submissive to
avoid generating her partner’s anxieties. In essence, Ayawawa’s theory quantifies women
and reduces them into some numbers.

52

The tradition of numeracy in China significantly contributes to the flourishing of
an epistemology that centers on quantification of human beings and their lived
experiences. This epistemology prioritizes understanding and evaluation based on
numbers at the expense of accounting for elements that elude numeric representation such
as people’s feelings. This epistemology potentially inspires the development of science
and technology in China in accordance with Chinese people’s inclination to understand
the world “truthfully” based on “accurate” quantifications and representations. For
example, the Sesame Credit/Zhi Ma Xin Yong/芝麻信用, which was developed by Ant
Financial Service Group, is very popular in China. The Sesame Credit can score its
customers from five perspectives: personal credit records, social behaviors, capabilities to
fulfill contracts, identities (such as jobs), and connections. The higher the scores people
get, the more benefits they can enjoy, such as renting cars and apartments without paying
for deposits, because it is believed that high-scored persons are more trustworthy and
probably are “better” citizens.

The Discrepancy between the Needs of the Large Chinese
Population and the Country’s Inadequate Capacity for
Production
The previous sections discussed myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the
Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, and the Chinese tradition of
numeracy. This section explores another important force that has profoundly impacted
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the status of science and technology in the era of reforms. This force—the discrepancy
between the needs of the large population and the country’s inadequate capacity for
production—not only has captured my attention but also has been of interest to the
Chinese government. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (1981) published the fundamental document “Resolution on
Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s
Republic of China.” In this document, the Chinese government both reflected on and
confessed the mistakes it had made during the Cultural Revolution and pointed out that
“the principal contradiction our country has had to resolve is that between the growing
material and cultural needs of the people and the backwardness of social production”
(The Six Plenary Session, 1981). In fact, since ancient times, Chinese society has always
struggled with the discrepancy between the needs of the large Chinese population and the
country’s inadequate capacity for production. To put it simply, a significant issue that
Chinese society has faced is how to feed, cloth, house, and transport so many people.
This discrepancy not only has led to widespread social turmoil in China, such as people’s
rebellions against governments and the overthrown of governances, but also has closely
related to the development of science and technology. To explain this argument, I pay
special attention to the issue of food supply and housing.
For Chinese people, their most basic need is to have a sufficient food supply.
Although every culture cares about eating, Chinese culture uniquely emphasizes food
because of the frequency and severity of famine. Li (1982) recorded severe national
famines in modern and contemporary China:
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The North China famine of 1876 to 1879, one of the great mortality crises in
world history, was caused by a drought that extended over five provinces,
affecting a population of over 100 million people and leaving an estimated 9.5 to
13 million dead. […] Between 1928 and 1931, northern China was once again
struck by a major drought that affected a population of 57 million, 12 million of
them “gravely.” (pp. 687-688)
Moreover, from 1959-1961, because of drought, floods, and the Great Leap Forward
Movement, about 30 million Chinese people died from starvation (Smil, 1999, p. 1619).
Besides the three national famines that Li discussed, other regional famines also
happened. For example, another severe food crisis happened from 1920 to 1921 in north
China, resulting in famine-related deaths for an estimated 5 million people (Fuller, n.d.).
Many Chinese people have suffered during famines. For example, Branigan
(2013) recorded Chinese people’s experiences in the Great Chinese Famine, which
happened from 1959 to1961:
People died in the family and they didn't bury the person because they could still
collect their food rations; they kept the bodies in bed and covered them up and the
corpses were eaten by mice. People ate corpses and fought for the bodies. In
Gansu they killed outsiders; people told me strangers passed through and they
killed and ate them. And they ate their own children. (para. 8)
Due to these severe famines, Chinese culture is infused with people’s anxiety about food
shortages. For example, a typical way for Chinese people to greet each other is to ask the
question “Have you eaten?” (Ni Chi Le Ma/你吃了吗?). The famous Chinese saying
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“Food is everything/Min Yi Shi Wei Tian (民以食为天)” reflects Chinese people’s
prioritization of food.
To solve the issue of starvation, the Chinese government has put forward many
policies, which have aimed to promote an equal distribution of the limited resources. For
example, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the Chinese government implemented a national
food distribution system. The government collected food and distributed it to individual
Chinese people based on the size of their families. The government gave Chinese people
food stamps (Liang Shi Piao/粮食票). Below are pictures of a rice stamp and a pork
stamp:

Figure 2. 3 Rice Stamp. This photo was taken by the author.
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Figure 2. 4 Pork Stamp. This photo was taken by the author.
Although this national distribution system lessened the discrepancy between the
sustenance needs of so many people and China’s limited capacity of food production
through saving some poor Chinese people from dying of starvation, it did not
fundamentally resolve this discrepancy. In fact, in 2016, the arable land (per hectares per
person) in China was 0.09; in contrast, in the U.S. the number was 0.47 and for Canada
the number was 1.21 (The World Bank b, n.d.). Facing the unfavorable natural conditions
for agriculture and the needs of a large population, it became necessary for Chinese
society to develop agricultural science and technologies to improve food production by
making full use of every hectare of arable land.
Yuan Longping, a Chinese agricultural scientist, has devoted his career to
promoting super hybrid rice that “emphasize[s] the plant morphological improvement and
utilize[s] the inter-subspecific heterosis [to increase the yield of rice]” (Ma & Yuan,
2015 , p. 200). In fact, “by 2003, half of China’s rice production area was planted with
[Yuan’s super hybrid rice] …. [By] 2007, China’s total rice yield was 500 million tons”
(The World Food Prize, 2008 ). This means that now China’s capacity of rice production
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has improved significantly, which results in the reduction of the likelihood of nationwide
famine and greatly alleviates Chinese people’s fear of starvation. Besides the science and
technology of super hybrid rice, farming, breeding, aquaculture, and other agricultural
science and technologies also have been developed and are widely used. Accordingly,
China has gradually been able to cultivate and harvest more crops, including 38 items
such as rice, wheat, and vegetables:
Year

Amount of Crops (in 1000 tons)

2010

33,263.00

2000

20,431.00

1990

4,319.00

1980

2,363.00

1970

798.00

1960

296.00

Table 2. 1 China Agricultural and Economic Data. Statistics were retrieved from “China
Agricultural and Economic Date”, USDA,
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17884.
Consequently, China “met its Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of
hungry people by 2015 and reduced the global hunger rate by two thirds” (World Food
Programme, n.d.).
Besides food supply, the discrepancy between housing the large Chinese
population and the country’s inadequate productive capacity has also been a serious issue
in Chinese society for a long time. Chinese people have always emphasized owning a
living space, as evidenced in the Chinese character“家,” which means home. This
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character includes two parts: the upper part “宀” refers to shelter, and the lower part “豕”
refers to pig. In ancient Chinese culture, it was believed that a home should have a shelter
and a pig. However, with the change of Chinese society from an agrarian to a more
modern society, many Chinese people no longer believe that a home must include pigs or
poultry; however, to this day, most Chinese people still believe that without owning a
housing unit, a home is not complete. 19 There is a popular Chinese song “I want to have a
home”/ Wo Xiang You Ge Jia/我想有个家. The lyrics of this song include, “I want to
have a home. It doesn’t need to be a fancy place…It doesn’t need to be a big place.” This
song reflects Chinese people’s strong affection for their homes and their longing for
owning living spaces.
However, because of the large population of Chinese people and the limited space
that is suitable for building houses, many Chinese people lived in overcrowded spaces
before the 1980s. In 1978, in urban China, the floor area of residential building per capita
was 6.7 sq m, and in rural China, it was 8.1 sq m ( CEIC, n.d.). In contrast, in the U.S., in
1973 the sq ft. per person reached 551 (approximately 51 sqm) ( Perry, 2016). These
statistics clearly revealed the sharp contrast between the average Chinese person’s living
space and the average American’s living space in the 1970s.
Facing the situation in which it is impossible for China to expand its geographical
borders, the feasible solution to increasing Chinese people’s living space is to construct

19I want to clarify the word “home” (Jia) in Chinese culture. “Home” is regarded as more than the combination of a
man, a woman, and children. More significantly, “home” is regarded as the root of a people, a sense of belonging, and
the place where people can release all their emotions at ease. Thus, even for people who do not want to get married,
they might still want to have homes. Thus, for many single people, if they want to have homes, they choose to buy
apartments or houses as well.
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tall buildings to make full use of vertical space available, which requires steel. China did
not have a steelmaking factory until the opening of Han Yang Tie Chang/汉阳铁厂 in
1890. Given China’s low capacity of steelmaking, from November 1957 to December
1958, the Chinese government promoted backyard furnacesand encouraged all Chinese
people to participate in steelmaking, a movement that I will explain more later in this
chapter. 20 It was not, however, until the era of reforms that China mastered the science
and technology of mass-producing high-quality steel and that the industry of steelmaking
began to flourish. According to the World Steel Association (2019), in March 2019,
“China’s crude steel production… was 80.3 Mt….The US produced 7.8 Mt of crude
steel….Japan produced 9.1 Mt of crude steel” (para 3). With the increasing amount of
steel available, China has been able to build more skyscrapers, which has contributed to
the dramatic increase of China’s residential area per capita. In 2017, in urban China, floor
area of residential building per capita reached 36 sq m and, in rural China, it reached 45
sq m, which was almost 6 times the floor area of residential building per capita in 1987
(CEIC, n.d.). Thus, although compared with some other countries such as the U.S., the
living spaces for Chinese people are still relatively cramped, their living situations have
improved significantly in the era of reforms. The improved availability of living space
demonstrates how scientific and technological development has contributed to alleviating
the discrepancy between the needs of China’s large population and the country’s

20According

to Wikipedia, “backyard furnaces (土法炼钢) were small blast furnaces….People used every type of fuel
they could to power these furnaces, from coal to the wood of coffins. Where iron ore was unavailable, they melted any
steel objects they could get their hands on, including utensils, household objects like chairs and doors, bicycles, and
even their own farming equipment, the intended end product being steel girders” (“Backyard Furnaces,” n.d.).
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inadequate productive capacity. Moreover, this positive change enabled by science and
technology reinforces the argument that science and technology are nearly omnipotent
and that they should continue to play significant roles with regard to addressing the issue
of housing in China.
Besides developing agricultural and architectural science and technologies, other
kinds of science and technology have also developed rapidly, driven by Chinese people’s
needs to survive and live comfortably. For example, China has worked hard on
developing and promoting high-speed train and railroad science and technology. This
kind of science and technology is crucial since it can profoundly improve the country’s
capacity of production because it offers more mobility for workers and products in
comparison with traditional trains. With the industrialization of some Chinese cities,
these cities need more workers. In this context, high-speed train and railroad science and
technology provide a comparatively affordable way to Chinese people, especially migrant
workers, to leave their hometown and conveniently travel to work in different cities.
Moreover, the nationwide high-speed train systems enable products to circulate around
the country and even around the worldrapidly at a lower cost in comparison with air
travel. 21 According to The Economist (2017), “[China] ha[d] 20,000 km (12,500 miles)
of high-speed rail lines, more than the rest of the world combined. It is planning to lay
another 15,000 km by 2025” (para 2). These high-speed rail lines increased China’s
capacity for transportation and production, bettering many Chinese people’s travel

21For example, China now has several high-speed railroads to some European countries. These railroads are used
exclusively for product transportation.
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experiences and the efficiency of product transportation. Using science and technology,
China has demonstrated its ability to provide for the material needs of its people and is
poised to continue doing so.
To understand the status of science and technology in the era of reforms, we need to
recognize that the discrepancy between the needs of a large population and China’s
inadequate capacity of production consistently drives the development of science and
technology for the purpose of increasing its productive capacity. In fact, as promoted by
the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, which are the two
movements that signified the beginning of modern China, the power of science and
technology can bring positive changes and solve practical social problems. Because of
this faith in science and technology, Chinese society has invested in their development,
which has resulted in progress such as the diminished issue of food shortages and
Chinese people’s improved living spaces. In return, this progress has reinforced the faith
in science and technology.

China’s Communist Party’s Policies
Apart from myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and
the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of numeracy, and the discrepancy
between the needs of the large Chinese population and the country’s inadequate capacity
for production, China’s Communist Party’s policies also have significantly impacted the
status of science and technology in the era of reforms. China’s Communist Party was
founded in 1921. Many of its forefathers (such as Mao Zedong and Li Dazhao) were
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students and intellectuals who had actively engaged in the New Culture Movement.
Moreover, some forefathers of the CCP had the experience of studying abroad, notably,
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Due to the backgrounds of the CCP’s founders and the
context of their political power, the CCP emphasizes developing science and technology.
In fact, from the first chairman of the PRC Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin,
Hu Jintao, and the current Chairman Xi Jinping, all of them have initiated important
policies and projects related to science and technology. These policies and projects have
driven the development of science and technology, which are viewed by the CCP as
powerful tools to solve social, economic, and political problems.
Mao Zedong initiated two significant scientific and technological projects. The
first was about mastering nuclear science and making nuclear power and satellites; the
second was the national project of “mass science.” In 1956, Mao pointed out that if China
wanted to protect itself from Western invasions, it must have its own nuclear weapons. In
October 1956, Mao approved the development of satellites and nuclear weapons, which
resulted in the successful launch of China’s first nuclear bomb on June 17, 1967 and its
first satellite on April 24, 1970.
Concerning the project of “mass science,” the Chinese government recruited
common Chinese people to participate in scientific and technological explorations even
though many of them had little or no STEM education. There were numerous programs
of mass science. For example, from 1957 to 1958, there was a program of producing steel.
As discussed previously, Chinese people were asked to collect and use iron products such
as iron pots and screws to make steel, and while steel workers spent days and nights in

63

the factories, other Chinese people were encouraged to produce steel in their backyards.
This mass participation reflected how the Confucian emphasis on citizens’ support,
sacrifice, and subordination to the government without questioning its justification
became articulated with Mao’s government’s desire to develop steel science and
technology to influence Chinese people in significant ways. Fan (2017) explains the
reasoning behind the project of mass science:
Maoist programs of mass science, such as earthquake prediction, barefoot doctors,
and various attacks on “elite science,” were based on the tenets of integrating
experts and the masses and combin[ing] indigenous and Western science. The
underlying political doctrine asserted the class character of science, exalted
everyday knowledge, and projected a particular vision of scientific and political
modernity. (p. 302)
Fan’s argument reveals that Mao’s national projects of mass science enabled the
articulation of local Chinese science and technology with Western science and
technology, and more importantly, reinforced the articulation of science and technology
with politics.
These two projects under Mao’s administration exerted significant impacts in the
following ways. First, they reinforced the importance of science and technology,
especially military science and technology, in spite of what might be considered other,
negative measures of success. Thus, although developing nuclear weapons was expensive
and time-consuming, the Chinese government continued to support the projects during
the three years of national famine in China (1959-1961) when many Chinese people were
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starving to death. Scientists and engineers who worked for this project were even under
protection during the Cultural Revolution, while many university professors were
tortured. Second, the project of mass science plays an important role with regard to
disarticulating science and technology from being seen as the purview of the West. As
argued previously, the belief that science and technology belonged exclusively to the
West was developed during the Westernization Movement and the New Culture
Movement. Instead, Mao’s project of mass science aimed to articulate science and
technology with traditional Chinese culture. Mao believed that in traditional Chinese
culture, there were useful scientific and technological ideas to exploit. In his view it was
necessary to combine both indigenous and Western knowledge. For example, in the
program of barefoot doctors, Mao emphasized that besides learning Western
pharmacology, doctors should also draw from traditional Chinese lore on medicine.
Third, Mao insisted that science and technology were “inherently political… neither
neutral nor value-free” (Fan, 2017, p. 314). Mao’s idea of mass science reflected his
efforts to eradicate gaps between classes and create an egalitarian society in which
everyone worked and everyone was served at the same time. However, as Elman (2008)
points out, “Maoist science and its rhetoric of science’s role in class struggle [served as] a
smokescreen for power politics” (p. 518). This means that Mao believes that science and
technology should always serve the government’s political purposes.
In January1963, Zhou Enlai, the premier of Mao Zedong’s government,
introduced the plan of four modernizations/Si Ge Xian Dai Hua 四个现代化 at the
Conference on Scientific and Technological Work held in Shanghai. Zhou argued that the
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government and the people should work diligently to realize the modernizations of
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. This was an essential
scientific and technological plan that exerted profound influence on the CCP’s later
policies even though this plan ended abruptly due to the breakout of the Cultural
Revolution.
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) dismantled the institutional scientific
infrastructure including scientific administration, scientific communities, and the
educational system in China. Thus, during that decade of social, cultural, and political
turmoil, the Chinese people and government were not capable of making important
progress in science and technology. In 1977, with the death of Mao and the return of
Deng Xiaoping to the power center of the CCP from the political wilderness, the Cultural
Revolution ended and the CCP shifted its focus to develop the economy as well as
science and technology.
Initially, Deng returned to Zhou’s plan of four modernizations. In March 1979,
Deng (1979) pointed out that “realizing the four modernizations is a many-sided complex
and difficult undertaking” (p. 188). In December of the same year, Deng announced the
reform and opening-up policy, which was his expansion of the plan of the four
modernizations.
ROUP maintains the core focus of the plan of four modernizations on developing
science and technology. Deng “identified technological change as the main mechanism
for improving economic performance and maintaining economic growth” (Saich, 1989, p.
68). He made a famous statement about science and technology on September 5, 1988 in
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a meeting with the president of Czechoslovakia that “science and technology are the most
important and fundamental productive forces (Ke Ji Shi Di Yi Sheng Chan Li/科技是第
一生产力).” Deng’s statement, which implied that science and technology are the forces
to create history, differed significantly from Mao’s (1945) claim that “people, only
people, are the force to create history” (“On Coalition Government”). For Deng, the value
of science and technology exceeded that of human beings. Deng’s arguments indicated
the beginning of a new era in which science and technology are strongly articulated to the
government’s main focus on economic development. Science and technology, it is now
believed, will bring the country a prosperous future.
From a young age, Deng was committed to promoting science and technology. In
1920, when Deng’s father asked him what he expected to gain when he was leaving to
study in France, Deng, a sixteen-year-old at that time, replied “to learn knowledge and
truth from the West in order to save China.” Deng’s reply reflected his faith in the power
of science and technology to bring China a promising future. Goldman and Simon (1989)
summarized Deng’s understanding of science and technology in this way:
Much of the rhetoric of the Deng Xiaoping regime, which came to power in late
1978, resonates with the May Fourth Movement’s [which is also known as the
New Culture Movement’s] celebration of science and technology as the key to
solving all China’s problems. This disillusionment with the prevailing ideology—
this time, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism—once more created an ideological vacuum
that the leadership and intellectuals again sought to fill with the idealization of
advanced science and technology. (p. 9)
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In short, Goldman and Simon argue that Deng romanticized science and technology and
assumed that they could fill the gap and solve the issues left by disappointment with and
inadequacy of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.
Deng formulated several policies that fundamentally contributed to the
development of science and technology in the era of reforms and initiated several large
national scientific and technological projects. First, Deng resumed China’s National
College Entrance Exam/Gao Kao/高考 in 1977 after it had been stopped for almost 10
years. Moreover, Deng pointed out that besides considering the class of a student’s
family, which was the main criterion used previously, universities should take students’
academic performances seriously in recruiting. Since then, intelligent and diligent
students have had the chance to receive higher education, regardless of their class
background. In fact, many members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the
Chinese Academy of Engineering began their university years in 1977 and 1978, such as
Zhou Shouwei, Bao Weimin, and Wang Xiaofan. Furthermore, Deng vigorously
imported Western science and technology and promoted STEM education and research.
For example, after the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.,
Deng visited the U.S. for the first time in 1979 and signed “The U.S.-China Agreement
on Cooperation in Science and Technology.” In February 1984, Deng visited The
Exhibition of Scientific and Technological Achievements held in Shanghai and pointed
the significance of developing computer training programs in schools. In 1986, Deng
initiated the 863 Program, which is one of the biggest scientific and technological
projects that promoted research in STEM fields in contemporary China. In the same year,
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Deng also initiated the Spark Program/Xing Huo Ji Hua/星火计划, which aims to utilize
science and technology to boost the development of rural China. In fact, it has been
maintained that since 1978, the spring of science and technology has arrived in China.
After Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continued to develop science
and technology, reinforcing the articulation of science and technology with the country’s
progress. For example, in 1995, Jiang Zemin announced the strategy of invigorating
China through science and education (Ke Jiao Xing Guo/科教兴国). Jiang argued that
scientific and technological developments were essential for China’s success; thus the
Chinese government should emphasize scientific and technological research and STEM
education. This strategy reflected Jiang’s efforts of articulating science and technology
with the Confucian emphasis on education in order to cultivate talents in STEM that
could serve the country. In 1997, Jiang argued that science and technology determined
the future of China’s economy. This argument brought science and technology “to the
centre” and expected “them to play a significant role in economic construction of China”
(Dolla, 2015, p. 43).
Hu Jintao, the chairman after Jiang Zemin, also emphasized science and
technology. In 2006, Hu stated his plan for China’s future to become an innovative
country in 15 years. This meant that besides learning from the West, China was expected
to create new scientific and technological achievements independently and to craft
products that are competitive and carry Chinese intellectual property rights. In the same
year, Hu’s government published “The National Outlines for Medium and Long-Term
Planning for Scientific and Technological Development (2006-2020).” This outline was a
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comprehensive plan for scientific and technological developments in China from 2006 to
2020. It called for launching independent innovative scientific and technological projects
both in traditional fields such as chemistry and in cutting-edge fields such as mobile
communication. Since 2003, which was the year that Hu became the chairman, the
Chinese government had “spent 340.6 billion Yuan on science and technology over the
past five years” and “China's total investment in research, experimentation and
development rose from the 128.8 billion Yuan in 2002 to 366.4 billion Yuan in 2007”
(Wen, 2008).
Xi Jinping, who succeeded Hu Jintao as Chairman of the PRC, has consistently
asserted the importance of science and technology for China’s future. Xi’s government
has inherited and expanded the Thousand Talents Plan (Qian Ren Ji Hua/千人计划), first
initiated by Hu Jintao’s government in 2008. This plan brings to China outstanding
international scholars, researchers, and entrepreneurs in STEM by providing them
competitive salaries, spacious apartments, and other benefits such as offering scholars’
spouses decent jobs. This project demonstrates Xi’s as well as Hu’s commitments to
developing science and technology. Accordingly, while the Chinese government has
invested a considerable amount of money on experts in STEM, talented scholars in the
humanities and arts are largely ignored, because it is believed that they cannot create
social wealth. In this way, the humanities have become disarticulated from educational
value, which was strongly emphasized in ancient China.
Facing the pressure of a trade war between China and the U.S., Xi is concerned
that some scientific and technological fields in China rely too heavily on Western
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countries. Xinhua Net, a website sponsored by the Chinese government, summarized one
of Xi Jinping’s most important speeches about developing science and technology,
especially in the event that China entered a trade war with the U.S., which was delivered
in May 2018:
Xi…said as China strives for prosperity and rejuvenation, it needs to devote great
energy to promoting science and technology, and endeavor to be a major world
center for science and innovation …Xi called on the country's science and
technology personnel to grasp the main trends, seize opportunities, face problems
squarely, and rise to challenges….Xi said they should aim for the frontiers of
science and technology, lead the direction of its development, shoulder the heavy
responsibilities bestowed by history, and be vanguards in innovation in the new
era…Xi said efforts must be made to ensure "high-quality science and
technology" to underpin the development of a modernized economy…. ‘The
initiatives of innovation and development must be securely kept in our own
hands,’ Xi said. (Xinhua , 2018).
In fact, in 2015, Xi’s government announced the program “Made in China 2025” (Zhong
Guo Zhi Zao 2025/中国制造 2025). This program aims to change China’s situation from
being the world’s factory of low-cost and low-quality products to an innovative one that
designs and crafts valuable high-tech products and provides cutting-edge technical
services and support. Fang and Walsh (2018) reported that the Chinese government
would roughly invest $300 billion US dollars (approximately 2024 billion Yuan) in this
plan.
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The Status of Science and Technology in the Era of Reforms
Earlier in this chapter, I explored several forces that have profoundly impacted the
status of science and technology in contemporary China. Chinese myth, which includes
numerous gods and goddesses that are scientists and engineers, reveals that there is a
deep tradition of valuing science and technology. Some aspects of Confucianism and
Daoism stifled the development of science and technology, especially in ancient China.
Other Confucian and Daoist aspects have contributed to scientific and technological
development even in ancient China, such as the emergence of gunpowder. Still, other
aspects have articulated with new elements in the era of reforms resulting in a transition
from stifling to encouraging scientific and technological development, such as valuing
education, which has tenaciously been articulated to what it means to be a good Chinese
citizen but has now been disarticulated from the humanities in ancient China and
rearticulated to STEM in contemporary China. The Westernization Movement and the
New Culture Movement significantly promoted the idea that science and technology,
which are associated with the West, are powerful and can bring Chinese people and the
nation a promising future. In addition, the Chinese tradition of numeracy and the
discrepancy between the needs of the large population and the country’s inadequate
capacity for production have profoundly driven the development of science and
technology. Progress enabled by scientific and technological development in terms of
providing more food and living space for Chinese people has reinforced Chinese people’s
faith in and need for science and technology. The CCP has formulated many policies to
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promote science and technology, even investing them as the remedies to all social
problems.
Due to the articulation of these mythical, ideological, religious, intellectual,
cultural, humanistic, and political influences, science and technology are romanticized in
the era of reforms. As a result, many Chinese people are fascinated with science and
technology, and they privilege scientific and technological developments regardless of
the costs. Additionally, science and technology have become integral to the Chinese
government’s political practices.
On July 22, 2018, the New York Times published the article “Wild About Tech,
China Even Loves Robot Waiters that Can’t Serve.” In the article, Mozur (2018)
discusses the phenomenon that increasing numbers of Chinese people embrace science
and technology without any hesitation. Many Chinese people support new scientific and
technological devices even when the new devices have no practical use. Moreover,
Chinese people even fly abroad to purchase “more advanced” scientific and technological
products, which are sometimes unnecessary. Chang (2015) observed that in “stores [in
Japan], China’s ravenous consumers cleared out shelves, buying electronic rice cookers,
air purifiers, digital cameras, and, most notably, electronic toilet seats.”
In fact, many Chinese children grow up with the saying “If you can study
mathematics, physics, and chemistry well, you can face the world confidently” (Xue Hao
Shu Li Hua, Zou Bian Tian Xia Dou Bu Pa/学好数理化走遍天下都不怕). Due to this
education, many Chinese people view science and technology as the most powerful force
that can definitely bring them happy lives, as described by a Chinese netizen:
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The way Chinese people treat science and technology is similar to the way
American people treat Christianity. American people visit churches during the
weekend piously. Chinese people view science and technology
piously…Currently, in China, science and technology replace arts, aesthetics [,
and humanities]. American people believe God is the creator of the world, and
Chinese people believe science and technology are the creators of the world. 22
Because of the value placed on science and technology, it has become
commonplace to promote the development of science and technology regardless of the
costs. A recent example concerns the births of two genetically edited babies. In
November 2018, these twin girls were born in China. The Chinese scientist He Jiankui
collaborated with several Western scientists to alter and modify the genes of these girls
when they were still embryos. Dr. He claimed that after editing the genes of these babies,
they were born healthy, proving that they are likely resistant to HIV even though their
father is an HIV carrier, who in ordinary circumstances would have likely passed down
the disease of AIDS to his children. Although Dr. He’s research probably contributes to
biological science and technology in significant ways, it has serious potential inhumane
costs, including the potential long-term health repercussions for these babies and their
descendants.

Mo Wu Wen left this comment in Baidu Tieba on 23 November 2018. Baidu Tieba is one of China’s
biggest and most active open-access social network with forum-like features. Baidu Tieba claims to be the biggest
online community that is in Chinese. People can create posts, leave and reply to comments under pseudonyms. This
comment is retrieved from: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/5958780368. I translated the comment from Chinese to English.
22默默无闻/Mo
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A very interesting and increasingly relevant articulation of the elevation of
science and technology to politics is the Chinese government’s growing effects to
harness, control, and constrain the power of science and technology since they offer
potentially subversive opportunities for Chinese citizens to resist the government’s
control. Thus, the government surveils and constrains Chinese people’s access to and use
of science and technology, for example by implementing the Great Firewall of China.
The Chinese government designed and applied the Great Firewall of China (GFW) to
block and filter information flows. As a result, Chinese people cannot access certain
websites such as Google, Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram because the
Chinese government is concerned that these websites include potentially politically
sensitive information and wants to inhibit the flow of this information in China. 23By
implementing the GFW, which enables the Chinese government to censor the Internet,
the government controls a main source of knowledge.
Besides the GFW, the Chinese government has implemented other national
scientific and technological projects such as Tian Wang (天网), a system of
surveillance. 24 The Tian Wang system is “the world’s biggest camera surveillance

23Legally, Chinese people cannot access these websites because based on the location of their IP addresses, their
requests to visit these websites would be rejected by GFW. However, many Chinese people pay for VPN services that
are provided by private companies. The service of VPN can change Chinese Internet users’ IP addresses, thus they can
visit these blocked websites. However, since January 2015, the Chinese government has worked on blocking VPNs.
Since 2015, several of the most popular companies that provide VPN services such as Express VPN and Green VPN
were prohibited by the Chinese government from providing their services in mainland China.
24The name of the system “Tian Wang” is taken from a Chinese proverb “The net of heaven has large meshes, but it
lets nothing through” (Tian Wang Hui Hui, Shu Er Bu Lou). Originally, this proverb was used to imply that justice has
long arms and that people should have faith in God. The Chinese government took the first two characters (“Tian
Wang”) of this proverb to name a nationwide system of surveillance to signify that the system can catch everything.
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network. Across the country, 170 million CCTV cameras are already in place and an
estimated 400 million new ones [would] be installed [between 2017 and 2020]. Many of
the cameras are fitted with artificial intelligence, including facial recognition technology”
(Liu, 2017). This system can cover most public places in China since those CCTV
cameras were installed in railway stations, airports, shopping malls, streets, schools,
universities, restaurants, cinemas, stadiums, buses, trains, cabs, flights, markets, and so
forth. Through using the Tian Wang System, the Chinese government can monitor
Chinese people’s everyday activities in a quick and effective way. Moreover, by
connecting to a database, which includes the pictures and identifying information of
people including foreigners in China, the Tian Wang system can not only quickly
recognize the identity of a person captured by a CCTV camera, but can also review the
person’s behaviors in the past few weeks and even the information regarding that
person’s social network. This system is very powerful. In 2017, a BBC News
correspondent John Sudworth tested the Tian Wang system by trying to stay hidden from
CCTV cameras in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province China. However, in 7 minutes, he
was captured by police because the Tian Wang System could even predict his possible
pathways of escape based on the previous footage captured by CCTV cameras (BBC
News, 2017).
This chapter explores myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization
Movement and the New Culture Movement, the tradition of numeracy, the discrepancy
between the needs of Chinese people and the country’s inadequate productive capacity,
and the CCP’s political practices, which are articulated and have exerted profound
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impacts on the status of science and technology. As this chapter has demonstrated, these
forces contribute to the veneration of science and technology in the era of reforms in
significant ways. The next chapter will address the other central issue of this dissertation,
Chinese women and their living situations in the era of reforms.
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Chapter Three: Chinese Women’s Roles in the Era of
Reforms
Chapter Two considered the influences on science and technology in the era of
reforms of Chinese myth, Confucianism and Daoism, the Westernization Movement and
the New Culture Movement, the Chinese tradition of numeracy, the discrepancy between
the needs of the large population and China’s inadequate capacity of production, and the
CCP’s policies. These elements contribute to the belief that science and technology are
powerful and can bring positive changes to Chinese society and people. The previous
chapter concluded that science and technology are venerated, which results in many
Chinese people’s preoccupation with them, their development regardless of the costs, and
their embeddedness into the CCP’s political practices.
This chapter focuses on Chinese women in the era of reforms through mapping
their roles. This chapter argues that the articulation of Chinese myth, Chinese language,
Confucianism and Daoism, and the CCP’s political practices disciplines Chinese women
to be wives and mothers in the era of reforms. However, at the same time, the
articulation of the discourse of The New Woman and the CCP’s political practices to
encourage and prepare women to join the workplace impacts women’s roles in the era of
reforms, resulting in an increasing number of Chinese women becoming professionals.
Thus, in the era of reforms, two predominant roles that many Chinese women have are
being a mother and a wife, and being a professional. The traditional role of being wives
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and mothers and the emerging new role of being professionals have created tensions and
contradictions that have impacted women’s living situations in significant ways.
As prelude to my discussion, I want to discuss an influential TV series, The First
Half of My Life/Wo De Qian Ban Sheng/我的前半生 (2017), in which the two leading
characters—Luo Zijun/罗子君 and Tan Jing /唐晶— are women in contemporary China.
This TV series is a noteworthy example because it showcases many tensions Chinese
women have experienced in the era of reforms. It became so popular that a photo of the
actresses Ma Yili and Yuan Quan, who played the roles of Luo Zijun and Tang Jing, was
chosen in November 2017 as the cover page of Elle (China), one of the most influential
high-fashion magazines in China. This TV series has also received many accolades such
as The Magnolia Award in 2018.
The first half of Luo Zijun’s life was spent as a rich housewife. However, in her
30s she was deserted by her husband after he decided to marry his mistress. After
reflecting on the first half of her life and deciding to support herself independently, Zijun
returned to the workplace with the help from her friend Tang Jing and Tang Jing’s
boyfriend He Han, with whom Zijun later felt in love. Tang Jing, unlike Luo Zijun,
devoted herself to work. However, after being betrayed by her long-term boyfriend He
Han and Zijun, Jing began to reflect on the first half of her life during which she rejected
He Han’s proposals and sacrificed her love for her career.
This TV series, which centers on Zijun and Jing’s struggle to balance their careers
and family lives, resonated with many Chinese women. In the era of reforms, the
discourse that good women are independent is popular; however, at the same time, good
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women are still expected to be virtuous wives and caring mothers. What follows is a
discussion of women’s two predominant and often conflicting roles in the era of
reforms—being wives and mothers and being professionals.

Chinese Women’ Roles as Wives and Mothers
Chinese women have always been expected to become wives and mothers. This
expectation is deeply rooted in Chinese myth, Chinese language, Confucianism and
Daoism, and Chinese political practices. The link between women and these sociocultural roles is a line of tendential force that resists disarticulation in the era of reforms
even when many significant changes have happened in Chinese society, as discussed in
Chapter One and Two.
Myth
Chinese women are always expected to get married and to have children. This
expectation was solidified in the early stages of Chinese civilization, as reflected in
mythical stories. Among Chinese mythical figures, we should pay special attention to
four of the most famous goddesses: Nü Wa/女娲, Guan Yin/观音, Chang E/嫦娥, and
Sao Ba Xing/扫把星. 25

25 To know more about Chinese mythical figures, please consider reading these books: 1) Birrell, A.(1993). Chinese
Mythology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 2) Christie, A.(1968). Chinese Mythology. Feltham: Hamlyn Publishing. 3)
Werner, E.T.C. (1922). Myths and Legends of China. New York: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd. 4) Yang, L.; An, D.;
&Turner, J., A. (2005). Handbook of Chinese Mythology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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Nü Wa, as discussed in Chapter Two, is a goddess with a human upper body and a
snake tail and is respected as the mother of human beings in China. She made people by
creating them from clay and is respected for her love for them. For example, in order to
patch the big hole in the sky, she used rocks of five colors and four legs of a giant
tortoise. When she was running out of materials, she sacrificed her body to patch the sky.
While ancient, Nü Wa remains an influential stereotype of Chinese women.
Chinese women are expected to follow Nü Wa as an example of shouldering the
responsibility of reproduction with love, taking good care of their children, and even
sacrificing their lives for their children unhesitatingly. Nü Wa is one of the most
significant figures in contemporary Chinese culture. For example, the popular Chinese
TV drama series Chinese Paladin (仙剑奇侠传), which aired from 2005 to 2016, depicts
the honorable lives of Nü Wa’s descendants, all of whom were women and who were
born with the obligation of taking care of people and later sacrificed themselves to fulfill
this obligation.
The second figure is Guan Yin. In Chinese myth, Guan Yin is the goddess of
mercy and compassion. Whereas in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, Avalokitesvara is the
male god of mercy and compassion, this figure was transformed into a woman in Chinese
Buddhism, which originates from Indian Buddhism but is more widely practiced than
Indian and Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary China. This goddess of mercy, Guan Yin,
is probably the most valued and honored goddess in Chinese culture. In Chinese myth,
Guan Yin was the third daughter of a king who was determined to join a nunnery. Her
father was outraged by her decision and tortured her. Later, he had become seriously ill
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and could only be cured by an ointment made from the hands and eyes of his children. In
another popular version, the ointment could only be made from the hands and eyes of
people who had no anger. Guan Yin did not hesitate to rip out her eyes and to cut off her
arms to save her father.
While an extreme story, Guan Yin represents another stereotype of Chinese
women: a filial daughter and a selfless beauty. A Chinese woman is expected to be a filial
daughter who has no hatred or anger towards her parents no matter how her parents treat
her. Moreover, in the myth, Guan Yin hears the cries of the world and helps people when
she witnesses miseries, as indicated by a popular image of her with a thousand hands and
eyes. Compassion has become a highly desired characteristic for Chinese women.
Moreover, Guan Yin is also deified as the figure who sends babies to families. Thus, it is
a common practice both in ancient and contemporary China that if a woman wants to get
pregnant, she will go to a temple of Guan Yin to beg for help. Thus, although Guan Yin
remains unmarried and doesn’t have a child of her own, she is still highly respected
because she takes care of all families and her maternal love is for all the people in the
world. Guan Yin is widely worshipped in contemporary China. In 2005, a 108 meter (354
feet) statue of Guan Yin was enshrined in Sanya, Hainan Province (“Guanyin of
Nanshan,” n.d.). The statue is one of the highest Buddhist statues in the world.
The third figure is Chang E. In Chinese myth, Chang E is the most beautiful
goddess. She was married to the expert archer Hou-Yi. After ten suns rose in the sky,
which made the living conditions unbearable, Hou-Yi shot down nine of them and left
only one in the sky. As a reward, he was given an elixir of immortality, but he was
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unwilling to take it and asked Chang E to keep it safe. However, Chang E could not resist
the temptation of being immortal and took the elixir. After, she started to float and fly
away until she finally landed on the moon. There, she is the only creature, aside from a
companion jade rabbit, and she leads a lonely, regretful life.
The myth of Chang E is very popular in contemporary China because it is often
promoted as proof that Chinese people’s dream of exploring the universe is deeply
rooted. For example, the Chinese government named its four unmanned lunar-orbit
spacecraft that have been sent to the moon as Chang E No. 1, Chang E No.2, Chang E
No.3, and Chang E No.4 and its lunar rover Yutu, which references the jade rabbit.
Moreover, Chinese culture romanticizes Chang E’s experience. For example, the MidAutumn Festival, which is a national Chinese holiday for families to gather together,
originates from the story of Chang E. Chinese people make cakes as offerings in
exchange for Chang E’s protection. However, as a feminist, I question the glorified
connotation of the story. Living lonely on the moon and being expelled from the
community of human beings might be difficult for anyone, including Chang E. It could
be viewed as the punishment for Chang E acting on her desire to be immortal and having
the courage to betray her husband in taking the elixir without his permission. Thus,
instead of solely viewing Chang E as the ascendant of Chinese astronauts or a protective
goddess, I focus as well on Chang E’s lived experience and view her as a Chinese woman
who is punished because of her quest for independence.
Similar to Chang E, Sao Ba Xing is another stereotype of Chinese women who
are not submissive to their husbands. The figure of Sao Ba Xing was crafted in an
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influential Chinese mythical novel, The Investiture of the Gods (Feng Sheng Yan Yi/封神

演义). Before being deified as a goddess of Sao Ba Xing, she was an ordinary woman
named Ma Zhaodi/马招娣. She was depicted as a greedy and shrewd woman who often
quarreled and fought with her husband Jiang Ziya/姜子牙 because she thought he was
not successful and rich enough, which led her to request a divorce. After the divorce, her
husband became so successful that he helped to establish the Zhou Dynasty and was
bestowed the Feng Sheng Bang, which is a list that empowers him to inaugurate new
gods of heaven. Enraged by his ex-wife Mao Zhaodi, who returned to him and bothered
him to inaugurate her as a goddess, Jiang Ziya inaugurate her as Sao Ba Xing, the
goddess responsible for spreading bad luck. Accordingly, no one wants or likes her.
People use water, brooms, and firecrackers to drive Sao Ba Xing out of their homes. Even
now, when Chinese people refer to a person, especially a woman, who is believed to
bring bad luck to others, they refer to that person as Sao Ba Xing.
These mythical figures reflect how a Chinese woman is expected to behave
culturally. She should be beautiful, gentle, a filial daughter, a supportive wife, and a
loving mother. Otherwise, she will be expelled, disgraced, and punished. These myths
constitute one of the key forces of articulation that emphasizes that Chinese women
should be virtuous wives and caring mothers.
Language
The Chinese language is another force that contributes significantly to the tenacity
of the link between Chinese women and their roles as wives and mothers. Chinese
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characters are hieroglyphic, which means they were made based on people’s
interpretations of images. For example, the number one in Chinese is “一,” the number
two in Chinese is “二,” the word for wood in Chinese is “木,” the word for many trees in
Chinese is “林,” and the word for forest in Chinese is “森林.” The Chinese character for
men is “男.” This character includes two parts: “田” means fields and “力” means
strength. When we put these two parts together, it is clear that Chinese men are supposed
to be powerful and conduct agricultural work. In contrast, the Chinese character of
women is “女.” This character reflects the figure of a woman who has full breasts and
wide hips, which are believed to be signs of fertility in Chinese culture. The difference
between the Chinese characters for men and women reveals the belief that men are strong
and are the breadwinners, while women are seen in terms of their reproductive organs.
These characterizations can be traced back through thousands of years of Chinese
civilization and language.
Moreover, the word “marriage” in Chinese is “婚姻.” Both the character of “婚”
and the character of “姻” begin with the radical “女/nv,” which refers to a woman. While
the character of men is absent, the close relation between the character of women and the
characters of marriage symbolically reinforces that marriage is an indispensable part of a
woman’s identity. “Wife” in Chinese is “妻.” Based on the classical Chinese book Shuo
Wen Jie Zi/说文解字, which interprets Chinese characters, “妻” refers to a woman doing
housework. “Pregnancy” in Chinese is “孕.” This Chinese character includes two parts
“乃” and “子.” “乃” not only depicts the body shape of a pregnant woman, but also refers
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to a woman’s “container”—the womb. Meanwhile, “子” means boys, so the figure of
women contains a male offspring (Xu, 2000). If, as Levi-Strauss states, language works
as a hidden structure influencing our behavior and thoughts, then it is—at least in part—
through these Chinese linguistic characters that Chinese women learn their roles and
negotiate their lived experience.
Confucianism and Daoism
The third line of force that contributes to keeping the link between women and the
expectation for them to become wives and mothers is Confucianism and Daoism. As
discussed in Chapter Two, some aspects of Confucianism and Daoism remain influential
in the era of reforms.
Besides promoting people’s subordination to authority and the government as
well as emphasizing education, the Confucian ideas concerning marriage and family are
powerful in contemporary China. Bell (2008) observes that in some provinces,
“communist Party officials… are assessed on the basis of Confucian values such as filial
piety and family responsibility” (p. 9). Moreover, it is becoming trendy for parents to
send their daughters to receive training in Confucianism, a trend that is strongly promoted
by some Chinese celebrities. In January 2019, Wei Pan/潘蔚, a famous hostess of the
Travel Channel and the wife of a popular Chinese singer, was interviewed. In the
interview, Pan explained her reason for quitting her job, leaving her comfortable life in
Beijing, moving to a small city, and writing a book recording and reflecting on her daily
life:
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[Bothered by my children’s education], I said what about moving to Xuzhou
where there’s a school [named Hua Xia Xue Gong/华夏学宫] focusing on
traditional Chinese value[s] [especially Confucianism, thus my children can study
there] …. I cooked for the children. I make wonton, stuffed buns, noodles and
steamed bread for them. The smell of mom’s cooking [represents the best of a
home]. …Our children [have changed] a lot in the past three years [since they
have studied in that school]. Like Aibao [, my youngest daughter,] has learned
and can recite much [of the] classic literature [in Confucianism]….Now I work as
a teacher [in that school]….I teach girls handicrafts. [A girl] [will] become a wife
and a mother in the future. [Thus,] it is important for her to express her love and
emotion through needle and thread. (Yitiao, 2019).
Besides Pan Wei’s daughters, Tao Hong/陶虹, a famous Chinese actress, also sent her
daughter to study in the same school even though this school is not qualified to award
students with any degree. Since many Chinese people cannot afford the high tuition of
Hua Xia Xue Gong, they send their children, mostly their daughters, to study in other
short-term Confucian programs. These programs, which are often titled “nü de ban/女德
班,” claim to enable girls to become virtuous by educating them with Confucianism. 26
“Nü de ban” programs promote the ideas that women should be submissive to their
parents, remain chaste before marriage, and show deference to their husbands. These

26Nü

De Ban (女德班): in Chinese character “nü” refers to women, “de” means virtue, and “ban” means classroom. Nü
de ban refers to classrooms that center on instructing women to be virtuous.
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programs often argue that a virtuous woman who abides by these ideas will be granted a
happy life. Despite the criticism of this program by some Chinese people and local
governments—for example, in December 13, 2018, Chongqing Wenming Wang, a
website sponsored by the government of Chongqing City, published the article “The
Brainwash of Nü De Ban Must Be Stopped”—many parents still send their daughters to
study there. Furthermore, some sexist ancient Confucian familial practices have been
revived. For example, on February 10, 2019, an article titled “The Ridicule of People in
Shan Dong Province During the Spring Festival is a Reflection of the Corruption of
Chinese Culture” was published on People. com. 27 The article focused on the criticism of
the practice of women preparing food, but not being allowed to eat at the table in Shan
Dong Province, which is the birthplace of Confucianism. It argued that this practice
reflects Confucian values that can make families live harmoniously and that the criticism
against this practice reveals that China’s culture is losing its Confucian roots and being
degraded. These examples indicate that Confucianism, especially Confucian thoughts on
marriage and family, are gradually regaining their influence in Chinese culture in the era
of reforms.
The Confucian position on marriage and family strongly promotes two ideas.
First, Confucianism emphasizes that people should get married and should have children.
Second, Confucianism argues that members in a family should have different roles and
responsibilities. The position of women in this system is subordinate.

27This article was initially published on People.cn, a website that is sponsored by the Chinese government, and was
cited by many websites in China. However, in a few hours, it was taken down from People. cn although this article can
be still be accessed from other websites.
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First and foremost, Confucianism argues that people should get married when
they become adults. 28 Mencius argues that getting married is expected from the time of a
baby’s birth. In the book Mencius, Mencius writes, “When a boy is born, all parents hope
he will someday set up a household, and when a girl is born, they hope she will marry”
(pp. 64-65). In many places in China, a related practice used to be popular and is still
performed. On the birth date of a girl, her father plants a camphor tree in the yard. When
the girl is going to marry, her father cuts the tree down and makes her a suitcase out of
the tree. The girl carries this suitcase to her husband’s home. This practice demonstrates
that parents plan for their daughters’ departures from time they are born to join other
families through marriage.
Besides emphasizing the expectation for women to marry, Confucianism
underscores the importance of women having children in their marriages. In Mencius,
there is a sentence “Bu Xiao You San, Wu Hou Wei Da. (不孝有三，无后为大).” The
original meaning of this sentence is: every child should shoulder his/her responsibilities
and respect his/her parents. However, the meaning of this sentence was redefined by later
Confucian scholars to become “no posterity is the worst of the three unfilial acts.” This
later version is still widely accepted and has remained the philosophical support for
procreation-driven marriage in China. In fact, one of the most important beliefs in ancient

28I

want to emphasize an important detail. Although same-sex love existed in ancient China as expressed by the
phrase“Long Yang Zhi Pi/龙阳之癖”that describes homosexual attraction among gay men, only heterosexual
marriages are recognized in classic Confucian texts.
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Chinese culture was “more sons, more happiness” (Duo Zi Duo Fu/多子多福). Stockard
(2002) points out that in ancient China,
It was a moral duty of the highest order to have a son, to assure that the line of
your grandfather and father—your line—continued unbroken through the
generation. This moral duty gave marriage in Chinese society its primary goal: to
produce sons to continue the descent line of the husband. (p. 44)
In this way, women were endowed with the responsibility to bear sons.
Additionally, Confucian scholars set rules for members in a family and required
them to follow these rules. Men should work outside and women should stay inside. Men
should be breadwinners and women homemakers. Wang (2011) summarizes Confucian
thoughts on men’s and women’s separate roles as “for a woman, bearing and raising
children for her family is more important than [all] other things in the world”; in contrast,
“for a man, he is supposed to build up [an] establishment outside” (p. 96).
Confucianism also argues that a husband and a wife should help, support, and
take care of each other. But this cooperation is contingent on a wife’s submissiveness to
her husband. An ancient Chinese ritual embodies this emphasis. Mencius describes this
ritual:
When a young man is capped, he receives a charge from his father, but when a
girl is married, it is her mother who gives her the charge. 29 As her daughter is

29Cap:

In ancient China, when a boy became an adult, a ceremony would be held for him. In the ceremony, a cap would
be put in his head. This practice signifies that he is recognized as an adult by his community. In the ritual of capping,
his father would give him advice and outline his expectations for the newly adult man.
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escorted out the gate she admonishes her: “When you reach your new home, be
respectful! Be modest! Never disobey your husband!” (Mencius, n.d., p. 64)
Even Ban Chao/班超, who advocated for women’s education in the Han Dynasty, writes,
“If a wife does not serve her husband, then the proper relationship (between men and
women) and the natural order of things are neglected and destroyed” (as cited in Swann
1960, p. 83).
Confucianism strongly emphasizes filiality. Parents raise their children; children,
in return, should take good care of their parents as they age. To be a filial child, the
person should provide his or her parents with clothing, shelter, food, service, and
psychological comfort. This means that a boy should respect his parents’ opinions, obey
his parents’ orders, and satisfy his parents’ expectations, which usually include having a
successful and respected career. For a girl, this means she should marry someone who is
chosen by her parents and serve her new family wholeheartedly to win her parents the
good reputation of raising a virtuous daughter. The girl is also expected to have children,
preferably sons, after she got married.
Historically, the only way for women to become successful and achieve selffulfillment was to be virtuous wives and caring mothers. As a result, husbands and sons
could focus on their careers and had more paths open to them to become successful.
Given their husbands’ and sons’ success, women could get credit for being successful in
their domestic roles. Accordingly, women were not expected to become knowledgeable
or read many books. It was believed that “it is a woman’s virtue to be ignorant” (Nü Zi
Wu Cai Bian Shi De/女子无才便是德). In contrast, women were expected to be good at
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decorating themselves in order to be aesthetically pleasing and to be skilled at
needlework in order to make clothing for their husbands and sons. The rule of “three
obedience” (San Cong/三从) clearly revealed how Confucianism planned an ancient
Chinese woman’s destiny: to obey her father before marriage, to obey her husband when
married, and to obey her son in widowhood (Wei Jia Cong Fu, Ji Jia Cong Fu, Fu Si
Cong Zi/未嫁从父，既嫁从夫，父死从子). 30
Although these Confucian ideas were more widely practiced in the past, they are
rooted in Chinese culture and remain influential in contemporary China. For example, in
the era of reforms, many Chinese people are hostile to women who have received higher
education. There is a popular saying: “there are three kinds of creatures in the world—
men, women, and women with doctoral degrees/Shi Shang You San Zhong Ren—Nan
Ren, Nv Ren, Nv Bo Shi/世上有三种人—男人，女人，女博士.” This argument
indicates that women who receive advanced higher education are not even considered
human beings. Moreover, Chinese women with doctoral degrees are often characterized
as dinosaurs, which are culturally recognized as ugly and ferocious creatures. These
interpretations of Chinese women who receive good education reveal that it is still not
preferred for women to become very knowledgeable in contemporary Chinese culture.
In 2018, there was a popular Chinese TV series Mother’s Life/娘道, which
depicted and celebrated a subordinated woman. The main character Ying Gu sold herself
as a slave to buy a coffin and a gravestone for her father. After marrying her husband and

30 To know more about the rule of three obedience, please read Gao, X. (2003). Women Existing For Men:
Confucianism and Social Injustice against Women in China. Race, Gender & Class, 10(3), 114-125.
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giving birth to three daughters, she became so ashamed because she failed to produce her
husband a baby boy. Her signature phrase, “Chaozong [her husband’s given name], let
me give you a boy,” reflected her dedication to the task of having a baby boy
(Guo, 2016). After eight years without conceiving a baby boy, she was expelled by her
husband’s family. However, she was willing to accept this punishment and believed that
it was a fair treatment of her. After the sudden death of her husband, she found out that
she was pregnant with her husband’s child again, a baby boy. In the end of the story,
when her only son, who later became a traitor in the War Against Japanese Invasion, was
about to be executed, Ying Gu stood in front of her son and took the bullet in his place.
Moreover, through studying the parental matchmaking corners, where hundreds
or even thousands of parents get together in parks or in big squares to exchange their
children’s information (such as age, salary, educational background, height, and weight)
in order to find potential satisfactory partners, Zhang and Sun (2013) argue that:
The existence of parental matchmaking corners indicates…the enduring
significance of marriage in urban China and the powerful effects of a selective
rendering [of] traditional gender ideology— “men leading the outer domain and
women the inner domain.” (p. 138)
Besides Confucianism, Daoism, especially the Daoist religion, also has exerted
profound impacts on Chinese women’s role as a wife and a mother. The Daoist religion
has many gods and goddess that are responsible for managing marriage and reproduction
among human beings, such as Jiu Tian Xuan Nv/九天玄女, Xi Wang Mu/西王母, , Bi
Xia Yuan Jun/碧霞元君, and Bao Sheng Da Di/保生大帝. These figures reflect the
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strong emphases of the Daoist religion on the necessity of people getting married and
having children.
Moreover, the Daoist religion promotes the philosophy of Tai Ji/太极, also often
written as Tai Chi. The Tai Ji Diagram below is recognized as the most thoughtful yet
simple reflection of the essence of Tai Ji, which was first put forward by the famous
Daoist priest Chen Tuan (871—989):

Figure 3. 1 The Image of Tai Ji. This image was drawn by the author.
The Tai Ji diagram includes two main images: a black and a white fish that fuse together
by connecting heads and tails. In traditional Chinese culture, the image of fish has a
strong connotation of intimacy. For example, the phrase that is used to this day to
describe the sexual pleasure between men and women is “the joyful connection between
fish and water/yu shui zhi huan/鱼水之欢.” In Tai Ji philosophy, the black fish refers to
yin/阴 that can be simplified as femininity, and the white fish refers to yang/阳 that can
be simplified as masculinity. The close connection between the two fish signifies the
intimacy of yin and yang, which is promoted by the Daoist religion.
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In fact, the Daoist religion pursues an intricate balance between yin and yang,
emphasizes that this balance is the beginning of everything, and argues that the marital
and reproductive connection between men and women enables the world to achieve this
balance. Tai Ping Jing/太平经, one of the earliest but classic books of the Daoist
religion, points out that “by performing the duties of husbands and wives, both yin and
yang find what they need, and the world can be peaceful” (Wang, 1997, p. 17), and
criticizes people who do not get married, stating that “the [so-called] chaste men and
women who are eager for the reputation of being pure and who refuse to connect with
each other are against the world. This action inhibits the connection between yin and
yang, which results in the death of the world” (Wang, 1997, p. 37). In fact, different from
Confucianism—especially some Confucian thoughts that were developed during the
Song Dynasty that strongly restricted and vilified people’s, especially women’s, sexual
desires— the Daoist religion argues that the sexual connection between men and women
is vital.
Due to the Daoist religion’s emphases on marriage and reproduction, Chinese
women are expected to shoulder their responsibilities to marry men and have babies.
According to the Daoist religion, it is necessary for women to do so in order to ensure the
peace and the flourishing of everything in the world.
Chinese Governments’ Policies
Besides Chinese myth, language, Confucianism and Daoism, Chinese political
practices also contribute to the expectation that Chinese women should be wives and
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mothers. Although the policies have varied in different historical periods, Chinese
women have always been disciplined to be wives and mothers.
In ancient China, governments were guided by Confucian thought. Confucianism
believes that governors must first and foremost govern families, regarding the individual
family as the basis of wider society. Thus, in ancient China, there were many prescriptive
policies that required women to get married and have children for the purpose of
increasing the labor force and maintaining social stability. For example, under Emperor
Taizong of Tang, officials matched single men who were over 20 and single women who
were over 15 to find them partners to marry. In the Song Dynasty, the legal minimum age
of marriage for men was 15, and 13 for women. Similarly, for single people over the
legal minimum age for marriage, the government intervened to introduce them to partners
(Wang J, 2011). Besides getting married, women were also compelled to have children. It
was legal for a husband to take concubines or even divorce his wife if she could not
produce an heir for his family.
Although the CCP abolished the law that allowed men to divorce their wives
based on the grounds of infertility, it continues to discipline women to get married and to
have children. Before the era of reforms, in the 1950s, after sending soldiers—mostly
men—to Xin Jiang Province to do agricultural work, Mao’s government recruited more
than 40,000 single women to work in the same province. One of the most important
purposes of this recruitment was to provide soldiers with wives. There was a famous
slogan for this historical: without wives, the soldiers cannot keep their minds on the
work; without sons, the soldiers cannot view Xin Jiang Province as their hometown (Dai
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& Vingie, n.d.). Additionally, in order to fight against female infanticide, in what might
on the surface seem like valuing women for their own sake, Mao’s government used
some slogans such as “if you don’t give birth to baby girls, in the future, your sons cannot
find women to marry” (“Striking Slogans in China,” 2017).
Moreover, when the PRC was established in 1949, working labor was in shortage
because many Chinese people had died in the War Against Japanese Invasion and the
Civil War in China. Thus, from 1949-1953, Mao Zedong’s government encouraged
Chinese couples to give birth to children. Two proverbs reflected the family planning
policies at that time. The first is “many hands make light work (Ren Duo Li Liang Da/人
多力量大).” The second, which often appeared in Mao Zedong’s conversations, is “when
many help to gather firewood, the flames shoot high (Zhong Ren Shi Chai Huo Yan Gao/
众人拾柴火焰高).” Accordingly, the Chinese government also formulated a series of
policies to regulate abortion and birth control. For instance, in 1952, the Chinese Ministry
of Health announced that besides special circumstances such as diseases, abortion was
prohibited; and individuals could have contraception only if their doctors could prove that
birth control was necessary for saving mothers’ lives.
In the era of reforms, the CCP’s tradition of emphasizing marriage and families
continues, as Fincher (2014) argues, “as any Communist Party publication will tell you,
marriage and family form ‘the basi[c] cell of society’ and ‘a harmonious family is the
foundation of a harmonious society’” (p. 23). The CCP has formulated policies and
promoted discourses to discipline women to get married and to have babies.
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The Chinese government has implemented policies that make the living situations
of single women difficult. Among many related policies, I want to focus on the CCP’s
policy regarding buying apartments. As discussed in Chapter Two, Chinese culture
strongly emphasizes that an adult should own a decent apartment, which is not easy in
China. In the era of reforms, owning an apartment in urban areas has become increasingly
difficult. With the growing number of people who move to and work in big cities, and
who want to buy an apartment there, there is an increasing demand to buy apartments in
cities, which is exacerbated by the limited capacity to develop these spaces further.
Furthermore, real estate developers and investors manipulate the housing prices in order
to maximize profits. Consequently, apartment prices in big Chinese cities are extremely
high. For example, in February 2019, the average price for apartments in Beijing was
45,220 Yuan per m² ( approximately 724.30 USD per sq ft; in Chao Yang District, the
most sought after district in Beijing, the average price reached 102,459 Yuan per m²
(approximately 1641.12 USD per sq ft); in Shanghai, the average price was 47,920 Yuan
per m² (approximately 767.55 USD per sq ft ); and in Huang Pu District, one of the most
sought after districts in Shanghai, the average price was 142,100 Yuan per m²
(approximately 2276.06 USD per sq ft) [Anjuke.com(a), 2019; Anjuke.com (b) 2019]. In
contrast, by December 31, 2018, the median sale price in Chicago was 245 USD per sq ft;
and the median sale price in Manhattan NYC was 1,489 USD per sq ft [Zillow.com (a),
n.d.; Zillow (b), n.d.]. These statistics indicate that the housing prices in big Chinese cities
are extremely high even compared with big American cities.
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Facing the high housing prices, the Chinese government has formulated policies
to regulate the market. The Chinese government argues that the main reason for the high
housing prices in big cities is the investors who have bought too many apartments.
Driven by this logic, the Chinese government regulates property ownership in order to
eliminate speculators. China’s central government classifies Chinese people’s needs as:
necessary requirement (Gang Xu/刚需) and soft requirement (Tan Xing Xu Qiu/弹性需
求). The central government argues that the market of real estate should first serve
people’s necessary requirements, more importantly Chinese couples’ needs for housing.
Accordingly, the Chinese local governments have set up their own policies based on the
central government. In 2018, the local government of Shanghai announced that no single
local residents are allowed to buy apartments. However, married couples that are not
local to Shanghai and have submitted their social security fees for 5 consecutive years are
allowed to buy a unit, and in some cases even two. Because of this policy, people who
want to buy an apartment in Shanghai have to bring their marriage certificates to prove
their legitimacy. Besides Shanghai, Guanzhou, another big city in China, also has a
similar policy. According to this policy, single non-local people have to submit their
social security fees for 5 consecutive years in order to become a candidate to buy a unit.
However, married people, even if both of them are not local, only need to submit their
social security fees for 3 consecutive years. Single local people are allowed to buy one
apartment, but the married locals are allowed to buy two. Similarly, in Beijing, unmarried
people are also only allowed to buy one apartment while married people are allowed to
buy two (“New! The policies of buying apartment,” 2018).
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The Chinese government’s policies relating to buying apartments do not favor
single people, especially single professional women who work in big cities. This is
because compared to single women, most single Chinese men are low-skilled workers
who cannot afford the high price of housing in big cities. Thus, these policies are not
relevant to them. Men from the middle-class and upper-class can easily find women to
marry due to the Chinese tradition that expects women to “marry up,” so they are not
seriously influenced by these regulatory policies. 31 However, for many single middleclass Chinese women who want to have a unit of their own and can afford the down
payment, the only way for them to buy one is to marry someone and in most cases this
involves rushing to find partners. In fact, an increasing number of Chinese single women
who work in the big cities expressed their strong desires of buying an apartment of their
own in these cities. These women “argue that compared with marriage, an apartment
offers them a stronger feeling of security…. They argue that an apartment can
significantly improve their living conditions and is also an investment” (“Why? An
Increasing Number of Single Women in Big Cities,” 2019). This means that due to the
Chinese government’s regulations, many single professional women have to compromise
their singlehood or their dreams of owning apartments. Thus, although on the surface, the
Chinese government’s policies concerning property acquisition exert negative influence
on both single men and women equally; professional women who work in big cities are

31The

cultural expectation for women to marry up will subsequently be discussed in more detail.
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the group of people most subject to the discriminatory effects of the government’s
housing policy.
Besides the policies related to buying apartments, the Chinese government has
also formulated other policies that disfavor single people. For example, since June 2017,
the Chinese government has established the Special Fund for Marriage Consumption
Subsidies (Jie Hun Xiao Fei Bu Tie Zhuan Xiang Ji Jin/结婚消费补贴专项基金). This
special fund aims to give subsidies to every newly married Chinese couple. This fund,
which comes from social security fees that are paid by both single and married workers,
is used exclusively to support newly married Chinese couples regardless of their
economic situations. In this way, the Chinese government denies single people’s access
to funds that they have paid into.
Furthermore, the Chinese government has begun to intervene into people’s
divorces, making the process more difficult. According to the Chinese Marriage Law,
there are two kinds of divorce: negotiated divorce and one-party divorce. Basically, if
both husband and wife agree to divorce, they can get the divorce certificate quickly from
the government. As explained in the Article 31 in the Marriage Law of China, “divorce
shall be granted if husband and wife both desire it. Both parties shall apply to the
registration office for divorce” (Commission on China, 2006). However, if only one party
desires the divorce, the process is more difficult and time-consuming. For example, local
government officials usually intervene by talking with the couple to figure out the
reasons that drive them to divorce. Moreover, the Chinese culture strongly opposes
divorce, as indicated by the phrase “one should rather damage ten temples than destroy a
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marriage/ ning chai shizuomiao, bu chai yi dun hun/宁拆十座庙,不拆一段婚,” which
can be roughly understood as people should not destroy a marriage for any reason. Given
this cultural belief, officials usually try to persuade couples to change their minds to
avoid divorce. In some places, an official’s work performance is even evaluated by the
number of couples that he or she successfully persuaded from divorce.
Since August 2018, the Chinese government has experimentally introduced the
“calm down” period for divorce. The Chinese government claimed that China’s high
divorce rate was caused by China’s Law of Marriage that made divorce “convenient.”
Thus, the government needed to intervene to reduce the divorce rate. They set up a
month-long calm down period for couples who want to divorce. This means that the
couples need to wait for one month between the time that they submit their mutually
consensual requests for divorce and the time the government begins to process their
requests. Moreover, during this calm down period, either of the partners can withdraw his
or her request. Accordingly, a negotiated divorce can turn into a more time-consuming
and arduous one-party divorce. In this way, the Chinese government hopes that more
Chinese couples, especially young couples, maintain stable partnerships.
Besides implementing policies, the Chinese government has engaged in
promoting discourses that oppose single people, such as the discourse that single people
are irresponsible and the discourse of the leftover women. The Chinese government
openly criticizes single people for being irresponsible, as described in the article “The
Population of Single Adults in China Reaches 200,000,000: A Population that Equates to
the Entire Populations of Russia and the U.K. Combined” that was published on August
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16, 2017 in People.cn, a website sponsored by the Central Committee of the Communist
Youth League. This article claims that “because single people have fewer responsibilities
compared with married people, it is much easier for single people to become lazy and
lack motivation to work… [Accordingly] they are influencing the Chinese economy in
negative ways” (“The Population of Single Adults,” 2017).
Additionally, the Chinese government has actively engaged in promoting the
discourse of the leftover women. “Leftover women (Sheng Nü/剩女),” a phrase that
refers to single professional urban women who are older than 27 years old, first appeared
on the internet in 2006. The word “sheng/剩” refers to remains or leftovers, and is often
used to describe something that is seen as less desirable. The word “nü/女” refers to
women. Chinese people combine these two words and use this derogatory term to
describe the group of single Chinese women who are mostly college educated, have
successful careers, and earn satisfactory salaries. In 2007, China’s Ministry of Education
even added the term “leftover women” to its official lexicon and since then, this
discourse has become not only more pervasive but also has gained “legitimate” status in
Chinese culture.
Before I explain the discourse of the leftover women in detail, I need to clarify
one point that it is not the case that China has a surplus of women that results in a large
number of single women. Instead, in contemporary China, there are fewer women
compared with men. Due to the Chinese culture’s preference for boys over girls, there has
been a long tradition of female infanticide, especially in rural areas, as demonstrated by
Jiang, Li, Feldman, and Sánchez-Barricarte (2012). Driven by some Chinese families’
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devotion to provide their baby boys sufficient resources such as money and parental love
to ensure their survival and success, they kill their baby girls. Moreover, due to China’s
one-child policy that had been implemented since 1980, the policy that required most
Chinese households to have only one child, the practice of female infanticide became
more prevalent. 32 Denyer (2016) reported that due to the one-child policy, “there [were]
30 to 60 million ‘missing girls’” in China who were “apparently killed in the womb or
just after the birth.”
A serious consequence of female infanticide is the striking gender imbalance in
the era of reforms. By 2017, 51.17% of the total population was male. This fairly equal
distribution was due in part to the surplus of women with longer life spans. However, for
young generations, there are more males, which make the gender imbalance increasingly
pronounced. For example, from the ages of 15 to 19, the sex ratio was 100 females to
117.7 males; from the ages of 20 to 24, the sex ratio was 100 females to 110.98 males;
and from the ages of 25 to 29, the sex ratio was 100 females to 104.47 males. In part due
to the gender imbalance, there is a lack of single Chinese women. Among the population
over 15-years-old who never married, 104,688 were males and 72,470 were females
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). This lack of single women results in a
surplus of men who are unable to find female partners.
Additionally, due to the deeply-rooted cultural belief that women should marry
up, Chinese women are expected to marry men who are superior to them either in their

32I will provide a detailed explanation of China’s one-child policy later in this chapter and in Chapter Five when I
discuss IVF.
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educational, economic, or familial backgrounds. Chinese culture argues that through
marrying up, a woman not only achieves self-fulfillment but also honors her parents.
Moreover, as discussed earlier in this chapter, since Confucianism promotes marriage
that subordinates the wife, it is advocated that through marrying up, women will be more
likely to be submissive and thereby maintain their marriages. From a cultural standpoint,
this kind of marriage is more stable.
Because of the expectation for Chinese women to marry up, many Chinese men
from the lower-middle and working classes have the most difficulty finding partners. In
Chinese society, these men are referred to as bare branches/ guang gun/光棍. The guang
guns are already in the base level of society and cannot fulfill Chinese women’s
expectation of marrying up. Fincher (2014) points out that “most of [guang guns] are
poor, uneducated and rural” (p. 22). Fong (2016) argues that the population of guang
guns will continue to increase. She writes, “ten years later [in 2026], one in four men in
China will be a low-skilled bachelor” (p. 109). Moreover, in Chinese society, guang guns
are viewed as potential disruptors to social harmony. Fincher (2014) recorded an editorial
that explains the living situations of guang guns in the People’s Daily, a newspaper
sponsored by the CCP:
The continual accumulation of unmarried men of legal marrying age greatly
increase the risk of social instability and insecurity….[It was reported that] older
unmarried men in villages surveyed in the past three years have taken part in
activities destroying social order, including gambling, rioting, stealing and gang
fighting. (p. 21)
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Thus, single women, who constitute the smaller population in the era of reforms, are
expected to “tame” guang guns even though marrying these men is against the cultural
expectation of marrying up and possibly their personal inclinations to remain single. The
discourse of the leftover women that has emerged in this context, to a large degree serves
the purpose of disciplining and compelling single women to marry single men.
The leftover women include two predominant stereotypes and can be classified
into several levels. The first stereotype of leftover women can be summarized as ugly,
unwanted women. This stereotype is of women who lack physical beauty and thus cannot
attract men to marry. Gradually they become jaded, blame men for being evil, and turn
into pathetic misandrists. The second stereotype is of women who are unrealistically
picky beauties. This stereotype of leftover women is often represented as women who are
beautiful but are extremely picky and have unrealistically high expectations for their
partners to be perfect people.
Although these two stereotypes are different, they are similar in terms of
indicating that single women are problematic and should be educated. The single women
who fit into the first stereotype are supposed to understand that it is due to their
unattractiveness that they cannot find partners. Thus, they should stop blaming men for
their status of being leftover. The single women who fit the second stereotype should be
educated to be realistic and understand that the perfect person doesn’t exist. In short,
these stereotypes contribute to the discourse that argues that leftover women are
troublemakers and should be disciplined to marry.
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Moreover, in Chinese society, different terms are used to refer to leftover women,
which I believe constitute a hierarchy of discrimination based on women’s ages. Below, I
list these terms and explain the hierarchy:
Level One (the basic level): single women between 25 and 27 are labeled as “Leftover
Women Warriors” (Sheng Dou Shi/剩斗士), which means that they fight in order to find
partners.
Level Two: single women between 28 and 30 are labeled as “Leftover Women Who Must
Succeed” (Bi Sheng Ke/必剩客), which means that they have no time to waste and must
find partners as soon as possible.
Level Three: single women between 31 and 35 are labeled as “Buddhas of Leftover
Women” (Dou Zhan Sheng fo/斗战剩佛), which means that they have already surpassed
most single women in terms of the difficulties of getting married.
Level Four: single women above 35 are labeled as “Great Sages of Leftover Women” (Qi
Tian Da Sheng/齐天大剩), which derides these single women for being leftover for so
long.
Level Five (the Highest Level): single women above 45 are labeled as “Kings of Leftover
Women” (Sheng Zhe Wei Wang/胜者为王), which ridicules these single women for
beating all leftover women and becoming their kings by achieving the ultimate “success”
in terms of failing to finding partners.
These labels are used to shame single women even though they may have
successful careers and belong to the middle or even upper classes. In contrast, most

107

middle-class single Chinese men over 30-years-old are labeled as “Uncle” (Da Shu/大叔),
a name that often used in Korean romantic dramas that depict how handsome, mature,
successful, rich, middle-aged men fall in love with young and poor girls. Thus the
connotation of “uncle” is positive and in sharp contrast with the connotations of the labels
assigned to unmarried women. A popular Chinese saying explicitly reveals the sharp
difference between the cultural interpretation of aged men and women: A man in his
forties is a flower in bloom, but a woman is soybean residue (Nan Ren 40 Yi Zhi Hua, Nv
Ren 40 Dou Fu Zha/男人 40 一枝花，女人 40 豆腐渣).
Although the discourse of the leftover women is discriminatory, the Chinese
government has engaged in promoting this discourse as part of its ongoing practices of
disciplining and compelling single women to get married through shaming them and
creating psychological burdens for their parents. For example, on March 10, 2011—a few
days after International Women’s Day— an article titled “How Many Leftover Women
Deserve Our Sympathy?” showed up on the website of the All-China Women’s
Federation. 33 The article argued that “as women age, they are worth less and less. So by
the time they get their Master’s and Ph.D., they become old and ugly like white pearls
become yellow and lose their shine.” The article concluded that “most leftover women do
not deserve our sympathy; instead, they need to be educated and be reflective on their
behaviors.” When I baidued the keywords “剩女/leftover women” and “新华网

33The

article was original published on the website of All-China Women’s Federation, which is a governmental
organization that aims to promote gender equality in China. However, this article was revoked later from this website.
But I managed to retrieve this article from an online forum (http://m.kdnet.net/share-8839395.html) in which a user
copied the content of the article before it was revoked. I translated this article from Chinese into English.
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/Xinhua.net,” a website sponsored by the Chinese government on June 11, 2019, at 11:30
a.m., I found numerous reports on the leftover women on the Xinhua net. 34 The
following shows the top three articles in the first page that I found:

Figure 3. 2 Screen Capture of Online Articles On Xinhua Net. This screen capture was
taken by the author.
The first article, “A Blind Date of a 25-Year-old Leftover Woman: All the Dozens of
Previous Dating Partners Got Married,” describes a 25-year-old single women’s dilemma
of requesting true love, encountering difficulties finding partners available, and puts
forward the statement that “women should engage in blind dates as young as possible”
(Li, 2018). The second article, “The Shift of Maternal Love: A Leftover Monkey
Becomes a Mother of a Chicken,” describes how in a zoo in Israel, a leftover female
monkey could not find partners and thus lacked the outlet to release her maternal instinct.
Finally, she “adopted” a chicken who ran away from the barn and stayed around her,
treating the chicken as her child (Chen, 2017). Although this article focuses on animals, it

34Baidu/百度:

Baidu is the biggest search engine in China. Because Google is blocked, most Chinese people use Baidu
to search for information.
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still serves the purpose of shaming single women. The third article, “A 40-Year-Old
Leftover Woman: I Am Still Expecting Love, But I Am Prepared to Spend the Rest of
My Life Lonely,” describes the living situation of a 40-year-old single woman, ending
with her decision to travel to Yunnan Province, which is often advertised as a romantic
place, where she expects to meet new people (Zhou, 2019).
In recent years, the participation of the Chinese government in promoting the
discourse of the leftover women has become less overt. For example, on February17,
2017, China Women’s News, sponsored by the All-China Women’s Federation, published
the article “The word ‘Shengnv/Leftover Woman’ Should Disappear.” The article argues
that aged single women are not leftover women; instead, remaining single is merely a
woman’s choice of lifestyle. Aged single women are strong, independent, brave, and
typically lead productive lives (Mo, 2017). However, this doesn’t mean that the Chinese
government respects single women’s decisions of following their hearts to remain single.
Three months later, on May 17, 2017, Junke He, one of the primary officials of Central
Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League, announced that the Chinese
Communist Youth League would begin to educate young Chinese people to have a
correct attitude to love and marriage and help aged single Chinese people to find partners.
On that day, the hashtag “The Communist Youth Leagues Helps Aged Single People to
Find Partners” was trending in Weibo, Chinese Twitter. Some Chinese netizens ridiculed
this policy and left comments like, “Thanks for taking care of me. I am waiting for the
Communist Youth League to assign me a girlfriend/boyfriend.” Since then, local Chinese
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governments have worked to help single people find partners by holding parties and
organizing speed dating events.
Besides disciplining Chinese women to get married, the Chinese government also
emphasizes that married Chinese women should have children, although the number of
children has changed from one child to two children with the implementations of the onechild policy and the two-child policy in the era of reforms. On September 25, 1980, the
Chinese government published the document, “A Letter to All the Members of the
Communist Party and the Communist Youth League Concerning Controlling Chinese
Population Growth.” This document advocated for communist members to voluntarily
limit their family size to one child. In December 1982, the one-child policy obtained a
nearly constitutional status. This policy was primarily put forward and supported by a
group of scientists in STEM. Deng Xiaoping, the head of the Chinese government at that
time, believed that one of the most critical tasks of the Chinese government was to
develop the economy and to transform China into a global superpower. As discussed in
Chapter Two, Deng believed in science and technology and had strong faith in scientists
and engineers to help him to solve the country’s problems. However, the Cultural
Revolution had disrupted the Chinese educational system, which resulted in a scarcity of
social and natural scientists available to work with Deng. Thus, he had to turn to
“rocketmen”—scholars in military science who were under protection from political
violence during the Cultural Revolution—for help. He appointed Song Jian, a Russiantrained missile specialist, to be the head of a research group, composed mostly of
rocketmen and mathematicians, which worked to formulate population policies.
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Song’s group argued China’s huge population seriously hindered the development
of the country. These scientists’ solution to China’s demographic problem was
significantly impacted by Western scientists such as Olsder, Kwakernaak, and Goldsmith
(Greenhalgh 2007, Fong 2016). This group laid out:
[A] radical new vision of population control as a giant social-systems-engineering
project. In this vision, the problem of population was one of an imminent
population-economy-environment crisis. Cybernetics (or control-theoretic)
equations showed that the ‘scientific’ and ‘only effective’ way to avert it was a
drastic one-child-for-all policy to be implemented immediately. (Greenhalgh,
2010, p. 32)
After the implementation of the one-child policy, there were some minor changes.
For example, due to the more conservative environment in the rural areas in China, most
families wanted to have a boy no matter the cost. Thus, the one-and-half-child policy was
implemented in these rural areas. This policy allowed for households to have a second
child if their first child was a girl. In this way, the girls signified the half. Furthermore, in
order to better connect with Chinese people of minority ethnicities to show that the CCP
emphasized their interests, any families that included one parent of minority ethnicity
were allowed to have two children. Despite these minor allowances, millions of Chinese
families were under the strict control of the one-child policy.
In order to ensure the implementation of the one-child policy, the Chinese
government performed many practices. It began to deliver free contraception to families.
Doctors of various specialties were trained to perform abortion and sterilization
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procedures. Scientists and engineers were funded by the Chinese government to develop
medicines and technologies of birth control. Hundreds of pills for emergency, short-term,
and long-term contraception have become available in the market. Family planning
institutions, which focused on developing family planning science and technology and
educating specialists, became an indispensable part of almost every medical college in
China.
Moreover, the government punished families with multiple children in many ways.
Chinese couples who worked in state-owned institutions such as governments,
universities, factories, and companies would lose their jobs if they had more than one
child. In many rural areas, the families that didn’t follow the one-child policy or the oneand-half child policy had their valuables, such as cows, houses, and savings, confiscated.
In addition, in some Chinese provinces that more strictly carried out the one-child policy,
if a family had more than one child, the father or in some cases the mother was sentenced
to jail time. Fong (2016) interviewed a former Sichuan County Official who told her “as
long as we kept the quotas, we could do anything: destroy homes, property, jail people”
(p. 72).
Furthermore, the Chinese government tried to persuade Chinese couples to only
having one child. For example, the Chinese families who only had one child could get a
monthly stipend from the government. The Chinese government made the promise that
“the government would take care of aged people if they only have one child” (Zhi Sheng
Yi Ge Hao, Zhen Fu Lai Yang Lao/只生一个好，政府来养老), which later became one
of the most popular slogans for the one-child policy. This slogan was used to fight against
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the traditional Chinese belief that through raising children, especially sons, parents would
have a secure future when they become old because they would be taken care of by their
children (Yang Er Fang Lao/养儿防老). The discourse that having only one child is both
good for the child who can live better off and good for the parents who can face less
economic pressure, can better balance their careers and family lives, and have more spare
time to enjoy their lives, was also prevalent.
China’s one-child policy had successfully slowed down the rate of population
growth. In 1980 the rate of population growth was 1.254%; in contrast, in 2010, the rate
of population growth was 0.483% [The World Bank (c), n.d.]. However, the one-child
policy had resulted in two serious issues, which bothered the Chinese government
significantly so that they later abolished the one-child policy and implemented the twochild policy, which is the current family planning policy in China. First and foremost,
“China’s one-child policy so tilted gender and age imbalances that in little under a decade
there will be more Chinese bachelors than Saudi Arabians, more Chinese retirees than
Europeans” (Fong, 2016, p. 7). In fact, as discussed earlier in this chapter, due to the
gender imbalance in China, millions of Chinese men cannot find partners. Moreover,
because the number of senior citizens is increasing rapidly, the Chinese government faces
considerable pressure in terms of taking care of senior citizens. It was reported that by
2017 the Heilongjiang Province had more than 20 billion Yuan deficit (approximately 2.9
billion USD) in pensions, and 13 more provinces would face fiscal deficit in 2018 (Wu,
2017). On Weibo, in April 2019, one of the highest trending hashtags was “The Chinese
government will run out of pension by 2035.”
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Noticing that the growing aged Chinese population poses a serious issue, the
Chinese government, instead of keeping their promise to take care of citizens when they
become aged if they only have one child, now argues that senior citizens should support
themselves through selling their apartments and has raised the retirement age. The
Chinese government wants to shift some of their support away from senior citizens
toward requiring more people to participate in sharing these responsibilities.
Moreover, another threatening situation that the Chinese government has
encountered is that an increasing number of Chinese families refuse to have even a single
child. The one-child policy has significantly influenced the views on reproduction in
Chinese culture. Many Chinese families have had good experiences of having only one
child, so the cultural belief that the more children (especially boys) you have, the more
happiness you have has been challenged. Accordingly, many young Chinese people who
grew up as the only children of their families have little interest in having more than one
child or even one child. In Chinese society, an increasing number of Chinese families
have become DINK (Double Income, No Kid) families. According to China.org.cn, “by
2002, nearly 600,000 dink […]families have appeared in China's large and medium-sized
cities, including one in every 10 households in the capital” (“More Dink Families Appear
in China,” 2002).The DINK families, more importantly the Chinese people’s changed
ideas concerning reproduction, create a serious issue for the Chinese government. As a
country that depends heavily on cheap labor for its production industry and that faces a
pension shortage, China needs to have more young working people.
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To boost population growth, the Chinese government implemented the selectivetwo-child policy in 2013. This policy allowed Chinese couples, when at least one of the
parents was an only child, to have two children. However, “about 700,000 Chinese
couples in which one of the partners is an only child applied to have a second child by the
end of August. […] That’s far fewer than previous estimates by the authority, which put
the annual births increase due to the policy change at more than 2 million” (Shan, 2014).
Witnessing this unsatisfactory result, since January 1, 2016, the universal two-child
policy that replaced the selective-two-child policy has been in effect. This policy
currently allows every Chinese family to have two children. According to the Chinese
government, there are four primary purposes of the two-child policy: to optimize the
demographic structure, to increase labor supply, to alleviate the stress caused by the
growing aging population, and to improve the health of the economy (“The Universal
Two-Child Policy,” n.d.).As can be seen, all these purposes are strongly related to
China’s economic development. In 2018, the Chinese government announced that the
department of family planning was dismissed. This decision implies that the Chinese
government has completely disregarded the idea of population control.
However, even though all Chinese families are allowed to have two children,
many of them still only want to have one child or none at all. Birtles (2018) reported:
China's family planning commission has revealed the country's birth rate dropped
by 3.5 per cent [in 2017], despite moves over the past couple of years to fully end
the one-child policy. There were just over 17 million new babies born in mainland
China in 2017.
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Similarly, Zeng and Hesketh (2018) point out that based on the recent measures of
population growth, the effect of the two-child policy in terms of increasing population is
not satisfactory and will remain so for a long time (p.1930). Thus, instead of curbing the
Chinese population growth, the Chinese government has begun to discipline couples to
have two children in order to increase the population. On August 7, 2018, Renming Ri
Bao, the official newspaper of the CCP, published the article “Giving Birth is a Familial
Matter and a National Issue Too/ Sheng Wa Shi Jia Shi, Ye Shi Guo Shi/生娃既是家事
也是国事” (Zhang, 2018). Shortly thereafter, this way of framing population growth
became the slogan of the current CCP’s population policy. This article argues that the
local governments should employ new strategies to encourage Chinese couples to have
two children.
Based on China’s lunar calendar, 2016 was the year of the monkey and the year
when the universal two-child policy began to take effect. As is their routine, the Chinese
government released a commemorative stamp. (See the stamp below):
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Figure 3. 3 Stamp Of The Year Monkey (2016). This photo was taken by the author.
In this stamp, an adult female monkey happily holds two baby monkeys in her arms. The
two baby monkeys are kissing the adult monkey. This commemorative stamp was
interpreted as the Chinese government’s celebration of the two-child policy. In designing
and releasing this stamp, the Chinese government implied that having two children would
bring a mother tremendous happiness. In the year of 2019, the Chinese year of the pig,
the Chinese government released a new commemorative stamp that seems to promote an
even larger family. (See the photo below)

Figure 3. 4 Stamp Of The Year Pig (2019). This photo was taken by the author.
In this stamp, there is a smiling pig family that includes two adult pigs and three baby
pigs. Although so far the Chinese people are not sure whether this stamp is a hint of the
Chinese government’s plan to release a three-child policy, it is certain that the era of
curbing the population has passed and that China is in the era of boosting birth rate.
118

In the beginning of the era of reforms, the one-child policy was implemented,
then replaced by the selective two-child policy, and later by the universal two-child
policy that is the current law. Despite the changes in the Chinese government’s focus, the
Chinese government continues to emphasize that a family should have a child or several.
To fulfill this purpose, the Chinese government establishes laws and uses media
strategically. According to Article 62 of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of
China, “after childbirth, female workers shall be entitled to no less than ninety days of
maternity leave with pay” (National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 1994).
Through providing about three months of paid maternity leave, the Chinese government
hopes that women are more willing to give birth. Moreover, every year, the Chinese
government organizes an event named “Beautiful Chinese Families.” In 2017, 991
families were commemorated as “Beautiful Chinese Families.” According to Yuancha Li,
the vice-chairman of China, a beautiful Chinese family emphasizes moral education for
their children by teaching them to love China and Chinese people, to work hard, to
respect and be interested in science, and to support and promote socialism (“Beautiful
Chinese Family in 2017,” 2017). This means that the premise of being a beautiful
Chinese family is—first and foremost— to have a child. In fact, in Chinese state media,
one can easily find numerous articles and reports that depict the happiness that a child,
now two children, brings to a family. This political propaganda makes a distinction
between beautiful families with children from “undesirable” families that are without a
child.
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There is one more point that I need to clarify here. Although the Chinese
government expects newborn babies, it does not welcome babies who come from nontraditional families that do not include a husband and a wife. China has the hukou system,
which significantly prevents the birth of illegitimate children by making their living
situation difficult in the society. Hukou is a Chinese household legal registration based on
a person’s birth place. The process includes four crucial steps:
Step one: After 12 weeks of pregnancy, parents should bring their marriage certificate,
their national ID cards, and their hukou books to the government to get birth permission.
Step Two: Parents bring the birth permission to a hospital. Then the hospital will create a
record of the pregnant woman and her baby.
Step Three: After the birth of the baby, the hospital will give parents the birth certificate
of the baby.
Step Four: Parents can register their baby for a hukou after showing the government once
more their marriage certificate, their national ID cards, their hukou books, along with the
birth certificate of their baby.
Accordingly, a baby whose parents do not have a marriage certificate won’t have
a legitimate birth certificate. This means that the pregnant mother cannot receive
treatment in public hospitals that provide more affordable service and even in most
private hospitals in China. Moreover, even after the birth of a baby at home or abroad, the
baby won’t have a Chinese hukou, which is the document that enables the baby to receive
social benefits such as the free nine-year education. Moreover, without this document,
when the baby grows up, they cannot register for the college entrance examination, which
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makes costly foreign education their only option. This system reinforces the Chinese
government’s disciplining of women to make them get married first before having babies.
In summary, the Chinese government has a great concern for single women.
Fincher (2014) points out:
Single women threaten the moral fabric…, for being free agents, unnatural in
failing to perform their duty to give birth to child and tame a restless man. From
the government’s perspective, married couples are much less likely to cause
trouble. (pp. 22-23).
Thus, the Chinese government makes an effort to discipline single women first into
marriages and then to become mothers through implementing a variety of policies and
promoting discourses that disfavor and even stigmatize single women and childless
married women. In summary, the articulation of Chinese myth, language, Confucianism
and Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ practices makes being wives and mothers a
largely nonnegotiable option for most Chinese women, as stated by To (2015), “the truth
[is]—marriage [and family are] still a big deal [for women] in China—both in the past
and the present” (p.xv). The link between Chinese women and as being a wife and
mother is particularly tenacious, in spite of major shifts in expectations about women as
professionals.

Chinese Women’s Roles as Professionals
The previous section focused on one of the Chinese women’s primary roles, being
a wife and a mother. It argued that due to the articulation of Chinese myth, language,
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Confucianism and Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ political practices, Chinese
women have always been expected to get married and to have children. This section turns
to the second role of Chinese women: being professionals.
Professional women were very rare in ancient China. In China’s long history,
women were, and largely still are, viewed as inherently not suited as breadwinners. This
viewpoint is sometimes attributed to the long history of China as an agricultural nation, in
which laborers were mostly men. In reviewing the anthropological research, Stockard
(2002) concludes that:
Some [anthropologists] put forward the strength theory, which attributes men’s
monopoly of plowing to the on-average greater upper-body strength of adult men
over women…. Other anthropologists favor the expendability theory, based on the
growing need to physically defend agricultural land from outsiders. (p.41)
Stockard’s statement clearly indicates that in ancient China, which heavily relied on
agriculture, men were preferred as laborers because of their physical strength. Moreover,
as discussed previously, Confucianism supports the argument that women should stay
inside and merely focus on taking care of their husbands and sons, as indicated by the
phrase “pin ji sichen/牝鸡司晨,” which was and is used to criticize female politicians
who oppose male emperors as well as women who actively participate in their husbands’
or sons’ outside affairs, such as making decisions for them. 35 These women are regarded
as an evil power that will bring disasters to the world. In ancient China, few women

35The

phase “牝鸡司晨” can be literally translated as: Hens replace roosters and begin to crow. The hens are
understood as abnormal and unnatural.
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received any education, and many received the surgery of foot binding to make their feet
small, which aligned with the standard of beauty in ancient China. These practices
restricted women’s ability to move around and to engage in labor. Although in ancient
China, some women strived to make a living through producing cloth or being
matchmakers, most Chinese women were housewives. 36
This unfavorable situation in which women were discouraged from and not
prepared for becoming professionals has changed since the 1900s, most significantly in
the era of reforms. In order to understand women as professionals, the following analysis
lays out two articulated forces, which are comparatively new when compared with myth,
Confucianism and Daoism but have begun to exert increasingly important impacts on
Chinese society. They have profoundly motivated and prepared Chinese women to join
the workplace.
The Discourse of The New Woman
The first force is the discourse of The New Woman. As discussed in Chapter Two,
since the Westernization Movement and the New Culture Movement, Western ideas have
travelled to China en masse. Along with the idea that science and technology are
important because they are thought to bring positive changes, the Western discourse that
advocates for gender equality and for women to be independent also has impacted

36Francesca

Bray in her book Technology and Gender: Fabric of Power in Late Imperial China discusses how women
in the Song dynasty managed to work as cloth makers. Bray (1997) writes “Sericulture and silk weaving spread to new
areas, so that a large number of women became involved in the production of high-value textiles….But tax demands
were high and grew during the Song…women had to work increasingly hard just to pay their taxes” (p. 206). Thus,
although it was a great improvement that women could work outside the home, they still struggled to support
themselves independently.
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Chinese society in significant ways. One of its primary impacts has been the emergence
of the discourse of The New Woman.
The key idea of the discourse of The New Woman is that with the development of
the Chinese society, modern Chinese women should be different from traditional Chinese
women who were generally categorized as submissive, illiterate, and dependent
housewives and mothers. In contrast, new Chinese women should be literate, independent
especially in terms of their finances, and have their own interests and careers.
Back in the early 1900s, a prominent Chinese scholar, Cai Yuanpei—who later
became the president of Peking University, the best Chinese university in the humanities,
and whose given name “Yuanpei” was chosen by Peking University as the title of one of
its divisions because of his profound influence on Chinese intellect and education—made
a famous announcement concerning what kinds of wives he was willing to accept after
being bothered by many matchmakers. Cai stated that his potential wife should:
1) Not have bound feet,
2) Be literate,
3) Accept that he won’t take concubines,
4) Be open to the option of remarrying after his death, and
5) Agree to divorce if their relationship is filled with irreconcilable struggles.
(Shen,
Cai’s criteria resonated with the argument that Chinese women should make progress and
become new women. The woman Cai wanted was fundamentally different from the
women who were preferred in the traditional Chinese culture: illiterate women with small
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feet who were happy to accept and take care of their husbands’ concubines, and to devote
their whole lives to one partner only. Cai’s idea, although still centered on a woman’s role
as wife and mother, promoted Chinese women to be more progressive. Because of his
social influence, many Chinese men followed his idea and wanted to marry new women,
which in turn motivated women to receive education and become more self-sufficient.
Chen Duxie, the scholar whose quotes “for democracy” and “for science” were
the two slogans of the New Culture Movement, also contributed to the discourse of The
New Woman in significant ways. In 1916, Chen published an article “the Year of 1916”
that criticized traditional Chinese culture for oppressing women and argued that women
should fight against their status of being subordinated. Chen (1916) wrote:
As young people of 1916, what should you do?
First, you need to take the position “to conquer” not the position “be conquered”.
Among all human beings, men conquer and women are conquered; white people
conquer and non-white people are conquered….As proud people of 1916, you
should wash away shame that is caused by this logic.
Second, you should respect your subjectivity and not become subordinate to
others. The Confucian thought of three obedience that requires people to be
obedient to rulers; children to be obedient to fathers; and wives to be obedient to
husbands…makes people subordinated slaves. Instead, people should center on
themselves…both men and women should fight against the status of being
subordinate and maintain their independent and autonomous subjectivities.
Hu Shi, another influential thinker of the early 20th century, also promoted the discourse
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of The New Woman. He made a significant speech, “American Women,” that advocated
for Chinese women to learn from American women and to become new women at Beijing
Normal University. Hu (1918) said:
[When I encountered and observed an American woman at a dinner table that she
shared with two Chinese couples, I found out that] these three women are
differentiated by their outlooks on life. Chinese women’s outlook centers on being
virtuous wives and caring mothers, in contrast, the American women’s outlook
goes beyond being virtuous wives and caring mothers….This expansive outlook
of American women is founded based on women’ perception of
independence…American women all have the idea of being independent….and
their life goals are probably about achieving independence….American women
think that men and women are equal human beings, and that they should all work
hard to be free and independent people.
Later in the speech, Hu discussed how American women received higher education and
became career women who actively participated in politics to fight for women’s rights. In
short, Hu promoted Chinese women to learn from their American counterparts to receive
education, to find jobs, and even to engage in politics.
An increasing number of female scholars not only appeared but also began to gain
prominence in the society since the late 1800s. Qiu Jin, who was born in 1875 and
received education in Japan, a more Westernized country at that time, is regarded as the
pioneer of new Chinese women. She devoted to participating in the rebellion against the
Qing Dynasty and promoting gender equality regardless of her husband’s disagreement.
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She founded Zhong Guo Nv Bao, an influential Chinese newspaper that centered on
advancing women’s education and rights and opposing oppressive practices such as foot
binding. Although Qiu was executed by the Qing government, she inspired many Chinese
women to choose different lives from traditional Chinese women. For example, Lü
Bicheng, Xiao Hong, Shi Pingmei, and Chang Eileen were four outstanding professional
women from 1910s to 1940 s. These four women not only received good education and
wrote influential pieces of literature to support themselves, but also openly criticized the
oppression of women and advocated for women to receive education and become
independent.
In 1935, the release of the film New Women, in which one of the main characters
played by Ruan Lingyu, a famous actress at that time, propelled another large scale
discussion of The New Woman. The film depicts two images of new women: a female
intellectual and a female worker (Cai & Sun, 1935). Through contrasting the female
intellectual’s tragic death and the female worker’s promising future, this film not only
criticizes the society for oppressing women but also states that new Chinese women
should also engage in politics and bravely fight against sexism. These historical figures
and events helped to articulate being literate and employed to the socio-cultural
expectations for a Chinese woman.
In the more recent years, the popularity of the discourse of The New Woman has
lessened in Chinese society with the increasing number of women receiving education
and having jobs. Thus, career women no longer seem a novel phenomenon. However,
contemporary Chinese culture continues to promote the image of a woman who has a
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successful career. For example, in contemporary Chinese society, there is a very popular
genre of TV series labeled “Big Female Characters Show/大女主戏”. These TV series
focus on depicting the process of how women develop themselves, overcome many
difficulties, and have successful careers while at the same time having admirable families.
Besides advocacy by intellectuals and promotion in Chinese popular culture,
many Chinese women’s organizations also support this idea that career women are
preferred in contemporary China. For example, in 1989, The All China Women’s
Federation (ACWF) used the slogan of women’s four selves to represent a new Chinese
woman who should have self-respect, self-reliance, self-confidence, and selfimprovement.
The discourse of The New Woman has profoundly impacted women’s roles. This
discourse has successfully contributed to encouraging many Chinese women to receive
education and to join the workplace. However, unfortunately, the persuasiveness of this
discourse is significantly based on its articulation with the traditional social expectation
for women to be desirable in order to marry men with higher status. For example, TV
series that belong to the genre “Big Female Characters Show” often depict how a welleducated professional woman attracts a successful man. In fact, in contemporary Chinese
culture, an increasing number of men prefer to get married to women with bachelor’s
degrees and with respectable jobs such as university professors and civil servants,
although some of them want their wives to quit their jobs after getting married. As a
result, receiving college education and joining the workplace have become a
nonnegotiable option and a crucial step for many women to marry up.
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Additionally, the articulation of the discourse of The New Woman with the socialcultural-historical-political expectation for women to become mothers and wives
redefines the meaning of being a Chinese woman in the era of reforms. To be an ideal
Chinese woman, the person not only needs to be a virtuous wife, a caring mother, but also
a well-educated successful professional at the same time. This expectation creates an
almost impossible position for women with its inevitable tensions in terms of the
contradictory personality traits that they are expected to embody. For example, as argued
previously, being virtuous wives and caring mothers requires women to be dependent and
submissive, but being successful professionals requires women to be assertive and
independent.
In summary, the discourse of The New Woman has significantly impacted
women’s roles in contemporary Chinese culture. Because of its promotion for women to
receive education, to find jobs, and to be independent, especially economically, being
working women has become a trend in contemporary Chinese society. However, to this
day, this discourse still fails to undermine the articulation, which I discussed previously,
that disciplines women to get married and to have children.
The CCP’s Political Practices
The second force that contributes to women’s new roles as professions is the
CCP’s political practices. Because the CCP claims to follow Marxism, which pursues an
egalitarian society in which both men and women equally work and are served, and more
importantly because the CCP needs more working laborers to develop its economy, the
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CCP has implemented many political practices to encourage and prepare women to join
the workplace.
Mao Zedong, an influential leader of the CCP and the first Chairman of the PRC,
made the famous statement, “women can hold up half the sky.” In the West, Mao’s
saying is often translated as “women hold up half of the sky.” However, based on Mao’s
original phrase “妇女能顶半天天,” the modal verb “can” should be included in this
sentence. The addition of the word “can” into this sentence changes the connotation that
Chinese women are important to the connotation that Chinese women can be important if
they work hard enough, which I believe is what Mao argues. However, the fact is that the
cultural reality is more complex than the words convey. Under Mao’s administration, the
two predominant options for women were positions of superficial status and those of
intense manual labor. Women in rural areas were encouraged to compete with men and
even to surpass men in expending manual labor in agricultural work. Women in urban
areas were assigned jobs in state-owned organizations (Dan Wei/单位) by the Chinese
government as long as they finished their education. Xian and Woodhams (2008) point
out that in Mao’s era, many women were “allocated to supporting positions that fitted
their perceived abilities regardless of their education background. These positions held
little room for promotion and a greater risk of redundancy” (p.411). For example, they
worked as salespersons and secretaries, which gave the appearance of including women
in organizations, but did not give them actual positions of power. In contrast, the rest of
the women were assigned to work in heavy industries such as mining, construction, and
petroleum, which were regarded traditionally as men’s fields. Most of these women were
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expected to conduct manual work. In fact, from the 1960s to the 1970s, the CCP
promoted the image of “iron women” (Tie Gu Niang/铁姑娘). Also known as iron girls,
this term referred to women who were strong physically, had visible muscles, were
capable and enthusiastic about conducting heavy manual work, and did not have typical
female features such as a comparatively smaller body size and long flowing hair. Below
is a poster that was released by the Chinese government of an iron woman, a female
construction worker. 37

Figure 3. 5 A Poster of An Iron Girl. Title: 我们为参加国家工业化建设而自豪 (We
Are Proud Of Participating In The Founding of Our Country's Industrialization).
Designer:丁浩(Ding Hao). Date: February, 1954. Publisher:华东人民美术出版社

37Appendix

A is the fair use report to support my use of this image in my dissertation.
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(Huadong Renmin MeishuChubanshe, Shanghai). Retrieved from:
https://chineseposters.net/posters/e16-17.php.
Although the image of iron women reflected the CCP’s endeavor to improve women’s
status through showing that women are as strong as men, this image failed to empower
Chinese women by either crediting their intelligence or advocating for their education.
Thus, women were viewed as physically but not intellectually equal. In fact, the image of
iron women pressured Chinese women into a situation where they had to conduct heavy
manual work in order to fit into this positive image. After studying and interviewing
actual iron women, Jin (2006) writes:
A veteran of the Shengli Oil Field women’s brigade stressed that there were ways
in which the establishment of women’s work brigades eroded ‘a certain kind of
protection’ that women had once received in the past [when they worked in heavy
industries]…. Whereas women’s brigades consistently received official
recognition, they also performed their share of undesirable tasks and endured
considerable discomfort. Gu Yingzhen (pseudonym), a former brigade leader in
Nanjing’s Shuang Zha Township, pointedly noted that Iron Girls performed work
that was at once shunned and arduous: “The women’s brigade specialised in
things that other people did not want to do. In the spring we planted seedlings,
watered the plants and worked on the water treadmills . . . during the harvest we
worked day and night. Two strong young men collapsed from exhaustion. They
fell asleep in the fields and refused to get up. We were stronger than them. (p.
620-621)
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This competition for women to be stronger than men in performing manual labor resulted
in many women suffering from serious health issues from exhausting their bodies when
they were young. Furthermore, due to the overemphasis on manual labor, other aspects of
women, especially their intelligence, were ignored. As a consequence of this persuasive
anti-intellectual image, many women were not enthusiastic about receiving education and
thus were trapped in their situations as manual laborers rather than decision makers.
It was not until 1986 that the CCP implemented the Compulsory Education Law,
after which an increasing number of Chinese women have been able to support
themselves by utilizing their intelligence. In general, this policy states that Chinese
children who are around the age of 7 should attend schools and all Chinese citizens
should receive at least 9 years of education. In order to fulfill this task, the Chinese
government has initiated several strategies. For example, the government covers all
children’s tuition from public elementary school (about 6 years) to middle school (about
3 years), has built more schools (especially schools in rural areas), and recruits college
students to teach several years in rural schools as a condition to waive their university
educational and living costs. This policy fundamentally changed the situation in which
many Chinese people, especially Chinese women from poor rural areas, were illiterate
and denied educational opportunities due to their families’ inferior economic situation
and their comparatively isolated geographical location. In 1982, 51.137% of Chinese
women aged 15 or above were literate; in 1990, 68.072% of Chinese women aged 15 or
above were literate; and in 2010, 92.711% of Chinese women aged 15 or above were
literate [ The World Bank (d), n.d ]. These 9 years of school enable women to be able to
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read and write, which is a crucial prerequisite to joining the job market. Moreover, some
girls who demonstrate their intelligence in elementary school and middle school also
change their parents’ minds from the notion that girls are inherently not as smart as boys
and will have difficulties finding satisfactory jobs to support themselves and their parents.
These girls sometimes reverse the notion that girls do not need to receive much education
but rather need to focus on finding breadwinners. Impressed by their daughters’ academic
performance, which means that there exist great possibilities for their daughters to
become prosperous in the future, many families, even including some rural poor families,
decide to support their daughters to receive higher education even though this requires
the parents to work harder. According to Martin (2018), “in 2012, female college students
made up 51.4 percent of the total university student population.” College education not
only potentially provides these women more job opportunities but also sometimes
requires them to find jobs to repay their families’ educational investment. In this way,
women are not only prepared but also motivated and pressured to become professionals.
In addition to the implementation of the Compulsory Education Law, the Chinese
government has formulated policies to protect women’s interests in the job market. For
example, in 1992, the Chinese government announced the “Protection of Women’s
Rights and Interests Law of People’s Republic of China.” This law guarantees that
women should enjoy equal rights to men in the spheres of politics, education, work,
ownership of property, personal rights, and rights of marriage and family. This law
emphasizes that women and men should be paid equally for equal work. In 2007, the
government issued “Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China,” in
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which the government explicitly states its objective to prohibit discrimination based on a
person’s gender, ethnicity, religious belief, or race in the workplace.
In February 2019, the Chinese government announced that it is illegal to list the
gender requirements or gender preferences in job advertisements, to reject job applicants
merely based on their gender, or to ask about a woman’s marital and childbearing status
in job interviews. Although this practice is partly motivated by the Chinese government’s
purpose of propelling women to join the workplace and by the Chinese government’s
current two-child policy that aims to encourage women to have babies, this political
practice signifies great progress with regard to protecting women’s workplace rights.
The CCP’s political practices are significant in China because they articulate to
the Chinese societal hierarchy, in which the government occupies the highest level of the
pyramid. Thus, the CCP’s policies not only profoundly influence Chinese politics, but
also Chinese people’s perceptions and the culture. Since the CCP requires women to
receive education, encourages women to join the job market, and educates women to be
prepared as professionals, a growing number of Chinese women are eager to do so
because it not only may fit their interests but also because they have been educated in
Chinese culture, which emphasizes people’s obedience to the government. Hence, many
women want to be “model” citizens and to support the government’s decision by joining
the workplace. Additionally, many Chinese men have more open attitudes to working
with female colleagues and marrying career women, and a growing number of
workplaces decide to accept female workers at least in order to follow the government’s
regulation in order to avoid trouble. Overall, the society has become increasingly tolerant
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and supportive of female workers. All these positive changes provide women
opportunities to make a living themselves, enjoy more freedom, and gain some
sovereignty over their destinies.
However, the CCP’s political practices that encourage and prepare Chinese
women to join the workplace are also articulated with its political practices of
disciplining women to get married and to have children, which creates many tensions and
contradictions in women’s lives. Moreover, due to this articulation, it is hard for Chinese
women to completely focus on their careers and become independent not only financially
but also in the sense of following their wishes to not get married or become mothers.

Chinese Women as Wives, Mothers, and Professionals in
the Era of Reforms
As argued previously, in the era of reforms, Chinese women are still expected to
become wives and mothers due to the articulation of Chinese myth, Confucianism and
Daoism, and the Chinese governments’ political practices that require and discipline them
to get married and have children. However, at the same time, impacted by the discourse
of The New Woman and the CCP’s political practices that encourage and prepare
Chinese women to receive education and to join the workplace, they are also expected to
become professionals. The traditional roles of mother and wife as well as the emerging
new role of professional create tremendous tensions and contradictions that Chinese
women have to navigate. For example, the famous line from the popular film Lost,
Found, spoken by a successful female lawyer, captures the tensions that many Chinese
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women have experienced due to the articulation of their traditional roles and new roles in
the era of reforms:
Today’s society has extremely high expectations for women. If you decide to
focus on your career, people will criticize you for being bad and irresponsible; if
you decide to focus on your familial life, people will criticize you for having no
career and merely doing what you are supposed to do. (Lü & Qin, 2018).
In fact, housewives, who still account for a large population of Chinese women,
have become more vulnerable in contemporary Chinese society because they not only
have to conduct all housework and rely on their husbands but they have also often been
criticized in comparison with career women for being lazy, noncompetitive, and
dependent, as argued by Liu and Ma (2009). But at the same time, as indicated by the
discourse of the Leftover Woman, single professional women are not preferred by society
or the government. They are also criticized for being irresponsible, extremely picky, and
sometime even stigmatized as ugly and unattractive creatures, as analyzed previously.
Cai and Feng (2013) focus on late marriage in Shanghai and find out that an increasing
number of women who receive college and even graduate education, which leads to them
to be able to find decent jobs to support themselves, decided to remain single and enjoy
their singlehood. Obviously, these professional women become the “undesirable” leftover
women from the perspectives of society and the government.
Moreover, while the society and the government expect married women to
maintain their families, many women, especially professionals, hold more open attitudes
toward divorce. As Zhang (2006) has argued, due to an increasing number of Chinese
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women becoming professionals, their improved material status changes their viewpoints
towards divorce. Thus, the phrases that have been used to describe divorce have changed
from “divorce wife,” to “make a divorce,” and “to negotiate divorce,” which signifies
women’s growing agency concerning this practice. In part because of this cultural shift,
as argued previously, the Chinese government introduced the experimental “calm-down”
divorce period for the purpose of reducing the divorce rate in China, which consequently
prevents some women from ending their unsatisfactory marriages.
Additionally, traditional Chinese culture expects Chinese women to be virtuous
wives, which require women to preserve their virginities before marriage. However,
many women who leave their hometowns and support themselves independently as bluecollar workers decide to have “temporary husbands.” These are short-term male partners
from the same cities who work to support and take care of each other. Liu (2014) points
out the action of having a temporary husband reflects Chinese women’s improved agency
in terms of choosing their partners. However, this relation is temporary and often won’t
last long; many women eventually have to marry the partners preferred by their families
and become traditional wives and mothers to take good care of their husbands, their
husbands’ families, and their children.
Moreover, many Chinese women have shifted their energy and time to their careers
instead of merely focusing on their families. In response to this, the discourse that the
most important thing for a woman is to be a virtuous wife and a caring mother becomes
increasingly salient in popular culture. Hershatter (2007) argues that in recent years the
discourse that a woman’s essential role is to be a virtuous wife and a caring mother has
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regained popularity even though this discourse had become less prominent in the mid
twentieth century. Hershatter (2007) writes:
The phrase ‘virtuous wife and good mother,’ which had circulated in the early
twentieth century, enjoyed a resurgence [in recent years], as did the notion that
women were primarily responsible for the healthy development and moral
education of children.

(p. 48)

Moreover, as pointed out by Zuo (2016), due to the hardship and discrimination many
professional women experience in the workplace, many of them have to quit their careers
and “retreat to the home [as] a refuge” (pp. 112-113).
In the era of reforms, the expectation of being a wife and a mother are articulated
with the expectation to become professionals, which complicates Chinese women’s lived
experiences in significant ways. This articulation creates strong tensions and
contradictions that require women to negotiate in order to fulfill their traditional roles as
well as emerging ones. Thus, it is common in China that women prefer certain
occupations, the two most predominant of which are teachers and civil servants, which
usually do not require them to work extra time, are more permanent even when some
women’s performance is infringed upon by their familial duties, and have regular, usually
longer holidays. Because of these affordances, women can have time and energy to take
care of their families while maintaining their jobs. Through choosing these specific
occupations, Chinese women try to negotiate their two roles.
Moreover, instead of understanding women’s struggles and helping women to
deal with difficulties by providing them with concrete strategies such as promoting men’s
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responsibilities to share household chores and extending women’s paid maternity leave,
society promotes the image of the “super mother,” which basically argues that ideal
Chinese women are able to be perfect both in their careers and their familial lives. Back
in 2013, there was a popular Chinese TV series Hot Mom! that describes how a
fashionable, professional woman has successfully balanced her career and familial life
after giving birth to her unexpected child. At the end of the TV series, the female main
character who used to not like babies is happily pregnant with her second child (Shen &
Qin, 2013). Another example is the popularity of the reality show Super Mom. This
reality show, which aired from 2016 to 2018, has focused on 12 pairs of mothers and
their children. All the mothers are beautiful and highly successful professional women
(Yuan, 2016-2018). In fact, Guo and Zhang (2017) point out that a super mother is
fundamentally different from a traditional Chinese mother who doesn’t have a career and
a working mother who seems to suffer from great pressures of balancing her career and
familial life. Instead, a super mother is confident, knowledgeable, has an elite career, and
not only raises her child, but also emphasizes her child’s education to make her child
successful in the future. Despite these many demands, super mothers supposedly enjoy
their lives and become prosperous while performing both of their roles.
This chapter has explored Chinese women’s roles as wives and mothers as well as
professionals in the era of reforms and maps the tensions caused by the conflicting
aspects of these two roles, which complicate women’s lived experiences. As argued in
the previous chapters, science and technology, which are promoted uncritically for
bringing positive changes and solving all problems, have become integral in people’s
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lives and integrated into the Chinese government’s political practices. Thus, in order to
better understand women’s lived experiences as well as the status of science and
technology in contemporary China, it is important to explore how the beliefs about, as
well as the applications of, science and technology are articulated with women’s roles in
the era of reforms. The next chapter will bring the previous three chapters together and
map the implications of the science and technology for Chinese women from a Cultural
studies perspective.
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Chapter Four: Putting It All Together: The
Implications of Science and Technology for Women’s
Roles in the Era of Reforms
Chapter One introduced the many changes that happened in the era of reforms,
explained the analytical perspectives of cultural studies and feminism, and laid out the
methods of articulation and mapping, which are the two major analytical tools I use in
this dissertation. Chapter Two explored the status of science and technology in the era of
reforms. It argued that science and technology are venerated. People believe that science
and technology have nearly omnipotent power that can bring positive changes, resulting
in their rapid development sometimes without regard to the human costs. Chapter Three
maps the two prominent roles that many Chinese women have in the era of reforms. It
argued that Chinese women are always expected to be wives and mothers. However, in
the era of reforms, they are also expected to become professionals. Chapter Three
concluded with an analysis of the tensions and conflicts, with which many Chinese
women have struggled, that are generated by the articulation of Chinese women’s
traditional roles of being wives and mothers with their new roles as being professionals.
This chapter brings all the previous chapters together and explores the
implications of science and technology for women’s roles as wives and mothers as well
as professionals in the era of reforms from a cultural studies perspective. As revealed in
previous chapters, many elements are articulated to women’s lived experiences. Among
them, four elements warrant particular attention. They are: 1) traditional Chinese culture
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that includes myth, Chinese language, Confucianism, and Daoism, 2) the CCP’s political
practices, 3) the discourse of The New Woman, and 4) science and technology. By
focusing on these four, I demonstrate how they are articulated to influence Chinese
women’s roles.
As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese culture has
significantly contributed to the expectation for Chinese women to be virtuous wives and
caring mothers. Traditional Chinese women, since their birth, were expected to get
married and to give birth to children, which should include at least a baby boy. Besides
being subordinate daughters that marry partners arranged by their parents, submissive
wives who take good care of their husbands and their parents-in-law, and caring mothers
who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for their children, most traditional Chinese
women had no other access to self-fulfillment. Even in the era of reforms, the influences
of myth, language, Confucianism, and Daoism remain strong in terms of disciplining
women to get married and to have children. Moreover, the CCP also expects women to
“tame” bachelors who are viewed as potential disruptive forces and to produce babies
who significantly influence the economic future of China. The cultural and the political
forces are tenaciously articulated, which make it difficult for women to remain single and
childless.
However, at the same time, the discourse of The New Woman urges
contemporary Chinese women to be different from their traditional counterparts through
receiving education and having jobs. It argues that illiterate women who have no careers
are not welcomed and not preferred by good Chinese men. Thus, not only in order to
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keep up with the times, but also to marry up, women should no longer confine themselves
exclusively in the domestic sphere. Instead, they should be literate and join the
workplace. Furthermore, facing the economic-political environment of the era of reforms
that needs female workers to demonstrate the party’s care for gender equality and to
contribute to the Chinese economy that heavily depends on mass labor, the CCP also
prepares and encourages women to join the workplace. Through implementing the free
nine-year compulsory educational system, an increasing number of Chinese women have
become literate. Through promoting the image of the Iron Girl and implementing policies
that aim to protect women’s rights in the workplace, the CCP tries to persuade women to
have careers. The discursive and the political forces have articulated with increasing
insistence and impact in the era of reforms, which makes being a professional gradually
become an important role shaping many Chinese women’s identities.
While the previous two paragraphs illustrate how traditional Chinese culture, the
CCP’s political practices, and the discourse of The New Woman have been articulated to
impact women’s lived experiences in the era of reforms. However, one force is missing:
science and technology. As discussed in Chapter Two, the era of reforms is strongly
characterized by the veneration of science and technology. This means that the idea that
science and technology are nearly omnipotent and are intrinsically positioned to bring
positive changes is deeply rooted in contemporary Chinese culture, and that Chinese
people and government have become increasingly dependent on science and technology,
hoping they can solve all problems. Thus, science and technology have influenced
Chinese politics, culture, society, and people in significant ways in the era of reforms.
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Obviously, along with all Chinese people, Chinese women cannot resist this pervasive
scientific and technological influence.
In fact, some scholars have discussed the impacts of science and technology for
Chinese women. For example, Zhou and Guo (1995) point out scientific and
technological developments in China on the one hand create more industries, thus
providing additional job opportunities for women; on the other hand, they reduce some
job opportunities that previously depended on human labor and they make some jobs
require advanced skills, which result in some women losing their jobs. When Pei and Ho
(2008) discuss cybersex, they mention the case of the housewife “Xiao Feng” who had
been empowered to discuss her “sexual coldness,” which was diagnosed by her husband,
with her netfriends who not only give her advice, but also supported her in resisting her
husband’s criticism. Hu et al. (2016) explore the use of neuraxial labor analgesia in
China, which is a method of providing pain relief for labor. They highly evaluate the
nongovernmental No Pain Labor & Delivery Program (NPLD) for bringing labor
analgesia and better perinatal care to Chinese women. Li, Qu, and Lǚ (2017) claim that
many women who get married late have difficulties conceiving naturally and have to use
reproductive science and technology for assistance. This stressful process of conception
leads to an increasing number of female patients with postpartum depression.
In more recent years, more people have engaged in this discussion. Xie (2018)
argues that the rise of internet matchmaking agencies in recent years contributes to
changes in Chinese matchmaking and dating culture from 1988 to 2018. Fincher (2018)
recognizes the important role of the internet and social media in feminist movements in
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China, and writes “even as the Chinese government tightened ideological controls on
university campuses across the country, more and more young women were starting
feminist social-media accounts” (p.50). In March 2019, to celebrate International
Women’s Day, many highly successful career women gathered together in Shanghai to
discuss their working and familial experiences and some of them talked about the
influences of science and technology for career women. For example, Zhai Fang pointed
out that science and technology enable career women to better take of their families since
they can work in offices at home, and Sun Jie used the case of handling tigers and argued
that science and technology significantly benefit women because they increase women’s
power and enable them to do many things that previously were only designated to men
(“Sun Jie—CEO of Ctrip: Science and Technology Enable Women to Do What Men Can
Do,” 2019).
In general, the previous literature reveals that science and technology have
impacted Chinese women’s lived experience in the era of reforms in three significant
ways. First, science and technology empower women, as indicated by Pei and Ho (2008),
Fincher (2018), and other scholars. This mainstream viewpoint has been argued
extensively by many Chinese researchers. Second, science and technology are doubleedged swords, which means that they can benefit some women but at the same time can
hurt other women, as indicated by Zhou and Guo (1995). Third, as argued by Li, Qu, and
Lǚ, science and technology can also create problems for women. Although this previous
literature is helpful, there still lacks sufficient and in-depth scholarship concerning the
implications of science and technology for women.
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To engage in and contribute to this scholarship, this chapter explores how science
and technology are articulated with the elements of traditional Chinese culture, the CCP’s
political practices, and the discourse of The New Woman to influence both Chinese
women’s traditional roles of being wives and mothers and their emerging roles of being
professionals in the era of reforms. To demonstrate the impacts of these articulations, this
chapter focuses on the following four examples of the developments and uses of science
and technology to promote marriage and family, for population control and family design,
to promote the discourse of the super mother, and for women to gain independence and
resist sexual violence.

The Development and Use of Science and Technology to
Promote Marriage and Family
As discussed in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese culture argues that women
should get married and the CCP also wants single women to marry, to “tame” single men,
and to give birth to babies. However, compared with many single women who are
professionals that receive good education, many single men do not have much money and
do not fit many Chinese women’s expectation of marrying up, which is preferred in
traditional Chinese culture. In order to increase these single men’s chances to find
partners, the Chinese government has implemented several policies, such as providing
subsidies for marriage. The government also has participated in promoting the discourse
of the leftover women, which originated from contemporary Chinese popular internet
culture. This section continues to explore the articulation of the government’s political
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practices with the traditional Chinese culture through adding the element of science and
technology. In general, through analyzing the cases of the “Apply for Marriage
Certificate” function on the App Alipay, the ways that dating websites promote
themselves and women’s experiences of using dating websites, and the government’s
prohibition for single women to receive the treatment of egg freezing, this section maps
how science and technology are articulated with the political and cultural forces and how
this articulation impacts Chinese women in significant ways.
The “Apply for Marriage Certificate” Function on the App Alipay
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Chinese government emphasizes its control
over science and technology as a means to surveil and discipline people. For example,
through implementing the Great Firewall of China, the government tries to monitor
information flows and filter information, so that the Chinese people can only access the
information that the government prefers them to see. The “apply for marriage certificate”
function on the App Alipay is another effort by the Chinese government to achieve its
political purposes through manipulating people’s access to science and technology.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government prefers single Chinese
people to get married and to set up stable families. Thus, it introduced the experimental
“calm-down” period for the purpose of reducing the divorce rate in China. However,
apart from preventing people from getting divorced too easily, the government also
endeavors to encourage people to get married. The government believes that the highexpense and time-consuming procedures of getting married in China have profoundly
contributed to China’s low marriage rate.
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In fact, the expensive and time-consuming nature of getting married is due in part
to the influence of traditional Chinese culture. The traditional Chinese process of getting
married, which was strongly viewed as a ritualistic practice and is still practiced by some
Chinese families to this day, includes three letters and six etiquettes. 38 In the era of
reforms, although this process has been simplified for some families, getting married still
remains costly and time intensive. Thus, the government thinks that what they need to do
is to reduce the cost. Accordingly, the government provides subsidies to newlywed
couples regardless of their economic situations. Moreover, the Chinese government
announced that since April 1, 2017, the service fee for getting a marriage certificate in
mainland China has been eliminated. This means that basically Chinese people do not
need to pay for anything to apply for marriage certificates.

38The three letters were: a) the betrothal letter that the bridegroom’s family gives to the girl’s family to signify the
mutual agreements by the families permitting the marriage,b) the gift letter in which the bridegroom’s family lists the
gifts that they are giving to the girl’s family, and c) the wedding letter.

The six etiquettes were:
a)

Proposing: the boy’s family should hire a matchmaker to bring around thirty different things to the girl’s family,
amongwhich a unique but necessary gift is a pair of life swan geese, which is symbolic because they maintain
monogamous pairing throughout their entire lives.

b)

Matching birth dates: For this step, the boy’s and the girl’s birth dates and times are brought to a fortune-teller to
calculate if they match, which basically verifies whether the god approves their marriage.

c)

Setting up the date for the boy’s family to send the betrothal letter to the girl’s family.

d)

Presenting the wedding gifts.

e)

Arranging the marriage for an auspicious date.

f)

Holding the wedding ceremony.

This elaborate process of getting married reveals how the ritualistic aspects of marriage were emphasized in traditional
Chinese culture.
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In this context, in 2018, the local governments of Jiangsu Province, Fujian
Province, Anhui Province, Sichuan Province, Zhejiang Province, Jiangxi Province,
Guangzhou City, Wuhan City, and Haikou City announced that people from these regions
can apply for marriage certificates using their cellphones. This option became available
after the government’s collaboration with the company Alibaba, which developed the
popular app Alipay that had more than 700 million active Chinese users in 2018
(“China’s Alipay,” 2018). Basically, the government added the function “Apply for
Marriage Certificate” into this app. This enables the users of Alipay to finish almost all of
the administrative process using their cellphones such as taking pictures, filling out
forms, and booking the date and time to get their marriage certificates, although they still
need to be present in the government’s civil affairs office to get their certificates. 39 It is
believed that this technological innovation will save people time waiting in the line and
dealing with administrative procedures and thus encourage marriages. In 2019, to
celebrate the Chinese Valentine’s Day (August 7), the local governments of Zhejiang
Province, Jiangsu Province, Jiangxi Province, Fujian Province, and Chongqing City
announced again that residents of these places can apply for marriage certificates online.
CCTV news, the most authoritative channel that is sponsored by the CCP, used the
hashtag “This is How Love Looks” to celebrate this news on its Weibo platform. It is

39Different from the marriage documentation in the U.S., the marriage certificate in China includes a photo of the
husband and the wife. Thus, in order to get the marriage certificate in China, couples must first take a photo of
themselves and submit the photo to the government. Previously, the photo could only be taken in certain governmentaffiliated photo studios.
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reported that more regions will follow this practice, and in the near future all Chinese
people will be able to apply for marriage certificates through their cellphones.
The function of “Apply for Marriage Certificate” online reflects the Chinese
government’s tradition of turning to science and technology to reduce the cost, time, and
energy required for a marriage, hoping they can solve the “problem” of China’s low rate
of marriage. It is interesting that although both the traditional cultural force and the
contemporary political force promote marriage, tensions still emerge due to their different
viewpoints concerning marriage. For the traditional Chinese culture, marriage is
significantly ritualistic, as evidenced by its long, highly-detailed codes of conduct.
However, for the Chinese government, marriage is more about utilitarianism. It hopes
people get married because they believe married couples have a lower chance of
becoming social disruptors and they need children since the shortage of pension and
future laborers pose increasingly serious threats to the economy.
However, the government’s effort has not been particularly effective. According
to the statistics released by the government in 2019, the marriage rate in 2018 in
mainland China was the lowest in the past decade. In 2018, the average marriage rate in
China was7.2‰, in Shanghai City was 4.35‰, and in Zhejiang Province was 5.9‰
(“Shanghai Has the Lowest Marriage Rate,” 2019).
The blame for the low marriage rate is heavily placed on women, while many
single men are seen as the victims of women’s desires for better lives. As analyzed
previously, the crucial purpose of developing this science and technology is to help men,
especially the men whose economic situations are not favorable. Through promoting the
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idea that marriage should be simple and not associated with money, the government
makes women who have material requirements for their partners, such as having
apartments or cars, the target of attack for being unwelcome women who have too many
desires. To be clear, I am not trying to judge these women. In fact, facing the situation
that many Chinese women have to shoulder all the household chores alone, to take good
care of their husbands and parents-in-law, are fired from their workplaces when they are
pregnant, and often are questioned in terms of their abilities, time, and energy to handle
jobs when they have children, it is understandable that some Chinese women have
material requirements for their future husbands to lessen some of their financial burdens.
Thus, probably in order to “recruit” more women to get married and reduce the impacts
of traditional Chinese culture, besides introducing science and technology to make
getting marriage certificates convenient, the government should better protect women’s
rights in their marriages and their workplaces.
Dating Websites
As discussed in Chapter Three, great tension in contemporary China arises
between the increasing number of Chinese women inclined to remain single until they
really want and are well-prepared to get married and the traditional cultural forces and the
CCP’s political practices that urge women to get married in their early or middle 20s. In
fact, for the traditional Chinese culture and the CCP, for women, marriage is more
important than being professionals. However, many single professional women have the
polar opposite idea. In response to this tension, cultural-political forces have created the
label “leftover women” to stigmatize single professional women who are over 27-years152

old for the purpose of compelling them into marriages. To understand the roles of science
and technology in this tension-filled context, I turn to dating websites and explore the
impacts of dating websites for Chinese single women.
Dating websites did not exist in China until the late 1990s. Despite its short
history, the business of online dating websites has expanded rapidly. According to
iResearch, which is a professional market research and consulting company in China, the
profit of the online dating industry was 4,000,000,000 Yuan in 2017(approximately
580,000, 000 USD). iResearch estimated that by 2020, the income of the online dating
industry would be over 50,000,000,000 Yuan (approximately 730,000,000 USD)
(iResearch, 2018, p. 12). Among the hundreds of different dating websites in China, I
focus on the three most influential ones: Jiayuan Wang/世纪佳缘网, Baihe Wang/百合
网, and Zhenai Wang/珍爱网. They have comparatively good reputations and have the
largest numbers of users.
Jiayuan Wang, which is also often known as ShijiJiayuan Wang, was founded in
2003 by Haiyan Gong who at the time was a second-year graduate student at Fudan
University, which is one of the best universities in China. Jiayuan Wang claimed that it
has gained the largest number of users among all dating websites. Baihe Wang was
founded by Fanjiang Tian and Yan Mu in May 2005. Among the three websites, Baihe
Wang works most closely with the Chinese government. Since March 2007, it has
cooperated with the Ministry of State Security of the PRC to request all its users to
provide their national ID numbers. Since April 2007, Baihe Wang has cooperated with
the All-China Women’s Federation. In February 2008, Fanjiang Tian, a founder of Baihe
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Wang, was appointed as a secretary in the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC. Zhenai
Wang was founded by Song Li and Si Chen who used to work for Morgan Stanley and
Dell respectively. Different from Jiayuan Wang and Baihe Wang that were initially
designed to provide a free online platform for strangers to meet, Zhenai Wang has
focused on providing a fee-based service from the beginning. Users have to work with
matchmakers from the company, send messages to strangers through matchmakers, and
pay at least 18,880 Yuan (around 3,000 USD) to have the chance meet a stranger in
person, which is also arranged and accompanied by matchmakers.
Although these three websites have their own unique features, all the them
promote their products through exploiting the tensions between the cultural-political
force that urges single women to get married in their early or middle twenties and many
single women’s situations of being financially independent and the targets of the culturalpolitical force. For example, in 2014, a commercial released by Baihe Wang explicitly
reveals how Baihe Wang took advantage of this tension to make a profit from single
women and their parents. The 30-second-long commercial “Because Love Won’t Wait/因
为爱不等待” begins with a single young woman’s monologue “This year I must get
married. I should do so considering my grandma’s wishes and health condition.
Whenever she meets me, she only asks me one question ‘Have you gotten married?’”
(“Because Love Won’t Wait,” 2014). 40 Then the camera shows how this young woman’s
grandma, who becomes increasingly old and sick, keeps on asking her the same question.

40

Appendix B is the fair use report that demonstrates my fair use of images from this commercial in my dissertation.
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The grandma is not happy even though her grandchild got her degree (see screen capture
1) and found a job (see screen capture 2). The only thing this grandma cares about is her
granddaughter’s marriage (see screen capture 3 and screen capture 4). Screen captures are
below:

Figure 4. 1 Screen Capture 1 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html.This
screen capture was taken by the author.
In this screen capture, the woman shows her grandma her diploma, but her grandma is
indifferent.
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Figure 4. 2 Screen Capture 2 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This
screen capture was taken by the author.
In this screen capture, the woman who has already become a professional is not happy
since she is still not celebrated by her grandma.

Figure 4. 3 Screen Capture 3 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This
screen capture was taken by the author.
In this screen capture, the grandma is getting older and appears visibly distressed and
asks her granddaughter “Have you gotten married?(结婚了吧)”

Figure 4. 4 Screen Capture 4 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This
screen capture was taken by the author.
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In this screen capture, the grandma is already in the hospital. She is on the verge of tears.
She asks her granddaughter the same question “Have you gotten married? (结婚了吧)”
The woman continues her monologue “I shouldn’t be picky and wait for my soul mate. I
should visit an offline store of Baihe Wang quickly.” At the end of the commercial, the
woman and her husband visit her grandma who stays at a hospital; she wears a wedding
dress, and tells her grandma with happy tears “Grandma, I got married” proudly and
affectionately. (see screen capture 5)

Figure 4. 5 Screen Capture 5 Of The Commercial "Because Love Won't Wait."This
commercial was openly accessed from http://www.iqiyi.com/w_19rrbikxx9.html. This
screen capture was taken by the author.
This commercial promotes the idea that Baihe Wang can help single women find
partners. It resonates with the cultural-political expectation for women to get married,
arguing it is both in women’s and their family members’ best interests to get married
before they enter middle-age since for women, nothing is more important than marriage
and that this technology can help them fulfill this purpose. After being played
ubiquitously on screens of family TVs, subways, airports, and shopping malls during the
Spring Festival in February 2014, a time when Chinese families usually reunite, cook and
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eat together, sit in front of TVs, talk about their experiences in the past year, and set up
their plans for the coming year, this commercial reinforced this expectation and the
necessity to use its service, as indicated by women’s comments online. On Tianya
Luntan, which is a popular Chinese open-access Reddit-style online forum, a user under
the pseudonym “nekoaisiteru” (2014) wrote “I feel very uncomfortable whenever I see
this commercial. As a single woman, I face lots of pressure. My mom has always wanted
me to find a husband. After watching this commercial, her expectation became even
stronger.” “俞艾维”/Yu Aiwei (2014) wrote “When I first saw this commercial I was
watching TV with my mom. My skin crawled and I knew something bad might happen.
Just as I thought: my mom turned to me and asked me to register for Baihe Wang.” “抹茶
红豆糯米糍”/Mocha Hongdou Nuomi Ci (2014) wrote:
Because of this commercial, in the eight days of my Spring Festival holiday, I did
not dare leave my room and watch TV with my family. The first moment I saw
this commercial, I realized that I am screwed. I poured myself a cup of water and
retreated into my room. In three minutes, my mom approached me and asked me
to have a blind date.
Similar to Baihe Wang, Zhenai Wang promotes its product through articulating
with the cultural-political expectation for women to find a husband who can be the
breadwinner of the family. In order to understand the process of using dating websites to
find partners, I registered for several Chinese dating websites, which include Zhenai
Wang. After submitting some of my information online such as my age, height, weight,
educational level, and place of work (I used my hometown Wuhan City instead of
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Houghton), matchmakers began to contact me. Below is a screen capture of a message
that a matchmaker from Zhenai Wang sent to me on February 16, 2019:

Figure 4. 6 Screen Capture Of The Message From Zhenai Wang. This screen capture was
taken by the author.
The message reads: Hello, I am the matchmaker Teacher Xiao from Zhenai Wang…I
want to introduce you to a partner. He is a manager of a company in the foreign trade
industry. His monthly salary is above 1,5000 Yuan (approximately 2181 USD), he has an
apartment of his own in Wuhan, and he is interested in travelling abroad.... 41

41In 2018, the average annual salary for people who work in Wuhan City was 73,671 Yuan (approximately 10,760
USD). This means that the average monthly salary was about 6139 Yuan (approximately 896 USD) (Statistics Bureau
of Wuhan, 2019).
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Aiming to allure me to pay for the service to meet the man, this concise message
primarily focuses on the man’s economic situation, as indicated by his job, his salary, his
property acquisition, and his luxurious interest, all of which reveal that he is a desirable
breadwinner. Through attracting women by advertising that many of its male users are
rich enough to support and lead a family, Zhenai Wang not only reinforces the necessity
for women to get married but also contributes to the gendered pattern of power and
authority.
Many women reported being discriminated against and shamed when they used
online dating services. In fact, many online dating websites intentionally choose to shame
single women, hoping this anxiety will compel them to buy expensive fee-based services.
On Zhihu, which is a Chinese version of Quora, in answering questions about using
ShijiJiayuan Wang, Baihe Wang, and Zhenai Wang, many women talked about their
negative experiences. For example, “维尼”/Wei Ni (2016) who described herself as a 29year-old single woman wrote “In an offline store of Zhenai Wang, a matchmaker told me
that it is unbelievable that I haven’t had a boyfriend for so long, so I need more help, thus
I should choose the service that costs 48,888Yuan (approximately 7,271 USD).” “英英”
/Ying Ying (2017) wrote “I never encountered such an evil website as Baihe Wang. I
paid more than 300 Yuan (approximately 45 USD), they called me again and asked me to
pay 600 Yuan (approximately 90 USD) more to update my service. They asked me
whether my family members had pressured me to get married recently since I am no
longer young.” On Douban, another popular open-access Chinese online forum, some
women also posted about their experiences using dating websites. “鹅组 lvlv 说不得”/
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Erzu Lvlvshuobude(2019) wrote “I received a message from ShijiJiayuan Wang. It wrote
‘if you don’t get married before you become aged, your womb becomes worthless’.” “郭
又欠”/ Guo Youqin (2019) wrote:
When I visited the offline store of ShijiJiayuan Wang, the matchmaker there
asked me whether I am a virgin…Then he told me that because I am no good at
decorating myself and am not willing to spend money, men don’t like me…He
told me that I lacked social responsibility….I talked back. He became angry and
was about to beat me. I was so scared.
My analysis reveals that although dating websites acknowledge professionalism—
for example the commercial released by Baihe Wang includes the image of a professional
woman and Zhenai Wang solicit its users’ information concerning their occupations and
places of work—many dating websites’ approach to resolve the tension between single
women and the cultural-political force that urges them to get married is to reinforce the
necessity for women to get married and to claim that their products can help single
women to get rid of their singlehood. In this way, many dating websites are articulated
with the cultural-political force that disciplines and even shames single women to find
partners before they become old like stale food that will expire soon. This approach
significantly ignores many single women’s inclination for late marriage or remaining
single for the rest of their lives.
Consequently, for some single women, dating websites reduce the pressure on
them to get married by offering them another option to meet new people; however, for
others, the dating websites’ approach of seizing on that tension creates extra burdens for
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them and their parents, contributing to these tensions. For example, triggered by the
commercial released by Baihe Wang, many single women shared online their terrible past
experiences of blind dates, their determination to avoid marrying merely because they are
aging, and openly criticized Baihe Wang for exacerbating their sufferings as single
women and the Chinese culture for being sexist. For instance, on Tianya Luntan, the user
“树蛙躲雨”/Shuwa Duoyu (2014) wrote “Marriage is important. But what is more
important is to be happy with our lives.” The user “小马甲 818”/ Xiao Majia818 (2014)
wrote “We, women, Let us be strong!” The user “20120207” wrote “It seems the whole
Chinese society begins to commercialize leftover women. It is disgusting. Single sisters,
watch out. Instead of marrying a wrong husband, we should remain single. Don’t be
manipulated by the propaganda…It is never too late to get married.” At the same time,
some single women channeled this incident of online boycotting of Baihe Wang and even
the discourse of the leftover women into a street campaign. On Valentine’s Day of 2014,
they protested outside the company of Baihe Wang and in subways. They held signs such
as “Don’t push me to get married,” and “Why Can’t I Remain Single? I Will Only Get
Married When I Want To.” A few single men also joined the campaign and held posters
like “Don’t Marry Me Because of Your Grandma.” (“Feminist Voice in Valentine’s Day
to Against Baihe Wang,” 2014). Through this radical protest, these single women justify
their decisions to remain single and request respect from the Chinese society and
government, which have contributed to the already existing tensions.
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The Treatment of Egg Freezing
As argued previously, an increasing number of single professional women
prioritize careers over marriages, resulting in the phenomenon of late marriage among
professional women in China. However, cultural-political forces also disfavor late
marriage and argue that if women get married late, there will be lower chances for them
to get pregnant or to have healthy babies, a claim that is said to be proved by medical
research. It is argued that this situation will detrimentally influence the relationship
between couples. Moreover, with the improvement of their economic situations,
professional women have more sovereignty over their lives, resulting in their confidence
facing divorce or determination to reject marrying men in order to avoid bad experiences
in marriages such as the conflict between daughters-in-law and parents-in-law. 42
However, some of the women who refuse to have husbands still want to become mothers
and to have biological children who can accompany them and take care of them when
they become old.
In this context, the treatment of egg freezing has attracted the attention of many
single professional Chinese women. On the website of UCLA Obstetrics and
Gynecology, egg freezing (or oocyte cryopreservation) is explained as “a process in
which a woman's eggs (oocytes) are extracted, frozen and stored as a method to preserve
reproductive potential in women of reproductive age” (“Egg Freezing,” n.d.). According

42Due

to the influence of the traditional Chinese culture, many daughters-in-law have to stay with their parents-in-law
in order to take care of them in contemporary China. However, staying together can be hard due to the differences
between their backgrounds.
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to Dr. Bergman (2016), “once frozen, embryos can remain viable for many years, with
cases of live birth resulting as long as 15 years after freezing”.
In general, this treatment enables Chinese women to fulfill two purposes. The first
one is that freezing eggs allows women to be less anxious about getting married early,
since they still have plentiful opportunities to have children even if they get married in
their 40s. Lake (2018) records the pressure concerning women’s fertility that Christy, a
professional Chinese woman, experienced: “‘I don’t mean to stress you, but I simply
cannot relax until you are married,’ Christy’s mom recently said to her. ‘You’re thirtyfour already. How can you be sure you’re still ovulating?’” (p. 21). This episode clearly
reflects the anxieties that are generated for single Chinese women by the issue of
women’s constrained biological clock when it comes to active fertility. With the help of
egg freezing, women can better focus on their careers and remain single until they find
people that they really want to marry. Second, this treatment enables women to have
biological children without getting married or having permanent partners. Reproductive
science and technology enable women’s frozen eggs to turn into fertilized eggs in test
tubes. After transplanting the fertilized eggs into a woman’s womb, it is possible for the
woman to have a child.
Egg freezing was largely unknown to most Chinese women until the 2010s, when
the internet enables celebrities to effectively exert one-to-many influence. In 2015, the
famous Chinese actress and director Jinglei Xu revealed that in 2013 when she was 39,
she flew to the U.S. to freeze nine of her eggs. Since then, Xu has promoted the treatment
of egg freezing, arguing that through freezing eggs a woman saves herself a future option
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of being a mother even if she becomes too old to ovulate. Xu’s argument has become
widely circulated in society and been viewed as extremely persuasive. For example,
searching the two key terms “Xu Jinglei” and “egg freezing” on Baidu, the largest search
engine in China, generated 419,000 results. Xu is regarded as the first Chinese celebrity
to receive the treatment of egg freezing, a pioneer for Chinese women to likewise seek
this medical treatment. Since Jinglei Xu’s revelation, some other famous Chinese
actresses such as Xuan Ye and Zhiling Ling also publically revealed that they had frozen
their eggs. These famous actresses have helped an increasing number of Chinese women
to become familiar with the treatment of egg freezing.
While the treatment of egg freezing can enable many Chinese women to fulfill
their dreams of better focusing on their jobs when they are young without being pressured
into getting married and having children or having children of their own without being
trapped into marriage, the Chinese government doesn’t favor either of these situations. As
discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government wants single women to get married
in their early or mid-twenties. Moreover, the Chinese government doesn’t welcome
“illegitimate” children—“out-of-state-family-plan” babies or babies whose parents are
not legally couples. In 2013, facing the situation that in some big Chinese cities an
increasing number of women have children without getting married, the document
“Population and Family Planning Management in Wuhan,” which was proposed by the
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local government of Wuhan city, argues that unmarried women who give birth to children
should be charged twice the social compensation fee. 43
Facing the popularity of the egg freezing, the Chinese government continues its
practice of challenging single women’s right to give birth through limiting access to egg
freezing exclusively to married couples since 2015. Accordingly, it became illegal for a
single Chinese woman to freeze her eggs in any Chinese hospital. The Chinese
government requires all the hospitals and medical institutions that provide the service of
egg freezing to mandate their female patients to provide three documents: 1) national ID
card, 2) marriage certificate, 3) and birth permission. If any of the three documents are
missing, the woman cannot receive this treatment (“It is not easy to freeze eggs in
China,” 2019 ).
That the government bans single women from egg freezing while allowing single
men access to sperm freezing has irritated many Chinese women. For example, on Tianya
Luntan, many Chinese netizens criticized this gender-based difference. The netizen “捷纪
天鹰”/Jieji Tianying (2015) wrote “Unbelievable country always has unbelievable
policies.” The netizen “冷月无声 1985”/Lengyue Wusheng1985 (2015) wrote:
In China, women should get married before turning 25, or they will become
leftover women; women should give birth to children before turning 30, or they
will be categorized as aged pregnant women. If you want to have a biological

43Social compensation fee/she hui fu yang fei/社会抚养费: according to the Chinese government, parents of
“illegitimate” children need to pay this fee to compensate their children’s “illegitimate” uses of social and natural
resources.
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child, sorry, you cannot freeze your eggs, instead, you have to show your
marriage certificate, reproductive certificate, and many other certificates. For
mothers, if you want your children enrolled in elementary schools, you have to
show schools the proofs that you have an IUD inserted. For married women who
only have baby girls, you have to work hard to become pregnant with baby boys
regardless of your health condition.
Obviously, the government’s political practice conflicts with many single women’s
interests, resulting in a great tension.
Despite many Chinese women’s strong reaction against the government’s ban in
recent years, the ban is still in place. Facing this situation, some privileged Chinese single
women respond this tension through traveling abroad to access egg freezing in foreign
countries. According to Kyle Francis, the CEO of the Southern California Reproduction
Center, due to the increasing number of Chinese women who want to utilize egg freezing,
this industry has become an expanding, profitable market in the U.S.. When Francis was
interviewed, he said, “fertility preservation is a growing factor, due in part to the fact that
[Chinese] people are waiting longer to get married, particularly as women's career
opportunities have expanded…. We are seeing patients in their early 30s to early 40s”
(“More Chinese women seeking,” 2018). In 2017, Ctrip, one of the biggest travel
websites in China, even began to provide a special travel plan, “The Trip for Egg
Freezing to Los Angeles, the U.S.A.” This trip lasted for seven days, and cost 218,888
Yuan (approximately 34,603 USD) (Tao, 2017).
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While travel abroad addresses the tension between the government’s ban and the
desires of many women to freeze their eggs, most Chinese women don’t have enough
money and resources to receive this treatment abroad. 44 Thus, although egg freezing
treatment provides single women important access to focusing on their careers without
worrying too much about getting married early, it does not fundamentally resolve the
tension produced between some single Chinese women’s prioritization of becoming
professionals over getting married and the cultural-political force that disciplines them to
get married early even at the cost of sacrificing their careers.

The Development and Use of Science and Technology for
Population Control and Family Design
While the previous section explored how science and technology are developed
and used to promote marriage and family in the era of reforms, this section maps the
development and application of science and technology for population control and family
design. As discussed in Chapter Two, many Chinese people believe in the nearly
omnipotent power of science and technology, which can enable them to fulfill their
wishes. For example, during the Westernization Movement, they wished to fend off the
Western invasions in order to live peacefully, and in the era of reforms, they wish to
become rich and prosperous, consequently turning to science and technology for help.

44 If a Chinese woman wants to receive the treatment of egg freezing abroad, she must first successfully obtain a visa
from her destination country. For some countries, such as the U.S., it is very hard for single women to get visas because
single women, given that they are available to marry, are suspected to have strong intentions of immigration.

168

Moreover, the Chinese government has heavily relied on science and technology to
achieve its political purposes such as surveilling its citizens, as evidenced by its projects
of the Great Firewall and the Tian Wang System. This section analyzes the issue of
population control and family design, which have been emphasized both by Chinese
people and the Chinese government. Through exploring the cases of governmentsponsored abortion, sterilization, IUD insertion, and use of IVF—which are the
predominant means of population control and family design in contemporary China—
this section considers how science and technology are articulated with politics and the
traditional Chinese culture to exert significant impacts on Chinese women’s lives.
Government-Sponsored Abortion, Sterilization, and IUD Insertion
Chapter Two stated that the Chinese government has a long tradition of utilizing
science and technology to achieve its various political purposes. Chapter Three pointed
out that in order to control the Chinese population, the Chinese government has
implemented several family planning policies, all of which regulate the number of babies
that a Chinese family is allowed to have. Additionally, Chapter Three stated that the
Chinese government has adopted several strategies to discipline people to follow the
government’s family planning policies strictly. For example, it is normal for parents who
have out-of-plan children to be fired if they work for the government-affiliated
companies, universities, labs, or other entities.
Besides these strategies discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese government has
turned to science and technology, especially the procedures of abortion, sterilization, and
IUD insertion. In order to achieve the desired effects of its family planning policies, the
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Chinese government has disciplined and even forced millions of Chinese people to
receive these procedures. In most cases, it is Chinese women that are subject to this
discipline. In Chinese culture, men are viewed as breadwinners and their strength is
closely associated with their reproductive organs, so their bodies, especially their
reproductive organs, are expected to remain intact. Moreover, because of the long history
of treating and viewing eunuchs as sub-human beings in ancient China, it is common that
men with damaged reproductive organs are mocked, discriminated aganist, and
stigmatized even in contemporary society. Thus, whether for abortion, inserting an IUD,
or receiving sterilization, Chinese women become the designated subjects. Rabinovitch
(2013) reported that due to the one-child policy:
Since 1971, doctors have performed 336m [million] abortions and 196m
sterilisations, the data reveal. They have also inserted 403m intrauterine devices, a
normal birth control procedure in the west but one that local officials often force
on women in China.
The many cruelties that occur in this process have been widely discussed. The
most representative work of Mo Yan, the only Chinese writer who has won the Nobel
Prize in Literature, is Frog/蛙, which touches on this subject. The pronunciation of frog
is “wa,” which is very similar to the word “baby/娃.” Yan’s book describes the range of
lived experiences of an obstetrician in Shandong Province (China): from helping women
with obstructed labor to deliver their babies, which saved many women’s lives, to
aborting women’s out-of-plan children, which led to the death of many women (Mo,
2016). The practice of forced abortion still exists in the years since China has
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implemented the more “relaxed” two-child policy. Sudworth (2016), who works for the
BBC News, interviewed a Chinese man who was hiding with his family because his wife
was going to give birth to their third child. The man explained his reason for hiding: “A
third baby is not allowed…so we are renting a home away from our village. The local
government carries out pregnancy examinations every three months. If we weren't in
hiding, they would have forced us to have an abortion.” Similarly, Mosher (2017), from
the Population Research Institute, states that “forced abortions in China continue despite
the two-child policy.”
Besides forcing some Chinese women to abort their out-of-plan babies, the
Chinese government also has disciplined and even compelled women to receive the
procedures of IUD insertion and sterilization. Fong (2016) points out:
China in particular favored sterilization because it was a virtually foolproof way
of lowering fertility. Nonpermanent barrier methods like condoms, the Pill, IUDs,
which gave individuals more choice and control, were not so trustworthy, even
though the IUD used—a stainless steel ring with no string—was specially
modified so women could not remove it themselves. In one year alone, 1983,
China sterilized over 20 million people. (p. 68)
To persuade and discipline women to have IUDs inserted, besides using force, the
government promotes the discourse that claims scientific studies reveal that an IUD has
no ill effects on a woman’s body; rather an IUD is beneficial for a woman’s health. Thus,
many Chinese women have IUDs placed in their bodies after giving birth to their first
children, and now after their second children.
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To ensure that the procedures of abortion, IUD insertion, and sterilization are
systematically carried out, there used to be a special governmental “Office Specialized at
Dealing with Women” (Fu Nv Shi Wu Ban Gong Shi/妇女事务办公室), and in some
regions this office still exists. An important purpose of this office was and, in some cases,
still is, to discipline women to follow the government’s family planning policies and
receive these “proper” treatments. Lili, a woman who I interviewed about her experience
when she encountered government officials, conveyed: 45
At first, they (village government officials) talked to us (all the wives in the
village). They told us we should sacrifice ourselves for the nation…They
mentioned many medical terms, I could not understand what I supposed to
do….They said “just do it, and stop asking questions. How could you understand
all the information, some of you haven’t even finished your middle-school
education”…I had to receive the surgery to have an IUD inserted.
Furthermore, because not all doctors had received enough training in
gynecological procedures and Chinese women were expected to receive the operation of
abortion, IUD insertion, and sterilization locally as an additional mode of corporeal

45 This interview was approved by the IRB #614903-1, “A Study of Chinese ‘Shidu’ Mothers.” Appendix C contains
the IRB approval of this project. Shidu mothers refer to Chinese women whose only child died. They followed the
Chinese government’s one-child policy to only have one child. However, their only children died usually when the
mothers were in their late 40s and 50s—an age at which they would struggle more to get pregnant again naturally. I
interviewed six shidu mothers. Four of them were located through a Chinese organization of shidu people that include
both shidu mothers and fathers “Hand in Hand,” and two of them were found through my personal connections. My
interviews were organized based on three main questions: 1) How does shidu affect your life? 2) How does shidu
impact you and your husband or ex-husband differently? 3) What are your future plans? All interviewees were assigned
pseudonyms. This interview was conducted in Chinese. I translated it from Chinese into English. I will talk more about
the issue of shidu mothers later in this chapter.
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control, the procedures were sometimes carried out in an unsanitary environment by
unqualified physicians. As a result, these procedures could result in serious side effects.
The case of the government-sponsored abortion, sterilization, and IUD insertion
reveals how the Chinese government uses technology to disciplines women to follow the
family planning policies to have the right number of babies. Moreover, it also
demonstrates the impacts of the articulation of politics, the traditional Chinese culture,
and science and technology on women. Due to the traditional Chinese culture, Chinese
women are expected to give birth to more than one child; however, the Chinese
government only allowed them to have one child. Subsequently, tensions emerged and
the government introduces policies and uses technology to both respond to and add to
these tensions. As indicated in my analysis, although science and technology probably
have successfully enabled the government to achieve its purpose of population control,
they fail to resolve the tension between the political and the cultural forces, as evidenced
by many Chinese people’s complaints and resistance. In this process, many women
remain the subjects and objects of control: first expected to give birth to many babies by
their husbands’ families, and then expected to give birth to only one child by the
government. Moreover, the introduction of science and technology in this process has
exacerbated many women’s suffering, sometimes endangering their health and even their
lives. For these women, science and technology fail to fulfill the expected roles of
bringing positive changes to their lives.
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In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Treatment
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Chinese culture has a long tradition of family
design through focusing on the necessity of a baby for a family and promoting gender
selection of babies. For example, in ancient China, it was legitimate for a husband to
divorce his wife merely based on the ground that she failed to produce an heir for his
family.
Even in contemporary China, having babies remains crucial for Chinese women.
For example, after collecting the narratives of Chinese shidu mothers, the mothers whose
only children died and thus leave them childless, I revealed that without a child, it can be
very hard for a Chinese woman to maintain her family and thrive in her community in
contemporary Chinese society. For example, Yan, a 57-year-old worker told me her
experience after the death of her only child:
My son left me when I was 48 years old…At that time, I had finished menopause.
I could not reproduce a child. My husband was 50 years old. Soon, we divorced.
He married a younger woman from a rural area. She produced a baby for him…I
don’t blame my husband; he also faced a lot of stress at that time. (as cited in Liu
& Slack, 2014, p. 41)
Yan is not the only shidu mother who was deserted by her husband. “Fang, a shidu
mother and leader of the shidu family organization ‘Hand in Hand,’ explained that of the
more than 500 people in the organization, 2/3 are females and more than half of them are
divorced” (Liu & Slack, 2014, p. 41).

174

Another shidu mother, Feng, reveals that in contemporary society, having a child
is still important for women if they want to be accepted by their communities. She
mentioned her experience after the death of her child:
In 2000, my best friend’s daughter made plans to get married. She called me and
told me this piece of news. I felt so excited because I finally found someone who
was still willing to share blissful events with me. I asked her for the location of
the wedding. She just smiled. At that time, I was so stupid. I asked someone else
and found the location ultimately. I knew her daughter, and I liked her daughter
very much. I wanted to go to her wedding to give her my sincere wishes. On the
wedding day, when I showed up, I saw anger and fear in my friend’s and
daughter’s faces. My friend took me away from the wedding and begged me to
leave. Her words hurt me a lot. Since then, I never go to any weddings or birthday
parties. (as cited in Liu & Slack, 2014, p. 44)
In fact, as discussed in Chapter Three, the tenacious connection between women and
childbirth can be traced back into Chinese myth. Due to this mythical influence, many
Chinese people believe that childless women are unlucky or even evil because God
refuses to send them a child. Moreover, as Chapter Three makes clear, the mythical
person who is responsible for spreading bad luck is the goddess Sao Ba Xing. Childless
women, the women who can be viewed as the potential manifestations of Sao Ba Xing,
are often discriminated against in the communities.
While the expectation to have children has remained constant, the number and
genders of the children that women are expected to bear have shifted over time. In the
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beginning of the era of reforms when China’s one-child policy was implemented, due to
the strong influence of traditional Chinese culture that argues that the more children,
especially baby boys that you have, the more blessed you are, many Chinese families
wanted to have more than one child, preferably baby boys. This meant that many Chinese
families had to break the government’s law or tried to circumvent the law. Thus, some
families decided to pay the government the fines for their out-of-plan babies, other
families wanted to be pregnant with twins since according to China’s one-child policy a
family was allowed to keep both children if they were twins. For some families who do
not want to break the law and do not want to have twins conceived with the help of
reproductive science and technology, which was still a risky practice that could
potentially endanger the parents’ careers if they worked for the government, they wanted
to guarantee their only children were boys. In order to meet many Chinese people’s
demanding expectations of family design, such as having twins and having a boy with
their only chance, they had to turn to reproductive technology for help because, as argued
in Chapter Two, many people rely on science and technology to solve their problems.
However, Chinese people’s notion of an ideal family has changed significantly in
recent years. After the implementation of China’s most recent two-child policy, Chinese
families are allowed to have two children, and many of them want their babies to include
one boy and one girl. The need for a baby boy follows the long Chinese cultural tradition
of preferring boys over girls, as discussed in Chapter Three. However, for the other child,
an increasing number of Chinese families hope that it will be a girl. This preference has
resulted in part from two reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter Three, due to the lack of
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single Chinese women, many Chinese men’s families have to pay large sums of money to
their sons’ girlfriends’ families to get permission for marriage from the girls’ parents.
Moreover, it is Chinese tradition that it is a bridegroom’s family’s responsibility to buy at
least one living unit for the newlywed couple. Fong (2016) points out that due to the
expense for a boy to get married in contemporary China, marriage has gradually become
“a matter of money, valuation, and investment” (p. 117). Thus, many Chinese families
now do not want to have two boys because they would have to face severe economic
pressure when their boys become adults. Instead, they want to have a boy and a girl: the
girl can obtain money for the family, which can be used to pay her brother’s girlfriend’s
family. This makes prenatal gender selection to have baby girls an investment for their
families, especially for their sons.
Additionally, the discourse that having a boy and a girl makes a happy family
began to gain popularity in Chinese society recently. For example, on January 15, 2016,
Sohu—one of the most popular websites in China—published the article “Having a Boy
and a Girl, That’s a Perfect Life.” In the article, the mother Yaling Li presented her happy
life by showing photos of her son and daughter. She concluded that her most meaningful
and proud job was to take care of her children and witness their growth (Chen, 2016). On
April 24, 2017, when the famous Chinese diver Jingjing Guo gave birth to a baby girl as
her second child, Jingjing Guo was widely recognized as a super lucky woman who have
a baby boy as her first child and a baby girl as her second child. She is regarded as a
female role model because she had a successful career that enabled her to attract and
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marry a rich man, and after her retirement she secured her position in a well-endowed
family by having two babies of different sexes.
In fact, nowadays in China, it is widely argued that since the Chinese character
“好” (good) is made of two parts “女” (girl) and “子” (boy), having a boy and a girl will
bring a family great wellbeing. This discourse tries to promote a new image of an ideal
contemporary Chinese family to replace the prior image that a happy Chinese family has
only one child that is ideally a son. On the one hand, this discourse reflects the
improvement of a girl’s status in Chinese culture because she is no longer viewed as a
money-losing property (Pei Qian Huo) as in ancient China or a half person as in the time
of China’s one-and-half child policy. On the other hand, it reinforces the necessity of
using reproductive science and technologies in order to have the right number of babies
of the right genders. In this context of emphasizing family design, IVF has become
prevalently used in Chinese society. In fact, China has the largest population of test-tube
babies in the world (“China Has World’s,” 2018). 46
The science and technology of IVF first appeared and were used in Western
countries since the late 1970s. The first test-tube baby was born on July 25, 1978 in the
U.K. Just one year after, the first test-tube baby in China was born on March 10, 1988.
According to Nordqvist (2018), IVF includes five crucial steps:

46

Test-tube babies: this term refer to babies conceived by in vitro fertilization.
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[The first step is to] suppress the natural menstrual cycle: The woman receives a
drug, usually in the form of a daily injection for about 2 weeks, to suppress their
natural menstrual cycle.
[The second step is called] super ovulation. [In this step,] fertility drugs
containing the fertility hormone follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) are given to
the woman. FSH makes the ovaries produce more eggs than usual. Vaginal
ultrasound scans can monitor the process in the ovaries.
[The third step involves] retrieving the eggs. The eggs are collected through a
minor surgical procedure known as “follicular aspiration.” A very thin needle is
inserted through the vagina and into an ovary. The needle is which is connected to
a suction device. This sucks the eggs out. This process is repeated for each ovary.
In 2011, researchers suggested that collecting 15 eggs from the ovaries in one
cycle gives the highest chance of a successful pregnancy. Frozen or donated eggs
may also be used.
[The fourth step involves] insemination and fertilization. The eggs that have been
collected are placed together with male sperm and kept in an environmentally
controlled chamber. After a few hours, the sperm should enter the egg. Sometimes
the sperm is directly injected into the egg. This is known as an intracytoplasmic
sperm injection (ICSI). Frozen sperm, retrieved through testicular biopsy, may be
used. This is believed to be as effective as fresh sperm in achieving a successful
pregnancy. The fertilized egg divides and becomes an embryo. At this point, some
centers offer pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) which can screen an
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embryo for genetic disorders. This is somewhat controversial and is not always
used. One or two of the best embryos are selected for transfer. The woman is then
given progesterone or human chorionic gonadotrophin (hCG) to help the lining of
the womb receive the embryo.
[The final step is to transfer the] embryo. Sometimes, more than one embryo is
placed in the womb. It is important that the doctor and the couple wishing to have
a child discuss how many embryos should be transferred. Normally, a doctor will
only transfer more than one embryo if no ideal embryos are available. The
transfer of the embryo is done using a thin tube, or catheter. It enters the womb
through the vagina. When the embryo sticks to the lining of the womb, healthy
embryo growth can begin.
IVF treatment mainly can enable its recipients to achieve two purposes. First, as a
significant medical breakthrough, it provides an efficient way to overcome infertility.
Second, IVF is also used for the purpose of embryo gender selection as well as
conceiving twins. In the fourth step “insemination and fertilization” of IVF treatment,
doctors can identify the gender of the fertilized eggs, allowing them to filter out female
embryos so that only male embryos remain. Fetal sex selection is prohibited in mainland
China since the Chinese government is afraid that if it is legal, many Chinese couples
would not want to have baby girls. However, it is a common practice that bribed Chinese
doctors will perform the embryo gender selection secretly even in Chinese public
hospitals. Moreover, in many other countries such as the U.S. and Thailand, it is legal for
doctors to reveal the gender of an embryo and the parents can then decide whether they
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want to discard the female embryo. Additionally, IVF treatment increases the chance for
women to have twins since usually several fertilized eggs will be transplanted into
women’s wombs.
Although IVF treatment can be very efficient, it is costly in China due to the
complex procedure involved. On Zhihu, the Chinese Quora, many people used their
experiences answer the question “How much does it cost to receive IVF treatment?”47
For example, “随遇而安”/ Suiyu Eran (2018) wrote, “In 2014, I received IVF treatment
twice. The first time, I paid for 72,000 Yuan (10,700 USD), and the second time I paid
96,000 Yuan (approximately 14,300 USD). However, both treatments failed.” Samson
(2019), a doctor in reproductive science, pointed out that to receive the IVF treatment in
China will cost in average140,000Yuan (approximately 19,737 USD).
Moreover, besides its cost, IVF treatment can result in female patients suffering
from serious pains. As described in the detailed process of IVF, the only step in which a
man is involved is providing his sperm. However, the woman’s work is much more
complicated. First, she has to take pills to suppress her natural menstrual cycle, then to
have FSH to produce more than one egg at a time, after that to receive surgeries to
retrieve her eggs and to have the embryo transferred to her womb, and finally to carry
the[se] embryo[s]to term. While men’s participation does not require much effort, the
treatment for women is painful and lasts for several months. In this process, unlike the
man who follows his natural proclivities, the woman is fighting against her own

47The

question and its answers were written in Chinese. They can be openly accessed from
https://www.zhihu.com/question/26900811. I translated them from Chinese into English.
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biological cycle. A report from sohu. com recorded many female patients’ miserable
experiences of receiving IVF treatment. It wrote “in this process, a mother received 236
injection. She definitely chooses to sacrifice herself in order to have a baby…A woman
even cannot leave the hospital after she received the treatment of fertilized egg
transplantation because she felt so much pain” (“The complete process of receiving IVF
treatment,” 2017). A woman “安素筱”/An Suxiao (2016) posted a long article “TestTube Baby: How Brave Can a Woman Be?” on Tianya Luntan, which recorded her
friends’ and her experiences. In her post, she quotes her friend Z’s comment to
summarize women’s experience when they receive IVF treatment: “I am treatedas a
lifeless machine.”
However, for the purpose of overcoming infertility, to have twins, and to have
babies in preferred genders, many Chinese women are willing to or have to endure all the
pains caused and cost incurred by the procedure of IVF. For instance, Lili, one of my
interviewees, talked about her experience of using IVF and trying to become a mother
again after the death of her son. Lili said:
I want to have a baby again. I don’t care about how much I need to pay for it. I
would sell everything I have; I just want to have a baby….[Lili told me that] I beg
God and the doctors to please give me a child. You asked me what my wish is
now? I have no wish but to get pregnant soon…. [I asked her: if you get pregnant
successfully, what are your plans for yourself and the baby? Lili thought for a
while and said] I have no plan. I just want to have a baby. (as cited in Liu & Slack,
2014, pp. 40-41)

182

In contemporary China, not only do infertile women receive IVF treatment, those
who are healthy also receive this treatment. Chinese people’s obsession with receiving
IVF treatment to have babies and to peform fetal sex selection even has resulted in the
flourishing of the international market of reproductive science and technology. It was
reported that “more Chinese women are visiting fertility centers in countries like
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and even as far as the United States, as they look to
start, or expand, their families”(“More Chinese Women,” 2018).
The case of IVF treatment reveals how science and technology are articulated
with the CCP’s family-planning policies and Chinese cultural beliefs concerning ideal
Chinese families to discipline Chinese women. In this context, IVF significantly affects
Chinese women even though some of them do not use it. Based on Wajcman’s (1991)
argument that “the very existence of [the reproductive science and technologies] changes
the situation…[A woman’s] ‘infertility’ is now treatable, and she must in a sense actively
decide not to be treated,” I argue the due to its articulation with the Chinese policies and
culture, the very existence of IVF treatment not only makes a woman’s infertility
treatable but also enables women to have babies in the “right” genders that are often
determined by the Chinese socio-cultural expectations, thus women must in a sense
actively decide not to receive this treatment (p. 62). It is ironic that IVF, which is often
viewed as an emancipatory reproductive science and technology that free women from
the situation of being infertile and provide women opportunities to choose their babies in
their preferred sexes, in reality traps Chinese women. On the surface, Chinese women can
decide whether they want to receive IVF treatment or not; in reality, many of them are
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pressured to receive this treatment. Additionally, the process of compelling is often
disguised as women’s choice. After being articulated with the socio-cultural expectation
for women to become mothers, IVF treatment has gained popularity in the Chinese
society, turning into a non-negotiable option for many Chinese women and reinforcing
the socio-cultural-political expectation for women to be mothers of the right number of
babies in the preferred genders.

The Development and Use of Science and Technology to
Promote the Discourse of the Super Mother
As discussed at the end of Chapter Three, in the era of reforms women are
expected to be caring mothers and at the same time professionals, which are roles that
often conflict. In response, though not necessarily intentionally, the media as well as the
government began to promote the ideal image of a woman as a super mother, which
essentially argues that women can balance these two roles and if a woman fails to do so,
it is her fault because she does not work hard enough or lacks ability.
It is not easy to become a super mother, a fact that is even recognized by the
government, which holds events to find and celebrate them. Thus how to become a super
mother is a crucial question, one that relates to science and technology. As discussed in
Chapter Two, in the era of reforms, many people believe that science and technology can
solve all problems, including the task of being super mothers that has emerged in this
context. This section explores the role of science and technology developed and used to

184

this end by focusing on the examples of breast pumps and children’s medicine made by
Johnson & Johnson.
Breast Pumps
Breast pumps are significant in terms of helping professional women balance their
careers and their responsibility to breastfeed their children. The main function of the
breast pump is to enable lactating women to extract milk from their breasts and
refrigerate it for their babies to drink when the mothers are at work. This technological
device can be powered by hand, batteries, or electrical outlet.
Breast pumps are very popular in China. Taobao, the biggest online market in
China, sold more than 30, 000 electric breast pumps from the company Rusch and more
than 20,000 from Xenbea monthly in 2019. Many customers who described themselves
as working women left comments expressing how breast pumps are their must-have
devices. In fact, in contemporary Chinese society, due to the increasing number of
women who carry breast pumps in their working bags, a specific term “bei nai ma ma/背
奶妈妈,” which can literally be translated as “mothers who are carrying milk in their
briefcases” was created to refer to lactating women in the workplace. By putting breast
pumps in their briefcases, these bei nai ma mas try to shoulder their mothering
responsibilities when they work outside their homes.
There is a significant difference between the promising advertisements for breast
pumps, which claim that they solve all the difficulties that bei nai ma mas’ have
experienced and the actual lived experience of many women who use breast pumps. They
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argue that their difficulties cannot be easily solved merely through using these
technological devices. Commercials for breast pumps often convey the message that they
significantly improve bei nai ma mas’ experiences, making their lives enjoyable and
enabling them to take good care of their babies by providing fresh nutritious milk in their
mothers’ absence. For example, the commercial for Rusch’s breast pump emphasizes that
this product is easy to use, won’t cause any pain, and even can massage breasts sore from
breastfeeding. Moreover, by giving its customers free storage bags for milk, it claims that
it provides a complete high-quality service that meets all of its customers’ needs and
saves bei nai ma mas from worrying about their babies’ food when they are away.
However, many women reported uncomfortable experiences using breast pumps
and argued that breast pumps, although necessary, do not fundamentally better their
experiences of being bei nai ma mas. On Zhihu, the Chinese Quora, when women
discussed their lived experiences of using breast pumps in the workplace, they often
mentioned that besides the physical pains caused by breast pumps, they suffered from the
psychological stress of being embarrassed in front of others, a situation that cannot be
simply solved by using advanced breast pumps. 48 For example, “三姐”/ San Jie (2019)
wrote: “being a bei nai ma ma, you must have to face many difficulties….Moreover,
whenever you go to any online forums, you can see people criticize career women who
do not want to be bei nai ma mas.” “晴天”/Qing Tian (2016) posted her record of
extracting 16, 510 ml of breast milk during the first two months following her return to
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the workplace and summarized, “I am so tired. I have tried many different environments
to extract my milk.” 49 In fact, most workplaces in China do not have a lactation room.
Moreover, many toilets in China do not have electric outlets. Thus, some mothers have to
use conference rooms, a comparatively more private space, when they need to use
electric pumps.
As discussed previously, super mothers are characterized as caring mothers who
take very good care of their children confidently and happily. Breast pumps have helped
many career women fulfill the purpose of continuing to breastfeed their babies after they
have finished their maternity leave, which is a prerequisite of being a super mother. In
fact, the idea that a responsible mother should breastfeed her baby for at least six months
to make her baby smarter and healthier is very popular in Chinese society. Mothers who
don’t meet this expectation are often criticized as being irresponsible and selfish. Chinese
society, which strongly discriminates against large framed women, accepts and even
respects lactating women with a larger body shape since they are culturally viewed as
mothers who have plentiful milk. In this case, their large bodies serve as the evidence of
their sacrifice for their children.
Although breastfeeding for young babies is strongly promoted, an increasing
number of women cannot be around their babies at all the times. According to Chinese
law, paid maternity leave for women is 98 days. Moreover, it is common that in order to
maintain their positions, many professional women who work for private companies

49These

comments can be openly accessed from https://www.zhihu.com/question/21325360/answer/59183635. I
translated this comment from Chinese to English.
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return even before they finish their maternal leave. This means that most professional
women, have to use breast pumps and become bei nai ma mas if they want to have
careers and at the same time be caring mothers. In this way, breast pumps provide these
women an important tool to becoming super mothers, and therefore highly respected
figures in society. But, at the same time, breast pumps lead to the simplification of bei nai
ma mas’ difficulties, framing their struggles as ones that can be easily solved by using
science and technology. Moreover, because of the possibility afforded by breast pumps,
many women are trapped. Many bei nai ma mas indicated that after returning to their
workplaces, they suffered from stress and anxiety, which resulted in reduced milk flow.
Thus, no matter how diligently they used breast pumps, they could not produce sufficient
milk. This circumstance leads to even more physical pain and anxieties for them (“An
investigation of lived experiences of bei nai ma mas,” 2015).
While mothers with careers have to use breast pumps and to endure physical
discomfort and psychological stress in order to raise their children in accordance with the
society’s expectations, fathers are largely absent from those responsibilities. In fact, while
the image of a super mother, which sets up an “exemplary” model for contemporary
Chinese women, emphasizes that women should prioritize their mothering
responsibilities over their careers, the image of the super father is negative and mocks
men who waste their time and life taking care of their babies. It is ironic that compared
with the society’s strong emphasis on women shouldering all kinds of obligations for
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child care such as breastfeeding, the paternal role is significantly ignored. 50 As a result,
some breast pump companies such as Xenbea even go so far to excuse paternal
responsibility by promoting their products as being quiet and therefore not impacting
other family members’ sleep in the middle of the night when the mother uses it. As
revealed in my analysis, although breast pumps provide important resources for women
to become super mothers, they do not resolve the fundamental tensions that many bei nai
ma mas face.
Children’s Medicines Produced by Johnson & Johnson
As discussed previously, super mothers are different from traditional mothers who
usually do not have jobs as well as working mothers who are often overburdened by their
responsibilities. Instead, super mothers are supposedly to be confident and professional
both in their careers and in raising their children. Science and technology, especially
science and technology focused on children’s medicines, strongly promote the quality of
professionalism super mothers should have.
Johnson & Johnson, in order to promote its fever reducer for children named “Mei
Lin/美林,” released a series of short commercials over the past few years. These
commercials depict mothers who “fly” quickly from their offices to homes to take care
their children when they are needed and show how these mothers turn to Mei Lin to
provide care for their children while maintaining their professionalism. Mothers in these

50 In contemporary Chinese society, it is normal that mothers and grandmothers are responsible for taking care of the
babies exclusively.
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commercials are depicted as beautiful, knowledgeable, and confident professional women
who can singlehandedly take good care of their children. These commercials always
conclude with the statement that “Every mother is a firefighter/Mei Ge Ma Ma Dou Shi
Xiao Fang Yuan/每个妈妈都是消防员.” In fact, the most typical image of mothers in
Mei Lin’s commercials is a mother who wears a firefighter’s suit, happily holding her son
and facing the camera with confidence. Below is the image of the mother in Mei Lin’s
advertisements: 51

Figure 4. 7 An Advertisement To Promote The Children's Fever Reducer Mei Lin.
This image can be publicly accessed from http://sucai.redocn.com/psd/553017.html.
In 2018, Johnson & Johnson released a long commercial to promote its product
Mei Lin, which was well received. This commercial depicts three generations of women
who live together: a grandma who is responsible for all housework; a mother who is a
highly successful, professional who often finishes her work at 2 am and at the same time
takes good care of and teaches her baby girl; and the young girl. The commercial begins
with the conflicts between these three generations of women: the professional woman
complained about her mother for not listening to her and the baby girl cried because her

51Appendix

D contains the fair use report to demonstrate my fair use of this image.

190

mother refused to wear clothes for her. With the sickness of the baby girl, who later was
cured using Mei Lin, these three women reconciled and expressed their love for each
other: the grandmother understands her daughter’s requests and the professional woman
explicitly shows her deep love for her daughter after staying awake the whole night to
take care of her (“Let love be right,” 2018).
Besides the father’s voice calling his family and asking the routine daily question
“How is everything today?” , the image of a father is absent in this commercial. While
promoting the effectiveness of its medicine and celebrating maternal love, the
commercial clearly sends out the message that women are responsible for taking care of
children, doing all housework, and if they need help, turning to science and technology
and their female family members. Additionally, this commercial promotes the way of a
high level of professionalism a woman should have to take care of her baby, which adds
extra demands for many women. As revealed in my analysis, children’s medicine, such as
Mei Lin manufactured by Johnson & Johnson, reinforces the image of the super mothers,
which reframe mothers to accommodate to the current culture, economic, and political
climate but still maintains the traditional Chinese family dynamics.
Besides breast pumps and children’s medicine, an increasing number of
technological products, such as smart home devices and mobile apps have been designed
to help mothers who are also professionals. These technologies are meant to help mothers
manage their time and take good care of their children, resolving the tension produced by
women’s roles of being mothers and at the same time professionals. However, with the
popularity of these products, extra burdens are added for women and the image of the
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super mother becomes more demanding. As revealed in my analysis, the image of a super
mother does not resolve the tension produced by women’s simultaneous roles as
professionals and mothers. Moreover, although science and technology can be helpful in
terms of enabling women to balance their careers and familial lives, the ways they are
promoted in China significantly reinforce the absence of the role of the father and
complicate the demands for women, which can even exacerbate women’s already
stressful lives.

The Development and Use of Science and Technology By
Women to Gain Independence and Resist Sexual Violence
As discussed in Chapter Three, the discourse of The New Woman advocates for
Chinese women to resist their subordinated status, to receive education, and to join the
workplace. It points out that since the late 18th century, feminist movements that
primarily promote gender equality and request for eliminating gender-based violence
such as foot binding have occurred in China. Chapter Three also pointed out that the CCP
encouraged and prepared women to join the workplace, as evidenced in its various
political practices. Accordingly, an increasing number of Chinese women have received
education and become professionals, which in turn have enabled them to better resist
sexism. However, as discussed previously, some sexist practices are still prevalent in
Chinese culture and are even supported by the Chinese government. Thus, tensions have
emerged between women’s independence and demands for gender equality and the sexist
attitudes associated with the tenacious cultural-political force. This section explores the
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roles of science and technology in this tension-filled context through focusing on
women’s job opportunities in the era of reforms and online feminist activism against
sexual violence in China.
Job Opportunities
As argued in Chapter Two, science and technology have developed rapidly in the
era of reforms and have influenced Chinese people significantly. One of their important
influences is the job opportunities they create. In fact, the development of science and
technology has offered Chinese women from various backgrounds valuable job
opportunities that increase their chances to gain independence.
Chapter Three argued that with the implementation of the nine-year compulsory
educational system, an increasing number of Chinese women have been able to receive
education. Additionally, according to Chapter Two, due to the Chinese government’s
emphasis on developing science and technology, STEM education is also prioritized
compared with education in the humanities and the arts, which results in many Chinese
women becoming scientists and engineers. In 2015, the Nobel Prize in Medicine was
awarded to Tu Youyou, a Chinese female scientist. Tu is the first and the only scientist in
China who has ever won the Nobel Prize in STEM. Tu and her team discovered the key
chemical element “artemisinin” in the plant of Artemisia Annua, which was commonly
used in traditional Chinese medicine to cure malaria. Her team successfully extracted
artemisinin from the plant. Tu’s discovery is recognized as significant worldwide. On the
website of the Nobel Prize, Tu’s work is explained as follows:
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A number of serious infectious diseases are caused by parasites spread by insects.
Malaria is caused by a single-cell parasite that causes severe fever. Traditional
Chinese medicine uses sweet wormwood to treat fever. In the 1970s, after studies
of traditional herbal medicines, Youyou Tu managed to extract a substance,
artemisinin, which inhibits the malaria parasite. Drugs based on artemisinin have
led to the survival and improved health of millions of people. (“Tu Youyou Facts,”
n.d.)
Chinese people are proud of Tu, since unlike many other scientists who have experiences
studying or working in Western countries, Tu finished all her education in China and her
achievement was significantly influenced by traditional Chinese medicine. Thus, Tu’s
success signifies that China has the ability to cultivate its own scholars in STEM and that
there is valuable scientific and technological knowledge in traditional Chinese culture,
resisting the stereotype that it is a backward culture reliant on superstitions.
Tu’s case also directed people’s attention to female Chinese scientists and
engineers. On 10 January, 2017, CCTV.com, a website sponsored by the Chinese
government published the article“1+15+50%: ‘Hua Mulan’ in STEM.” The article
celebrates Tu as the most representative female scientist along with 15 other female
scientists and engineers who were PIs on projects that won top Chinese prizes in STEM
and the 50% of female scientists and engineers who have also worked on most of the
renowned projects in STEM. The article likens them to Hua Mulanin contemporary
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China. 52 The article states, “these female scientists and engineers who are active in
different disciplines are blooming, working hard, and creating [legends]” (Liu, 2017). In
fact, female scientists and engineers have important roles that will become increasingly
indispensable in China, as indicated by Ma et al. (2018). They write:
China is focused explicitly on building its own research and development (R&D)
and innovation. Its R&D staff swelled from 3.2 million in 2009 to 5.8 million in
2016, and the increased demand for talent has highlighted the need for more
female scientists….after age limits for female grant applicants [for Young
Scientist Fund] were extended [from 35 to 40 by the Chinese government as a
strategy to attracting many women to work in STEM and to improve gender
equality in 2011], The percentage of female award recipients jumped from 33% to
43% in 2011….Women’s representation on review panels [in STEM] went up by
45% between 2010 and 2017, to 13.3%. That is still low, but consistently higher
than rates seen from 1986 to 2009, which fluctuated around 6%.
Although the development of science and technology has afforded women who
receive advanced education in STEM chances to become scientists and engineers, female
scientists and engineers are still strongly discriminated against in their workplace. For
example, in 2018, 177 male scientists were elected as Outstanding Young Scholars in

52Hua Mulan: Hua Mulan (花木兰) is famous female hero in Chinese culture. Although it is believed that she lived as a
woman warrior in the Northern and the Southern Dynasties (420-589), she was treated as a legendary figure instead of
a real person in Chinese culture. The legend of Mulan describes how she camouflaged as a man to replace her father
who was old and sick and her younger brother to serve in the army because in that period of time every family with
more than one male was required by the government to send a man to serve in the army. Mulan was very brave and her
performances were outstanding during the wars. Mulan is not only known by Chinese people. In 1998, Disney released
the film Mulan based on the story of Hua Mulan in Chinese culture. In 2004, Disney released the film Mulan II which
continues Hua Mulan’s story in the 1998 film.
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China; in contrast, only 23 female scientists were elected. Until 2017, female scientists
only constituted 6% of the members of the Chinese Academy of Science (“The First
Female Chief Editor of Nature,” 2018). Moreover, outstanding female scientists are often
derogatorily labeled as “Abbess Mie Jie /灭绝师太.” 53 Thus, although female scientists
and researchers are valuable, they are not as valued as they deserve to be due to the
cultural-political forces that prioritize men over women in the workplace.
Besides offering women who receive good educations job opportunities in STEM,
the development of science and technology also has provided migrant job opportunities to
Chinese women who only receive middle school, high school, and vocational education.
These women are known as rural migrant workers/Nong Min Gong/农民工. They leave
their hometowns, usually villages and small towns, and come to big cities to conduct
manual and low-skilled work. In 2018, there were 115.7 million migrant workers in
China and more than one third of them were employed in the manufacturing industry
(National Bureau of Statistics, April 2019). Moreover, among these workers, 34.8% were
women (National Bureau of Statistics, May 2019). Foxconn, a manufacturing company
that is famous for its role in producing electronics, including mobile phones, laptops, and
tablets, is one of China’s largest private companies that has employed considerable
number of migrant workers. According to Foxconn’s 2017 Suicidal and Environmental

53Abbess

Mie Jie is a female figure from an influential swordsman novel The Heaven Sword and Dragon Saber/倚天屠
龙记. “Mie jie” means “destroy and eliminate.” Abbess Mie Jie is depicted as a stubborn and high-skilled female leader
who has an extreme idea of success. In order to fulfill her dream of leading her team to be the best, she is willing to
sacrifice her students’ love and happiness and even to kill her closest student (Jin, 2013).
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Responsibility Report, an official document released by the company, it had 988,000
workers in China as of December 31, 2017; among them, 35% were women (pp. 11-23).
The phenomenon of large numbers of Chinese women from rural areas becoming
migrant workers is quite recent and began to emerge during the mid-1980s when China
began to cooperate with Western countries to build modern factories equipped with
assembly lines. These modern factories attracted companies to move their factories from
Western countries to China where labor is cheap, the exchange rate favors U.S. and
European currencies, and many poor Chinese people are desperate to take any kind of job.
Due to the expanding population of migrant workers, in 1991, a TV series Wai Lai Mei/

外来妹 showcased this group through depicting the experience of six female migrant
workers in the manufacturing industry (Chen, 1991). This TV series was highly
successful and is still regarded as one of the best Chinese TV series. It applauded female
migrant workers’ bravery in leaving their hometowns and making irreplaceable
contributions to the development of the city, even though they were suffering from
discrimination and homesickness.
The discussions concerning the issue of female migrant workers always center on
two words: “opportunity” and “hardship.” The opportunities for these women from poor
rural areas to find jobs as factory workers as well as waitresses, cleaners, and other
menial laborers in cities are crucial for them to achieve economic independence. After
interviewing and surveying migrant women in Beijing, Jacka (2005) points out that many
female migrant workers suffer from poverty and sexism before their migrations to Beijing.
They intentionally decide to work in cities for the following reasons: to leave their
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backward, poor hometowns and/or families; to develop themselves; to broaden their
horizons; to exercise independence; and to receive education. Jacka concluded that these
urban job opportunities enable women to explore the world, to gain independence, and to
redefine their identity as someone more than a daughter and a wife (pp. 55-62). Similarly,
Goodburn (2015) also believes that urban job opportunities improve rural women’s living
situations significantly:
While [migrant] women’s burden of work in cities may not be much less
[compared with their burden of agricultural work in their hometowns], their
subordinate status is subtly changed, at least societally if not necessarily within
each household, with the increase in participation in paid labour and the distance
from husbands’ parents. (p. 336)
While many female migrant workers develop a sense of autonomy, they are struggling at
the same time. For example, Pun and Chan (2012) explore the hardships of migrant
workers after discussing the case of Tian Yu, a female migrant worker in Foxconn, who
survived after attempting to commit suicide. To and Tam (2014) write, “the fact is that
they [migrant workers] still receive poorer welfare benefits… [and] they are also blamed
as the causes of social problems.” (p. 1329)
Whether or not women from rural China choose to become migrant workers, the
development of science and technology, which results in the rapid expansion of the
manufacturing industry in China, provides women— especially rural women who only
receive minimal education— an extra option besides conducting agricultural work in
their hometowns. Besides female scientists, engineers, and migrant workers, the
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development of science and technology also contributes to the increasing number of
businesswomen. Dong Mingzhu (董明珠) and Hu Weiwei (胡玮炜) are the two most
representative figures whose success significantly resulted from the development of
science and technology. Dong began her career as a salesperson in 1990 at Gree
Company, which is famous for producing air conditioners. In 2012, she became the
chairperson of this company. As a highly successful company, in 2017 the revenue from
Gree air conditioners in China was 123.41 billion Yuan (approximately 18.3 billion USD)
(“Gree,” 2018). Moreover, air conditioners produced by Gree have been exported to other
Asian, African, Latin American, and European countries. Gree’s success is widely
attributed to Dong’s efforts and intelligence. At the same time, Dong is also widely
recognized as a highly successful Chinese professional woman.
Compared with Dong Mingzhu, Hu Weiwei’s path to success has been different,
even though both of them took advantage of scientific and technological developments.
Hu began her career by building an online platform while Dong began her career as a
traditional salesperson. Inspired by the rapid development of information and
communication science and technologies, Hu set up the company Mobike. This company
centers on a bike-sharing scheme. People download the Mobike App into their
smartphones in order to use it to unlock bikes. When they finish using the bikes, they can
leave the bikes almost anywhere and finish the rental process by using the app again. By
December, 31, 2017 there were 200 million registered users, and Mobike was active in 16
countries by May 2018 (Smith, 2019). Because of the success of Mobike, Hu, who was
born in 1982, became one of the youngest and most prosperous businesswomen in China.
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Although not many businesswomen are as successful as Dong Mingzhu and Hu
Weiwei, many Chinese women set up small businesses, especially online shops, to
become self-employed workers. Previously, it was expensive and complex to own a shop,
because the person needed to pay rent for a store and get a set of licenses from the
government. However, the development of the Internet makes the path to opening a shop
much cheaper and easier. Alibaba, a world renowned company in e-commerce, was
founded in 1999 in Hang Zhou China. Alibaba enables businesspeople to sell products
without renting a physical place and without needing to obtain the many required licenses
from the government. In this way, Alibaba provides many people, including women, job
opportunities. As Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba has said, Alibaba contributes
significantly to female entrepreneurship. Ma (2017) claimed that
More than one-third of its founders were women, with a similar percentage taking
senior management roles. Women are well-represented within Alibaba, with the
ratio of female employees once nearing 50 percent, and is only slightly watered
down after a wave of mergers and acquisitions of overseas assets.
Also, half of the sellers on its gigantic Tmall and Taobao marketplaces are women,
and a greater proportion of storefronts with higher positive user ratings have
female owners.
These are clear manifestations that the internet has helped equalize the playing
field and enabled women to create and pursue opportunities to flourish in their
own right. (as cited in He, 2017)
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By running online shops, some women have become rich and successful. For
example, in 2018, the Wall Street China reported on the successful career of Zhang Dayi,
who began her business as an owner of an online clothing shop. Using pictures of herself
wearing the clothing she sold in her shop as a guide for how to be fashionable, Zhang’s
online shop has become famous and has gained many loyal followers. On 11, November
2017, the sales of Zhang’s online shop exceeded 170,000,000 Yuan (about 25,000,000
USD) daily (“Will Zhang Dayi’s Company,” 2018). In fact, it has become a trend for
many Chinese women to become self-employed as owners of online shops. They focus
on their interests such as clothing, cosmetics, and specialized talents (e.g. painting and
language skills), to achieve economic independence and gain self-fulfillment.
However, we should notice that despite their successes, many female online shop
owners are being strongly denounced. They are labeled as “Internet Red/ Wang Hong/网
红” , which has a derogatory connotation. They are accused of using their influence to
make Chinese women obsessed with superficial concerns such as buying excessive
clothes to chase fashion trends and of commercializing their bodies to make profit.
Moreover, since their businesses are primarily women-related, they are not viewed as
seriously as other businesses. In addition, in order to attract customers, many of these
women try to build personal connections with their customers, which results in them
being vulnerable to overwork and abuse. For example, in 2012, a 24-year-old female
online shop owner “艾珺 Aj,” whose shop won recognition as a diamond shop since it
was deemed high-quality and trustworthy, died from overwork. It was reported that in
order to run her shop, she took only five hours of sleep and put all the rest of her time
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into her shop (“A 24-years-old online shop owner,” 2012). However, because she was
self-employed as an online shop owner, her death from overwork did not receive any
material compensation. Furthermore, in 2015, “Xiao Mei,” an owner of an online
homeware shop, was raped by five men who lured her out to discuss her products
(“Beautiful Online Shop Owner Was Raped,” 2015). These two cases reveal that the
working conditions for owners of online shops are not necessarily stable or safe.
Although the development of e-commerce has not avoided or eliminated sexism
or provided sufficient protections for women who are self-employed, it offers Chinese
women another opportunity to make a living independently. With the development of
science and technology, an increasing number of Chinese women have more
opportunities to become career women whether they are in cities or in rural areas and
whether they receive college education or not, although sexism continues to be a problem.
Consequently, despite discrimination against women in the workplace, Chinese women
are more likely to become independent working women who take control of their lives.
Online Feminist Activism Against Sexual Violence
As argued in Chapter Three, traditional Chinese women were expected to be
submissive in their marital and familial lives. However, with an increasing number of
women receiving education and becoming professionals accompanied by the popularity
of the discourse of The New Woman that criticizes traditional submissive women in
contemporary China, many women began to question the legitimacy of the requirement
for women to be submissive and to realize that, like men, they should be equally
respected. This change is explicitly reflected in Chinese women’s increasingly strong
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attitudes against sexual violence. For example, on March, 2015, five young feminist
women protested against sexual harassment on public transportation in Beijing, the
capital city of China. However, on March 6, they were arrested, which happened two
days ahead of International Women’s Day. This case reveals the serious tension that is
created by the increasing number of Chinese women who engage in feminist movements
and the Chinese government’s political goal of building a society that is stable and free
from conflicts, activism, and complaints.
In this context, many women shift their locations of resistance against sexual
violence from offline to online spaces, utilizing the internet and social media. For
example, a group of feminist activists imitated the play Chicago to make a video “China
Scumbag Illustration” that lists and criticizes the six most typical forms of sexual
violence in China and posted it online (Tu & Hu, 2018). In the video, Tu and Hu replay
the life experiences of six women who killed their boyfriends and husbands due to the
unendurable sexual violence they suffered. The first women was betrayed by her husband
who not only slept with many women but also categorized these women based on their
sexual behaviors and labeled his wife as dead hutong. 54 The second woman was suffering
from domestic violence. She was beaten frequently and violently by her husband using
his favorite instrument: a saxophone. The third woman was driven to kill her husband
because he killed her adopted children since she wanted to have a child but her husband
lacked the ability to reproduce. The fourth woman was used by her boyfriend as the

54Hutong/胡同

means alley. Through comparing the woman to a dead alley, her husband criticized the woman for his
betrayal of their marriage, arguing that it is the woman’s fault because she lacked sexual attraction for him.
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scapegoat for his crime of transporting and hiding heroin in her apartment. Moreover, in
order to escape from the punishment, her boyfriend called the police to report her
address. The fifth woman was suffering from her ex-boyfriend who stalked, harassed, and
threatened her every day since their first encounter following their breakup. The next
woman killed her husband because he killed their baby girl since someone was willing to
pay for their baby girl for a ghost marriage. 55 This video was widely discussed online.
For example, due to its high search frequency, in November 2018, the hashtag “China
Scumbag Illustration” was the highest trending topic on Weibo, the Chinese Twitter.
Despite many Chinese netizens’ disagreements with the radical approach that the six
women took to end their suffering by killing these men, most viewers commented that
this video truthfully depicts the predominant forms of sexual violence that are prevalent
in Chinese society and that Chinese women have the right to fight against sexual
violence. This video reveals how Chinese women utilize the internet and social media to
resist sexism, to criticize sexual violence, and to exert feminist influence over the society.
In fact, in recent years, many social activist movements that target sexual violence
have happened online. One of the most successful movements is online anti-domestic
violence activism, which significantly contributed to the implementation of China’s first
anti-domestic violence law on March 1, 2016. Legette (2017) focuses on the discussion
of domestic violence on Chinese online platforms, especially the Weibo account Feminist

55Ghost marriage is a traditional Chinese cultural practice of sending a wife to accompany the dead male members of
their families, which is still performed in some Chinese areas. To perform ghost marriage, people usually hold wedding
ceremonies for dead men and women to announce that they are couples. Some people also kill women and baby girls
and bury them with men to perform ghost marriage.
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Voices, and argues that the online platforms have contributed to China’s politics and
society in the ways as “raising awareness and fostering normativity of an anti-domestic
violence stance; [forming] anti-domestic violence CSO [Chinese Civil Society
Organization] network; [and]linking the online discourse to offline action” (pp. 22702272). Similarly, Tan (2017) highly evaluates the impacts of the online anti-domestic
violence activism, stating:
During the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence campaign and
the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women in
November 2012, feminist activists in China launched a petition for legislation
against domestic violence which was eventually enacted in December 2015. (p.
178).
In this activism, many women use their bodies as the battleground. For example,
many of them post their nude photos online with words written on their bodies with their
faces covered or absent, which can hardly be done offline in the conservative Chinese
society. Tan (2017) analyzes this action and describes one of the pictures as “inscribed on
her [Xiao Meili who is a Chinese feminist] torso were two columns of Chinese
characters: ‘Shame on domestic violence / Proud to have [a] flat chest’” (p. 178). Tan
argues that in this way, Xiao Meili asserts that women should never be held responsible
in any way for being victims of domestic violence for any reason. In arguing that social
media has become the core political resource for young Chinese feminists, Li and Li
(2017) also invoke the example of the online activity of women uncovering breasts to
fight against domestic violence. They point out that Chinese women use this activity, as
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well as other similar strategies to attract the most public attention in order to efficiently
send out their messages regarding their intolerance of domestic violence, and to create
strong public pressure for the Chinese government to respond and to make legal changes.
In short, the online anti-domestic violence activism has helped Chinese women to
identify the manifestations of domestic violence, thus they realize that violence includes
both physical and mental abuse. Additionally, this online activism enables many Chinese
women to express their requests for being legally protected and respected in their
marriages and families, provides victims of domestic violence with resources to seek help
such as China’s Anti-Domestic Violence Network, and creates strong social pressure for
the Chinese government to address the issue of domestic violence. These efforts have
later resulted in the enactment of the anti-domestic violence law that has the potential to
save millions of women and children from being abused.
Although the internet and social media are helpful in terms of providing a safer,
relatively anonymous space for women to bravely and openly criticize sexual violence
and advocate for social changes, these technologies do not resolve the tensions between
women’s demands for equality and independence and the government’s conservative
attitude towards social activism. For example, although the video “China Scumbag
Illustration” was popular and recognized by most of its viewers as Chinese women’s
determination to demand for social justice that they deserve, one day after it became
trending on Weibo, it was banned all over the Chinese internet by the government.
Although the government hasn’t provided an explanation for this action, it is likely that
the part of the video that depicts the way the women end intolerable sexual violence
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irritated the government. It is possible that the six women who killed the men that
suppressed them can be interpreted more as social disruptors rather than feminist fighters.
Consequently, this video was banned likely because the government prioritizes stability
of the society over ending sexism. Besides banning this video, the government also
banned the Weibo account Feminist Voices, which had significantly contributed to the
online activism against domestic violence in March 2018. Fincher (2018) interviewed a
Chinese feminist and borrowed her words to explain the ban, writing:
[The feminist Lü Pin] says the fact that the Chinese government felt the need to
crack down so harshly on feminist social-media accounts was a sign of just how
successful the feminists had been in tapping into the urgent needs of women
across China and striking a nerve with the mainstream public. (p. 51)
Despite the government’s increasingly strict censorship concerning online
comments that indicate and demand for social change, Chinese women are resilient and
try to speak out against sexism. For example, many Chinese women still engage in the
#MeToo movement, a topic that is strongly censored by the government through deleting
comments and even banning some participants’ social media accounts. In order to avoid
being caught, instead of using the hashtag “#MeToo,” many Chinese women used two
emojis

and

when they talked about their past experiences of being sexually

harassed and even damaged on campuses, in their workplaces, and in public spaces.
refers to rice, which in Chinese sounds like “me.”

refers to rabbit, which in Chinese

sounds like “too.” So when put these two emojis together, it refer to “Me Too.” Through
this code, they demand for social change.
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The online activism against sexual violence reveals how the internet and social
media have empowered Chinese women through providing them an important space to
build solidarity and more importantly to resist sexism and make political demands. In
fact, as indicated by Kuah-Pearce (2008), “by embracing the Internet and the cyberspace,
[many] women have accumulated significant socio-cultural capital and are creating a
feminized virtual space for their use” (p. 43). However, while serving Chinese women,
the internet and social media are under the strict control of the Chinese government.
Consequently, although the internet and social media mediate the tension to some degree
between women’s engagement with feminist activism and the government’s conservative
attitude towards any social activist movements, they have not resolved the tension in a
fundamental way.
This chapter has explored the implications of science and technology for Chinese
women’s lived experiences as wives, mothers, and professionals. Through focusing on
the developments and uses of science and technology to promote marriage and family, for
population control and family design, to promote the discourse of the super mother, and
for women to gain independence and resist sexual violence, this chapter has demonstrated
that science and technology are closely articulated with traditional Chinese culture, the
Chinese politics, and the discourse of The New Women to exert gendered influences.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
This final chapter includes three sections. The first summarizes the main
arguments in this dissertation. The second explores the theoretical and practical
implications of my findings. The third addresses a limitation of this dissertation and my
future directions of research.

Summary: Cultural Stories of Science and Technology and
Chinese Women
This dissertation has brought together scholarship from cultural studies, gender
studies, contemporary Chinese studies, and science and technology studies to explore the
implications of science and technology for Chinese women. More specifically, this
dissertation answers the following questions: what’s going on with regard to science and
technology in the era of reforms? What are Chinese women’s lived experiences in the era
of reforms, and how do science and technology impact them? I tell two stories—one
about science and technology and the other about women in contemporary China—to
summarize the main arguments in the previous chapters.
The first story is about science and technology. They have existed in Chinese
culture for thousands of years. The ancestors of the Chinese people deeply respected
science and technology, which for them were mysterious powers that were difficult to
control, figuring the people who mastered scientific and technological skills as gods and
goddesses. Over time, Confucianism gradually replaced myth as the ideological
foundation of Chinese culture. As a philosophy that strongly emphasizes people’s
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subordination to the government and education but humanities education exclusively,
critical thinking as well as STEM education were profoundly underscored. However, this
doesn’t mean that Confucianism had only negative impacts on science and technology. In
fact, due to its two emphases, Confucianism contributes significantly to the STEM fields
in contemporary China, as the Chinese government promotes STEM. Besides
Confucianism, Daoism, as the most traditional Chinese religion, also impacts science and
technology in Chinese culture. In order to survive in the society to attract followers,
Daoism shifted from a philosophy that promotes the idea that people should not pursue
scientific and technological knowledge, which would not be beneficial, to a religion that
focuses on exploring scientific and technological world to find out ways to live healthily
and remain immortal. Due to this shift, Daoism has made significant contributions to
STEM, especially medical science.
In the 18th century, with invasions from Western countries equipped with
advanced weapons, two socio-cultural and political movements, the Westernization
Movement and the New Culture Movement, emerged, arguing that science and
technology should be highly prioritized. Since then, Chinese society has increasingly
emphasized science and technology. In the era of reforms, with the Chinese government’s
promotion of science and technology and strong support of STEM projects and
education, science and technology are venerated as being nearly omnipotent, able to solve
almost all social, economic, cultural, and political problems. An increasing number of
Chinese people believe that through using advanced scientific and technological artifacts,
they can better their living situations, and the Chinese government believes that science
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and technology are crucial to achieve almost any political purpose. At the risk of
oversimplification, contemporary Chinese culture strongly celebrates science and
technology.
My first story is about science and technology, and my second one is about
Chinese women. Chinese myth promotes the image of a good woman: she should have
babies and be willing to sacrifice herself for her babies. Moreover, she should be a caring
beauty who is subordinate to her parents and her husband. The Chinese language
reinforces the idea that as a woman, your reproductive function is most crucial.
Confucianism states that women are restricted to the domestic sphere and should not
receive much education or find jobs since their destinies are pre-arranged as marrying
men chosen by their parents and sacrificing themselves for their husbands, their babies
(especially baby boys), and their parents-in-law. Daoism, at the same time, argues that
unmarried women unbalance society and nature. Besides these social and cultural
pressures, the Chinese government also supports the idea that women should get married
and have babies, expecting that women will “tame” unmarried men, who are viewed as
potential social disruptors, and will give birth to future laborers who are important for
Chinese economic development. Accordingly, the Chinese government has conducted
many political practices to persuade, compel, and discipline women to become wives and
mothers. The social, cultural, and political expectation for women to get married and
have babies is strong to this day. As a result, similarly to Chinese people’s emphasis on
food, which results in them greeting each other with “Have you eaten?” it is common that
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Chinese women will be asked about their marital and reproductive status when they meet
new people.
While Chinese women are expected to become wives and mothers, they are also
expected to become professionals in the era of reforms. The discourse of The New
Woman promotes the image of an independent and well-educated Chinese woman.
Facing the political and economic needs to include women into the workplace, the
Chinese government has implemented several policies to promote women’s education
and encourage them to find jobs. The traditional roles and the new role often conflict,
requiring women to navigate tensions. For example, many Chinese women prefer to
become teachers because these positions are more stable and usually have longer
holidays, so they can have more time to take care of their families. The discourse of the
super mother, which argues that women have the ability to have good careers and at the
same time to become good mothers single-handedly, has become popular. This discourse
basically argues that if women fail to balance their families and careers without
complaint, they are not capable enough.
My third story puts my first story about science and technology and my second
story about Chinese women’s roles together. In the context of the veneration of science
and technology in contemporary Chinese culture and women’s expected roles as wives,
mothers, and professionals, science and technology have significantly impacted women’s
lived experiences, especially by promoting marriages and families, population control
and family design, and the discourse of the super mother; while also helping some gain
independence and fight against sexual violence.

212

Through focusing on several technological artifacts, these implications were
revealed. For example, through inserting the function “Apply for Marriage Certificate”
into the popular app Alipay, the Chinese government aims to encourage more Chinese
people to get married. The government also prohibits single women to receive the
treatment of egg freezing, hoping through limiting single women’s access to have
biological babies they will get married and have “normal” families. Moreover, many
dating websites in China promote their products by reinforcing the social, cultural, and
political pressure for single women to get married.
For the aspect of population control and family design, the Chinese government
has disciplined and even compelled women to undergo abortion, sterilization, and IUD
insertion to ensure the implementation of China’s family-planning policies, which restrict
the number of babies a family is allowed to have. Additionally, due to the Chinese long
tradition of emphasizing women being mothers and gender selection, many Chinese
women have been trapped by IVF, which makes their infertility “treatable” and gender
selection “easy and accurate.”
Breast pumps, as well as children’s medicines, are promoted by taking advantage
of the discourse of the super mother, which reinforces the traditional gender roles in a
family as only mothers should be children’s caretakers. For instance, breast pumps, often
advertised as making professional women in the period of lactation worry-free, represent
these women’s struggles as something that can be easily solved by science and
technology, but it is not this simple. Companies that manufacture children’s medicine
often promote their products by emphasizing how their products can enable women to
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provide professional care for their children efficiently. Thus women can not only be
professional in their careers but also in their families. However, there lacks an emphasis
on fathers’ roles in child rearing, which reinforces the tensions that many women have
experienced between their careers and familial responsibilities.
The development of science and technology also enables some women to gain
independence through offering them job opportunities, even though sexism in the
workplace has seriously impacted their professional development. For example, an
increasing number of Chinese women become scientists and engineers, and with the
industrialization of China many rural women who receive little education are able to
leave their hometowns and to work as migrant workers in cities. Moreover, internet and
social media, though they are under the strict censorship of the Chinese government, still
provide Chinese women a crucial site to engage in social activism to fight against sexual
violence in their families and workplaces.
This dissertation narrates cultural stories of science and technology and Chinese
women in the era of reforms. It reveals that in this era, some traditional forces continue to
have profound impacts, but new forces have emerged; some old articulations are being
dis-articulated while new articulations are beginning to take effect. As a result of this
process of maintenance and change, science and technology are elevated to supreme
status and influence contemporary Chinese culture in significant ways. Various forces
and articulations, which have created alignments, tensions, and conflicts, have also
affected Chinese women’s lived experiences, resulting in the perpetuation of some of
their traditional roles and responsibilities as well as the introduction of new ones. My

214

cultural stories explore the impacts of science and technology for Chinese women’s lived
experiences in the era of reforms: not only their powerless positions, reinforced by
science and technology and resistant to change, but also their resilience against sexism
and their efforts to better their living situations through strategic use of science and
technology.

Theoretical and Practical Significance
This dissertation contributes to the field of cultural studies mainly through
discussing the gendered implications of science and technology, which have been
explored by many Western cultural theorists but rarely by Chinese scholars. This
discussion is important since as discussed in Chapter Two in the recent decades science
and technology have developed rapidly in China. Moreover, unlike the Western context
in which there are many voices arguing that the impacts of science and technology are
not good overall, the main discourse in China applauds the general goodness of science
and technology. This one-sided discussion can be harmful. As a cultural researcher, I
hope this dissertation, which maps some implications of science and technology for
contemporary Chinese women, will invite other Chinese cultural theorists to engage not
by asking whether science and technology are beneficial or harmful, but exploring how
science and technology affect people’s lived experiences and rethinking the roles and
impacts of science and technology in contemporary Chinese culture.
My analysis reveals that in contemporary Chinese society, science and technology
articulate with many elements, especially the Chinese government’s policies and
traditional Chinese culture. These two articulations have exerted significant impacts on
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Chinese women’s lives, such as disciplining them to conform to sexist cultural and
political expectations. Thus, researchers who aim to understand the gendered influences
of science and technology in China should pay special attention to the elements of
Chinese politics and Confucianism, realizing that science and technology are most
tenaciously articulated with these two elements. In summary, instead of asking whether
science and technology influence Chinese women positively or negatively; researchers
should first attend to the Chinese government’s political practices, since in Chinese
society, the government’s attitude fundamentally shapes women’s access to and use of
science and technology. Then, researchers should turn to traditional Chinese culture to
explore how traditional cultural ideas, which play crucial roles in Chinese society, have
become articulated with science and technology in ways that impact women. After that,
researchers can examine other elements, such as class and economic background, to study
the various impacts of science and technology for different women.
Besides the theoretical significance of this dissertation to the field of cultural
studies, this dissertation also contributes to the field of women’s studies in China.
Women’s studies, which is often known as fu nv yan jiu/妇女研究, emerged in the era of
reforms. Du (2005) records the history of the development of women’s studies:
[The field of women’s studies] arose out of the “Open & Reform Policy” in China
in 1980s…. In 1982, Social Science Abroad…first mentioned women’s studies….
At present, women’s studies in mainland China is still in the early stage of
development. (p. 40)
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As described by Du, this field is still young, thus it needs researchers to bring different
perspectives to facilitate its continued development. This dissertation is my effort to
engage in the scholarship in women’s studies through addressing several primary
commitments of this field. Based on Chow, Zhang, and Wang (2004), the field of
women’s studies in China has the following commitments:
(1) a commitment to make feminism and gender the theoretical and the principal
analytical concepts of women's studies; (2) an engagement [with] scholarship
from outside China through a series of reading/discussion[s] [to] evaluate the
relevance of this scholarship to the Chinese context; (3) [education] and faculty
development by combining scholarship with teaching inside and outside China for
theory building, curriculum development, [and] pedagogy; and (4)
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches targeting [the following]
disciplines: history, sociology, and education. (p.167)
My dissertation brings in the method of “articulation” from the field of cultural studies; a
field that was born and has been mainly developed in the West, to explore how gender
matters in the era of reforms. My dissertation shows that this field provides a useful
analytical framework that can be used to analyze culture in other contexts. Thus, cultural
studies can be fruitfully incorporated into the field of women’s studies. Moreover, by
focusing on the issue of science and technology, this dissertation enriches women’s
studies by adding an important analytical perspective, which is crucial in contemporary
China, which elevates science and technology above many else. However, in China there
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is a lack of researchers in women’s studies to investigate the gendered impacts of science
and technology. I hope to encourage more to join the field.
In the global context, an increasing number of scholars (e.g. Lykke 2002;
Haraway 2003; McNeil 2007) have noticed that the intersection of feminist studies,
science and technology studies, and cultural studies is worthy of research and have
proceeded to explore it. Thus, this dissertation, which forms the early scholarship in the
Chinese context, contributes to women’s studies by laying groundwork that scholars from
women’s studies can further develop.
Besides this theoretical significance, this dissertation makes two major practical
advancements. First, through exploring women’s lived experiences in contemporary
China, this dissertation sheds light on the trajectory of Chinese women’s empowerment
and specifically their fight against sexism. This dissertation reveals that in contemporary
Chinese society, gender is articulated with other issues such as the Chinese government’s
political practices and traditional Chinese culture to influence gender asymmetrically.
Thus, in order to better women’s living situations, the Chinese government should
carefully consider the gendered influences of its policies before implementing them.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, due to the deeply-rooted idea that Chinese
people should be subordinate to the government, the Chinese government’s role in
counteracting sexism is crucial. Thus, the Chinese government should recruit more
feminist politicians, not in decorative positions, but in positions that can enable women to
voice their requests.
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Apart from the government, Chinese people, especially people who work for the
mass media industry, should promote ideas that support gender equality to supplant old,
sexist ideas. For example, TV series that depict real independent women who are
successful without relying on their fathers or partners should replace the current popular
TV series that often depict how women become successful only after attracting rich,
loyal, and sophisticated men to help them. Moreover, some successful TV series from
foreign countries that focus on career women who solve problems independently should
be imported into China to replace the current popular Korean TV series that often
celebrate love between poor young women and successful middle-age men. Promoting
the image of independent women in popular culture is important for changing the
traditional Chinese idea of women as being subordinate.
This dissertation also reveals that some Chinese women have used effective
strategies to fight against sexism. For instance, they have used feminist theories to argue
that sexism is not legitimate; and used science and technologies to form solidarities,
engage in activism, and open options for themselves. Thus, Chinese women should
remain receptive to feminist ideas. Moreover, the women who can have closer
interactions with feminist ideas and theories, such as scholars in women’s studies, should
work on interpreting these ideas to make them more accessible and should promote these
ideas to other women. If more Chinese women can participate in social movements to
voice their requests for gender equality, this collective power would not be easily ignored
and could promote change over time.

219

Second, through analyzing the status of science and technology and mapping the
living situations of Chinese women in the era of reforms, this dissertation presents my
understanding of contemporary Chinese culture, the reform and opening-up policy, and
Chinese women, which can help other Chinese people as well as foreigners to understand
contemporary China from a cultural studies perspective. With the rapid rise of China as
an influential global power, many people have become curious about the reasons for
China’s accelerated development and the trajectory of China’s future. This dissertation
suggests that science and technology play important roles in terms of propelling China to
become prosperous. Because of this, it is very likely that the Chinese government will
continue to promote science and technology, hoping that they can further facilitate
China’s development. Accordingly, the Chinese government will most likely further
strengthen its practices of encouraging Chinese people to receive higher education in
STEM, investing a large sum of money in Chinese people’s education and STEM fields,
bringing in foreign experts in STEM, and cooperating with other countries on STEM
projects.
This dissertation also reveals that despite China’s rapid developments in the past
decades, sexist ideas still remain tenacious in Chinese society and even more so in the era
of reforms. In Mao’s era, promoting gender equality was a key focus of the Chinese
government, resulting in the political propaganda of iron women and the abolishment of
arranged marriage. However, in the era of reforms, since the Chinese government
primarily concentrates on developing the economy and evaluates the country’s
performance and Chinese people’s living situations mainly through numbers, many
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humanistic aspects are trivialized. Accordingly, although the government still claims that
men and women are equal, they have not implemented as many significant political
practices as Mao’s government did to empower Chinese women. The lack of government
attention to the issue of sexism will affect Chinese women in increasingly detrimental
ways, resulting in more unfair treatment of women in their workplaces and in their
marital and familial lives. I believe that besides developing the economy, the Chinese
government needs to put more effort into the humanistic aspects of the Chinese society,
such as fighting against sexism. Although economic performance is crucial for a country,
what enables people to live happily also includes the government’s efforts to make the
country a fairer and more just place where people, regardless of their gender, can gain
more access to self-fulfillment and live their best lives.

Limitations and Further Directions
This dissertation can be expanded by incorporating a more detailed discussion
concerning the differences between the lived experiences of rural women and urban
women. Although Chapter Four, which argues in one section that science and technology
have provided working opportunities for women, points out that an increasing number of
rural Chinese women have left their hometowns to do menial labor in cities, Chapter
Three, which focuses on women’s lived experiences, as well as other sections in Chapter
Four, could benefit from more discussion concerning the unique experiences of urban and
rural women.
This discussion is crucial when researchers want to study Chinese culture because
the differences between rural and urban women’s living situations are striking. For
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example, according to the International Labour Organization, Chinese women are “more
likely to be in agriculture than men,” which “signals a greater sticky floor for women
impeding their mobility” (Dasgupta, Matsumoto, & Xia, 2015, p.10). This means that
compared with urban women who have more freedom and access to earn livings through
their intelligence, many rural women are still limited to their households and to
agricultural work. Moreover, unlike many urban women who are able to receive college
and even graduate education, a large number of rural women can only receive middleschool or at most high-school educations after which they are expected to work as lowskilled migrant workers or to get married and have babies. Accordingly, the impacts of
science and technology can vary profoundly for rural and urban women. I should pay
more attention to the aspect of geographical difference, which would make my analysis
of women’s lived experiences in the era of reforms more careful, detailed, and persuasive.
Because of this limitation of my dissertation, I plan to conduct more work to
explore rural women’s lived experiences in my future research. More specifically, I want
to focus on the group of left-behind women, who are also known as Niu Shou Fu Nv/留
守妇女, to explore how science and technology have impacted them.
Left-behind women are rural Chinese women whose husbands are away from
their hometowns as migrant workers. These women are left behind to take care of their
aged parents and parents-in-law, raise their young children, and do agricultural work.
Even before the era of reforms, some women were left behind by their husbands who
worked away from their hometowns. But in the era of reforms, left-behind wives have
become a pronounced social phenomenon as the government’s relaxed control over
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population mobility, the building of many foreign factories in China, and the
development of transportation science and technology have made it easier for working
men to travel. According to Zhang and Zhang (2006), the number of left-behind women
had reached 47 million in 2006 (p.15). Moreover, many researchers (e.g. Chen, Qin, and
Zhu 2005) have reported that these women often suffer from heavy workloads,
psychological stress, and no safety. To understand the implications of science and
technology for rural women, it is important to explore how science and technology
influence left-behind women by mapping the ways that these women are using them and
the differences they have created in their lives. I believe a comparison and contrast study
of the implications of science and technology for leftover women, who as I discussed in
Chapter Three, are single, professional, urban women and for left-behind women who are
married, poorly-educated, rural women will not only help to map a more comprehensive
landscape of the living situations of Chinese women in the era of reforms, but will also
generate some inspiring new understandings of how science and technology are
articulated with genders, classes, educational backgrounds, and economic situations to
impact these women in diverse ways.
Moreover, I believe my dissertation could be strongly enhanced by including
additional first-hand data collected through further fieldwork, such as observing some
Chinese women’s daily lives as well as conducting interviews and surveys with them,
which is also my future research direction. I plan to interview 30 Chinese women who
have used the internet, dating websites, IVF, egg freezing, and/or breast pumps. My
interviews will be organized based on the following five questions: what motivates you to
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use these technologies? What is your experience of using them? Based on your
experience, how do you think science and technology are influencing women? What is
your understanding of women’s constraints in contemporary Chinese society? Do you
think science and technology help you to overcome these constraints? I want to combine
Chinese women’s narratives of using science and technology with the interpretations of
the implications of science and technology for them that I have made in this dissertation,
which were developed mainly based on my analysis cultural artifacts such as songs,
films, and TV series.
Last but not least, I am also considering studying the implications of science and
technology for men as my follow-up project of this dissertation, in which I map the
gendered the implications of science and technology for women exclusively. As with
women, Chinese men are also strongly influenced by science and technology. For
example, the increasing number of Chinese male homebodies/Zhai Nan/宅男—the group
of men formed in part by the availability of the internet who usually have jobs or are
supported financially by their parents, prefer to spend their money and time on
videogames, and are fascinated with fictional women in these games and in comic books,
but have no interest in marrying real women or having children—reveals that science and
technology have also influenced Chinese men’s lived experiences in significant ways.
Thus, it will be interesting to explore how science and technology impact Chinese men
and women differently. I believe this exploration will enable me to better understand the
gendered influences of science and technology.
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In general, this dissertation explores the implications of science and technology
for Chinese women. In doing so, this dissertation sheds light on contemporary Chinese
culture. Through laying out a groundwork, this dissertation invites more research that can
contribute to gender studies, cultural studies, and science and technology studies in the
context of contemporary China.
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copyright of this image.
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author owns the copyright of this image.
Figure 3.4 Stamp Of The Year Pig (2019). This photo was taken by the author. The
author owns the copyright of this image.
Figure 3.5 A Poster Of An Iron Girl. This poster is from a publiclyavailable online source.
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image is from a publiclyavailable online source. Appendix IV containsthe fair use

273

evaluation document to demonstrate the author’s fair use of this image. Citation and
attribution information is available in its caption.

274

